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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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30 MARCH 1990

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### ACC Head on Next Steps, Unified Currency, Realism

90OA0388B Cairo MAYU in Arabic 26 Feb 90 p 11

[Interview With Dr. Hilmi Nimr, ACC Secretary General, by Husayn Ghaytah; "ACC Secretary General to MAYU: Joint Investment Projects for Integration of Production; Establishing Bank for ACC States"; first three paragraphs are MAYU introduction; date and place not given"]

[Text] In a brief interview, ACC [Arab Cooperation Council] Secretary General Dr. Hilmi Nimr answered MAYU's questions on how the ACC will deal with Arab and foreign financing funds, on the extent of these funds' contribution to the crystallization of the projects to be set up, and on how important it is to focus in the next phase on joint or investment projects that seek to increase production.

Dr. Nimr has asserted that the cooperation will not be confined to trade exchange between the ACC's four member states and the other sisterly Arab countries. There is agreement between the four leaders on the need to draw up a map of economic integration serving the interest of the peoples of the ACC member states and of all the Arab peoples generally in order to counter the international economic blocs.

The ACC secretary general said: Iraq held the ACC and Ministerial Committee chairmanship in the first year. Consequently, all the ACC and ministerial committees' meetings were held in the capital of Iraq (Baghdad). With the onset of this year, sister Jordan takes over leadership of the action and chairmanship of the ACC.

### Immense Accomplishment

Regarding the old and new agreements concluded by the four leaders and their implementation schedules, Dr. Hilmi Nimr said: It is well known that leaders Mubarak, Saddam, Husayn, and Salih have already signed 16 agreements and will sign 11 more today. Thus, in one year since its foundation, the ACC has produced 27 agreements. This is an immense accomplishment for one year.

There is an agreement which has established the principles of action in all the fields and which takes the circumstances of each ACC member state into consideration. Agreements are not accomplishments—not in the sense of accomplishment to which citizens here in Cairo, in Baghdad, in Amman, or in San'a' aspire—toward realization of the desired integration. But the agreements are certainly the product of serious efforts by leaders of the ACC's four member states to determine the general framework of common thinking regarding the areas of cooperation. This framework is needed to implement the articles of each agreement. Moreover, one agreement

may give rise to several agreements which could be implementable in the long run.

### Ideas and Principles

The ACC secretary general asserts that agreement on the general ideas constituted the first phase. The second phase consists of the transformation of the ideas into implementable general principles. This is the task of the ACC ministers concerned and of the ACC General Secretariat. Lately, the General Secretariat signed memoranda of understanding with the Agricultural Development Organization. We are about to conclude similar agreements with the Agricultural Development Organization and with the Arab Development Fund.

### Increased Production

ACC Secretary General Dr. Hilmi Nimr added: The ACC has two options to achieve integration.

The first is trade exchange through the abolition of administrative and customs shackles impeding the flow of goods between the Arab countries. This option requires a number of steps embodied in reducing customs fees and abolishing these fees in the long run, in abolishing the subsidy for goods in stages so that the ACC citizens may not have to endure a sudden rise in prices all at once, and in solving the monetary system problem.

This option is difficult to implement in the initial phase of the ACC's life because the ACC states are facing an economic problem. Consequently, it is difficult to start with trade integration.

The second option is to exert efforts to increase production through production or investment integration and, more significantly, to establish joint projects between the four states and utilize the manpower and the raw materials available in the four states and the experts needed for these projects so that every project implemented may enjoy a relative advantage.

There is no doubt that production integration can assume two forms. But before these forms are assumed, a solution has to be found for our economic problems which are pointed out in the first option. Moreover, efforts have to be made to eliminate the deficit in the member states' general budgets and to secure the foreign currency needed for every project.

There is no harm in employing the system of bilateral deals, equal deals, or mutual deals, and in liberating some goods from restrictions, especially goods whose importation is prohibited.

### Arab Market

[MAYU] I asked Dr. Nimr about the presence of three councils in the Arab arena and about whether the time permits the establishment of a common Arab market to counter the international economic blocs?



[Nimr] The Arab market is a final objective and an ambitious hope of the ACC, because an Arab market means the achievement of absolutely free trade without any quantitative or administrative restrictions and without any customs fees. We hope that this objective will be achieved in the long run.

I believe that the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] has the opportunity to take a step toward this market in the short run because every [other] council operates under the umbrella of its charter and its specific principles, and because every bloc represents ambitions that extend from the Arab East to the Arab Maghreb—ambitions to set up a common Arab market to counter the economic blocs, especially when unified Europe comes into existence in 1992. We hope that the dream will be transformed into a tangible reality which reaffirms the Arab nation's entity.

#### **We Reject Subservience**

[MAYU] Will reliance on the dollar continue to exist in all transactions? Isn't there a plan to issue a unified currency for the ACC member states?

[Nimr] The drawbacks of relying on the dollar are the same as the drawbacks of relying on the ruble and the yen. Reliance on a single currency means subservience and this, definitely, is undesirable.

This is why we resort to cooperation with the Arab funds to finance the projects. This is something that is probable, that is permissible, and that is possible to achieve with conditions that suit the integration and that do not violate these funds' constitutions.

We have more than one alternative to solve the currency system problem, especially since it is impossible to have a single currency in the initial integration phases. Such a currency will not solve the currency system problem but will rather create numerous problems. This is why we are currently considering the creation of a unified ACC bank to solve the currency system problem, especially where joint projects or investment projects are concerned.

[MAYU] What about the political aspect facing the ACC leaders?

[Nimr] Under the umbrella of the developments in the international and regional arenas, there are a large number of issues. Leading among them are the efforts and endeavors being made by President Saddam Husayn to break the deadlock in the peace process, the efforts being made to solve the Palestinian issue and to establish a just peace, the worsening conditions in Lebanon, and the efforts to bolster the new leadership in Lebanon in order that it may be able to achieve the stability that has been missing in Lebanon for the past eight years.

#### **Al-Qadhdhafi Discusses Chad, Opposition With Mubarak**

45000112 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5 Mar 90 p 7

[Text] Libyan sources have confirmed that the visit of Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi to Egypt was about two main topics—a request for Egypt to resolve the Libyan opposition situation, and mediation with Chad to close the Libyan opposition radio station and to release the Libyan prisoners-of-war who have not joined the Libyan opposition groups.

#### **Haykal Proposes International Oversight for Immigration**

90OA0356A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 27 Feb 90 p 8

[Article by Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal: "Observations on Issue of Soviet Jewish Immigration; Some Facts, Some Details, Some Proposals"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] If we move a step forward to familiarize ourselves with the issue, we find that less than one-third of the Jews—i.e., the Jews who live in Israel—believe that their growth, prosperity, and security can be achieved only if their numbers increase to form a real state with a future. [passage omitted]

The dream of a large-scale Jewish immigration that joins the Jews in Israel has become the true guarantee of life and of the future.

But this dream's paths to life and to the future are not open. This is because the U.S. Jews will not immigrate to Israel, nor will West Europe's Jews or the majority of South Africa's or Latin America's Jews. All these are established where they are and each of them has created his Jewish paradise where he is. Moreover, some of them are fusing, and want to fuse, in the environment in which they live, even though they continue to harbor a large store of sympathy, even if only by guilt, for their coreligionists who have marched to the Zionist paradise and have stormed its gates. Those most remorseful are the U.S. Jews because they constitute the biggest and wealthiest part of the world Jewry, especially since they have created for themselves in the United States strongholds of influence and have found reasons for harmony between themselves and the U.S. policy!

After all this, the conclusion is that Israel pins its hopes almost exclusively on about 2.3 million of the world's Jews, namely the Soviet Jews, for increased immigration to Israel. The Soviet Jews' roots are not deep in the Soviet Union for historical reasons and there life there is not prosperous for realistic reasons.

Thus, Israel and all those who sympathize with it, be they Jewish or non-Jewish, have attached their hope and their interest to the Soviet Jews as the readily available and prepared reserve, or the reserve that could be prepared and ready, for the adventure of the Zionist paradise.

### But Obstacles Obstruct Path

1. The Soviet Union has put restrictions on emigration from the country within the context of a logic on which the Soviet Government has established its laws for a long time.

2. Jews wishing to emigrate from the Soviet Union want to immigrate to the United States where, in their mind, milk and honey flow.

3. They do not wish to break away from history's siege in the Soviet Union to find themselves in geography's siege in Israel.

4. Moreover, the news they get about life in Israel is not encouraging. In Israel, perils that they do not want and living standards that are not much better than their current standards await them.

However, those who have attached their hope and interest to the Soviet Jews have begun to pressure with all the means to pull down the Soviet walls or to open gaps in these walls for immigration. [passage omitted]

### And Jewish Immigration Rates Began To Grow

When all the doors were opened last year, 1989, a total of 70,000 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union, of whom only 9,000 immigrated to Israel. As for the others, some headed for the United States and some chose Europe. When Israel realized this attrition, which left it with but few immigrants, it moved promptly and tried to block the open outlets so that it may leave immigrants from the Soviet Union with just one outlet that leads them to Israel. [passage omitted]

When persuasion with propaganda failed, despite all the pretexts of religion and of nationalism, Israel resorted to another method, namely coercion. Both houses of the U.S. Congress promptly issued a special law that restricts Jewish immigration to the United States. This was an amazing act on the part of the country that has given itself the right to launch a crusade in the name of human rights, especially the right of immigration, particularly for Jews from the Soviet Union specifically!

What this startling situation has produced is more startling scenes, even from the human rights angle. Large numbers of Jews have thronged into numerous gathering centers in Western Europe. They refuse to go to Israel at any price and they will wait, even if for life, for a visa to go to the United States.

The British television, for example, has produced an excellent documentary film on a gathering center in a suburb of Rome, Italy, where 12,000 Soviet Jewish immigrants have barricaded themselves, refusing to go to Israel. Meanwhile, the United States refuses to let them in.

Some scenes in the documentary film are sad and desperate segments of human suffering, and this suffering continues to this moment! [passage omitted]

So, the crux of the matter to this hour is, to put it simply, that we cannot deal with the issue without examining and without determining the facts, the positions, or the responsibilities.

To put it more explicitly, in adapting our positions, we cannot rely on what is carried to us by the Western media, especially the Western news agencies that have now become the number-one maestro controlling our moves and our dispositions!

I say that there isn't a single Arab government that has at its disposal confirmed and documented data on this issue—data on which a government can build a position and chart a policy!

Regardless of what we know or don't know about the issue, what can we demand logically and reasonably in this regard and what is it that can achieve justice here?

Can we ask the Soviet Union to reimpose restrictions on immigration?

This is impossible. The Soviet Union has opened the door of immigration to those wishing to immigrate within the framework of a new general policy which, like an earthquake, is shaking the Soviet Union violently from one end to the other.

Can we ask the Soviet Union to prohibit the immigration of Jews to Israel, in particular?

This is also nearly impossible. The proof is that the Arab world itself has not been able to accomplish this. This proof is again offered by the figures of the Israeli Central Statistics Agency (published in 1988). These figures include a full page on the origins of the Jews now living in Israel. This page carries the subtitle: "Jewish Roots of Israel's Citizens." [passage omitted]

The gist of it is that we simply cannot ask others to do what we ourselves have not been able to do. This is actually tantamount to an impossible condition that is beyond the control of both the request maker and the request recipient.

There remains the question: So what then and what is it that we can do? It is my opinion, and not all opinions are evil, that the Soviet Jewish immigration is a part of the issue, not the entire issue. [passage omitted]

It is not right that our vital concerns should blow all at once like storms and then subside all at once. It is not right that they should impose themselves on attention one day and go to the realm of the forgotten the next day because another storm has developed, has chased away the first storm, and has gained control over us!

We are not entitled to blame the blameless because the absolute generalization of blame is evidence of lack of courage in the confrontation—a lack that leads those who do not merit the blame and those who deserve it to disdain the blame and disdain those who voice it—both in form and content!

The conclusion is that we cannot equate in our positions a party that takes our feelings and interests into consideration, even if only by abstention, and a party that tramples these feelings and interests without any concern!

(Perhaps we should remember that the cold war has ended but that international contradictions are, by the nature of things, continuing. A new type of conflict, even of camps, is developing now. It is important that everybody in this world know that the Arabs do possess an influential weight—and there can be no influential weight for a party that does not form its independent opinion and declare it to everybody with a degree of forwardness and firmness!)

As for options and alternatives, we may be able to request that emigration from the Soviet Union be put under the supervision of the UN General Commission for Refugee Affairs or under any other international supervision. Our request should be made within the context of a serious campaign of human rights, the simplest of which is not to force a human being to immigrate to a place to which he does not wish to go. By the criteria of what actually developed in 1989, it is likely that less than 10 percent of the Jews wishing to leave the Soviet Union will choose Israel as a refuge, and not necessarily as a place to settle!

We certainly cannot accept general statements that condemn the settlement of Soviet Jews in the West Bank and Gaza—and such general statements have already been made in Moscow and Washington—because they do not actually mean anything, unless we can establish in the West Bank and Gaza some sort of international supervision that performs the task of following up on these general statements in the occupied territories. This type of international supervision may perhaps alleviate the suffering of those Arabs, and also Jews, who have been thrown by fate under Israel's control. Pictures have come out of the West Bank showing demonstrations staged by Soviet Jewish families that had arrived in Israel and had been given homes and lands only to discover that they were in the midst of the intifadah [uprising]. With their demonstration, these Jews are proclaiming their wrath at the deception to which they were subjected on the one hand and, on the other hand, to their being placed on the front line!

From start to end, the issue continues to be the issue of the independent Palestinian state. Without the establishment of this state, every day is a problem, every hour is a crisis, and every tomorrow is a surprise, a storm and, perhaps, a fiery tempest!

### **Sources of Water, Threat of Shortage Reported**

90OL0263A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT  
in Arabic 18 Feb 90 p 12

[Dispatch from Damascus by Walid Nijm: "Arab Water Security Threatened by Rising Demand and Depleting Resources; Arab Water Resources and the Creeping Thirst"]

[Text] Water in fair volume is currently available to the Arab nation but the issue of water and water security will soon be of major concern to countries of the region because of the geographic allocation of water resources, growing demand, and shrinking usable resources.

At the core of the problem is the rising imbalance between demand and available water resources. The rational development and exploitation of Arab water resources is furthermore impeded by geographic, climatic, human, political, and economic factors, among others.

Arab apprehension over water security has been intensified by recent regional developments such as Turkey's move to shut off the flow of the Euphrates that originates in its territory, having previously shut off the River Quwayq that runs through Aleppo, the second-largest city in Syria. Ethiopia, meanwhile, raises the River Nile issue as Israel pursues strategies to usurp "neighboring" water resources.

Have the water wars, or their opening rounds, actually begun? What impact will water confrontations have on Arab development and on the lives of Arab citizens?

Following are the highlights of a comprehensive study of this issue by the Arab Center for Arid Region Studies.

The water situation in the Arab world cannot be isolated from the conditions in the region surrounding it. The [Arab] world occupies an important area of Africa, where vast deserts spread from the Atlantic to the Red Sea shores and include the Sahara Desert, the Libyan Desert, the Western Desert, and the Nubian Desert.

Major deserts in Asia are al-Rub'-al-Khali and al-Nafud. Mountain ranges frequently delineate the Arab nation's deserts and plateaus and sit parallel to the coasts of the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea. They include the mountain ranges of the African-Arab rift valley to the east; the eastern and western Lebanon mountain ranges whose crest is 3,083 meters high; and the Hijaz and 'Asir mountain ranges where the highest summit reaches up to 3,750 meters. They are matched on the western coast by a range extending along Egypt and the Sudan with a crest of 2,200 meters; the Amman mountains that peak at 3,101 meters; the Zaghrus mountains in Iraq where the summit is 2,148 meters high, and the Aures and Atlas mountain ranges that peak at 4,165 meters.

A dry desert climate dominates most countries of the Arab nation where mean temperatures range from 10 degrees centigrade to 30 degrees centigrade in the wintertime and from 30 degree centigrade to 50 degrees centigrade in the summer.

Rainfall is densest at the feet of coastal mountains where it exceeds 1,000 millimeters annually but drops to less than 25 millimeters per year on desert peripheries.

An indication of the worsening desertification problem in the Arab nation is that areas threatened with desertification are now estimated at 20.18 percent of aggregate Arab arable land that in turn account for no more than 13 percent of the total area of the Arab nation.

#### **World Water Resources and the Share of the Arab World**

Total world water reserves are estimated at about 1,368 million cubic kilometers of which fresh water accounts for no more than 24 million cubic kilometers. Salt water, in other words, accounts for 97.5 percent of world water reserves. The volume of fresh water on earth is extremely high yet 69 percent of it is permanently frozen as polar ice cover and cannot be exploited. Subterranean water accounts for 30 percent while rivers and fresh-water lakes account for only 0.2 percent of world water reserves.

The Arab nation's share of renewable water resources is estimated at some 337.5 cubic kilometers or 0.71 percent (less than one percent) of world water reserves even though it occupies a huge 14 million square kilometers, or 9.4 percent of total world area.

The individual Arab's share of those water reserves is estimated at about 1,745 cubic meters annually compared to a worldwide median of 12,900 cubic meters annually and an Asian annual median of 6,700 cubic meters. These averages vary from one country to another.

The above figures and averages clearly highlight the water shortage in the Arab World—a threat that will undoubtedly intensify in the future.

#### **Surface Water Resources in the Arab Nation**

It should be pointed out that the Arab nation is generally poor in large perpetual water networks. Exceptions are the River Nile in the heart of the African continent and the Euphrates and Tigris rivers whose annual flow is estimated at about 1 billion cubic meters.

The explanation for this exception to the rule is that both water systems, the Nile and the Euphrates-Tigris, have their sources outside the Arab nation in regions with rainfall as heavy as 1,400 millimeters at the head of the Nile. The existence of two lakes helps regulate river flow throughout the year. Rainfall at the Euphrates and Tigris sources exceeds 1,000 millimeters and is supplemented by snow that falls almost continually.

#### **The Nile and the Euphrates and Tigris in More Detail**

##### **The Nile River:**

The White Nile, one of the river's two branches, has its head at Lake Victoria, which occupies an area of 67,000 square kilometers situated in the heart of Africa at an elevation of 1,130 meters above sea level in the equatorial plateau outside the Sudanese border. Its annual

rainfall is in the range of 1,150 millimeters and is considered a natural reservoir that regulates river flow.

The second branch (The Blue Nile) emerges at Lake Tana, which has an area of 3,000 square kilometers in the Ethiopian plateau, also outside the Sudan. It has an elevation of 1,800 meters above sea level and receives a median annual rainfall of 1,400 millimeters.

The third main tributary is the 'Atbarah river, which also runs to the foot of the Ethiopian plateau.

The Nile penetrates the Sudan from south to north and continues its flow through Egypt into the Mediterranean.

The river has a main course of about 4,300 kilometers and crosses several climactic zones from equatorial, to Savanna [subtropical], to semidesert, to desert, and then to the Mediterranean.

The Nile's three tributaries have a combined annual flow of some 75 billion cubic meters at the Sudanese border.

##### **The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers:**

The two rivers spring from the Anatole plateau in southeastern Turkey from the eastern Taurus mountains and the Zaghrus mountains. They are moist humid regions where annual rainfall exceeds 1,000 millimeters. The Euphrates crosses Syria into Iraq. The Tigris enters Iraq at Syria's eastern border. Both rivers receive several small tributaries before they merge at Shatt-al-'Arab. The Euphrates is 2,330 kilometers long, the Tigris 1,718 kilometers.

The two rivers pass through rainy then dry regions that gradually turn into desert at their mouths. They have an estimated [combined] annual flow of about 64 billion cubic meters at their points of entry into Syria and Iraq.

##### **Permanent Rivers in the Arab Nation**

There are only 50 such rivers including the Nile, Euphrates, and Tigris tributaries. Most of them spring from mountains overlooking the Atlantic and Mediterranean and are generally shorter than 100 kilometers. Exceptions are Morocco's rivers, which spring from the upper and middle Atlas mountains. The longest, Dar'ah, runs for a maximum of 1,200 kilometers. Those rivers are fed by winter rains that exceed 1,000 millimeters annually, supplemented with melting mountaintop snow.

##### **Seasonal Valleys in the Arab Nations**

Hydrographic networks exist all over the Arab nation and vary in density and formation according to climate, type of soil, annual rainfall, and regional topographies.

Created in past geological ages, those networks are sometimes ancient. Examples are the desert valleys in the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Sahara desert, and the Arabian Peninsula.

Each of those networks is composed of hundreds of thousands of valleys where water runs intermittently for



limited periods of time ranging from a few hours to several days, or even months, depending on rainfall.

No information is available on the annual water capacities of those valleys, but their aggregate overflow is estimated to exceed dozens of billions of cubic meters.

#### Subterranean Water Resources in the Arab Nation

Main and secondary water strata throughout the Arab nation were documented over the past 40 years by widescale exploration based on geological, geophysical, and hydrogeological surveys and on the findings of exploratory wells often dug as deep as 4,500 meters.

Pre-Cambrian crystalline formations in the Arab nation are found in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Sudan, and Somalia. Volcanic rock of the third and fourth periods sprawls throughout the Levant and the Arabian peninsula. Continental sandstone dating back to the first period is in the eastern regions of the Arabian peninsula and along the borders of the Arab countries of North Africa. Continental sandstone of the second age is widespread in the Arab nation and especially in North Africa's desert belt. Carboniferous strata dating back to the second and third ages are found throughout the Levant and in the Arabian peninsula. Volcanic rocks dating back to the third and fourth ages are found throughout the Nile delta and in the valleys of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Juba.

Generally speaking, those formations bear subterranean waters and are spread in large areas throughout countries of the Arab nation.

Several of the water strata found in various parts of the Arab nation carry fresh or semifresh water with salinity below 1,000 milligrams [mg] per liter—tolerable in arid regions.

Fresh water in the Arab nation is essentially concentrated in the Mediterranean region. Water salinity does not exceed 500 mg per liter along its eastern shore in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. This also holds true in Arab Maghrib basins.

Salinity in that water is attributed to interaction with sea waters in coastal areas.

Similarly, water salinity in the Sahara desert does not exceed 500 mg per liter, especially in the eastern region.

Those two basins aside, most subterranean waters throughout the remaining regions have salinity exceeding 1,000 mg per liter. In the Euphrates-Tigris region, for instance, salinity ranges from 1000 to 6,000 mg per liter because of the multiplicity of evaporation layers.

In the Red Sea and Bahr-al-'Arab regions, salinity exceeds 1,200 mg per liter and can be as high as 10,000 mg per liter because of salt deposits in the soil, rapid evaporation, and sea action. Water in the Arabian peninsula is generally of

medium to high salinity except in the sandy strata where salinity is lower than 1,000 mg per liter.

#### Water Shortage in the Arab Nation

Most Arab water needs are ensured by exploiting subterranean water because of the scarcity of surface water, except in regions adjacent to the great rivers—the Nile, Euphrates, and Tigris—and the coastlines.

But these subterranean resources are themselves threatened by the mere fact of being exploited to meet the Arab nation's growing demand.

One must distinguish here between two types of water strata—those with renewable resources and those without. The former is found in the Mediterranean region where median annual rainfall between 400 and 600 millimeters helps feed the water strata and renews its resources yearly. River beds, valleys, and watersheds also feed strata in their vicinity.

Nonrenewable water strata are more prevalent and can be found in regions of the Sahara desert and the Arabian peninsula. They are slow to replenish despite vast reserves that vary in age from 1,500 to 3,000 years. Studies indicate that water in the strata at Um-al-Radmah formation in the Arabian peninsula is more than 25,000 years old!

Even though water in the Arab nation is currently available in adequate quantities, expected demand and available resources indicate that the problem has the makings of a future crisis and could even become a matter of life and death. Following is a water demand forecast for the period 1985-2030:

The Arabian peninsula will need 5.4 billion cubic meters of potable water by the year 2030. The Arab Maghrib will have a need for 11.4 billion cubic meters; the Arab Levant for 7.2 billion cubic meters; and Egypt and the Sudan for 11.1 billion cubic meters.

Arab industry is expected to grow during that period and its demand for water will grow from 1.3 billion cubic meters in 1985 to about 22.1 billion cubic meters in the year 2030.

Agriculture, on the other hand, is the perennial major water consumer. Farm demand for water will grow by 27 percent from 296.6 billion cubic meters in 1985 to about 377.6 billion cubic meters in the year 2030.

Those are indications that the entire Arab nation faces a worsening water shortage and that a balance will be maintained until the year 2000 when imbalances begin to occur between demand and aggregate available water resources.

**Rivers of the Arab Levant**

River	Length in Kilometers	Source
1. Tigris	1,718	Taurus mountains
2. al-Zab major	260	Zaghrus mountains
3. al-Zab minor	380	Qurat mountains
4. al-'Azim	210	Zaghrus mountains
5. Dayyali	440	Zaghrus mountains
6. al-Karkhah	780	Zaghrus mountains
7. al-Tayyib	80	Zaghrus mountains
8. Duwayraj	110	Armenian Plateau
9. Euphrates	2,330	Taurus mountains
10. al-Khabur	430	Taurus mountains
11. al-Sajur	108	Formed where the Euphrates and Tigris join
12. Shatt-al-'Arab	190	Formed where the Euphrates and Tigris join
13. Karun	400	Zaghrus
14. Burdi	79	Eastern Lebanon mountains
15. al-A'waj	91	al-Shaykh mountain
16. Quwayq	126	Taurus mountains
17. al-Sun	6	al-'Alawayin
18. Northern al-Kabir	80	al-Aqra' mountain
19. al-'Asi	571	al-Bika' valley
20. Southern al-Kabir	50	al-'Alawayin mountains
21. Astwan	40	Akrum mountain
22. al-Barid	35	al-Mukammal mountain
23. Abu-'Ali	40	al-Mukammal mountain
24. al-Jurah	33	al-Munbatri mountain
25. Ibrahim	42	al-Munbatri mountain
26. al-Kalb	25	Sunanyin mountain
27. Beirut	38	al-Kaniyyah mountain
28. al-Damur	35	al-Baruk mountain
29. al-Ulah	50	al-Baruk mountain
30. al-Zahrani	38	al-Rayhan
31. Abu-Aswad	23	al-Rayhan mountain
32. al-Littani	170	al-Biq'a' valley
33. Abu-Zibl	20	
34. Jawiyyah	30	
35. Jordan	225	al-Hawlah Valley
36. al-Yarmuk	130	Springs from al-'Arab and al-Shaykh mountains
37. Banyas		al-Shaykh mountain
38. al-Hasbani		al-Shaykh mountain
39. al-Zarqa'	120	al-'Arab mountain

**Rivers of Egypt and the Sudan**

1. The Nile	4,800	The equatorial and Ethiopian plateau
2. The White Nile	2,150	Lake Victoria
3. Bahr al-Jabal	1,460	Lake Victoria
4. Bahr al-Ghazal	820	Lake Victoria
5. al-Subat	600	The Ethiopian plateau
6. al-Baru	400	The Ethiopian plateau
7. al-Baybur	400	The Ethiopian plateau
8. The Blue Nile	1,350	Tana Lake
9. Atbarah	1,030	The Ethiopian plateau
10. Shaybilli	1,650	The Ethiopian plateau
11. Jube	1,150	The Ethiopian plateau

**Rivers of the Arab Maghrib**

1. Mejerda	380	Tell Atlas-Tunisian mountains
2. Miliane	110	Tell Atlas—Tunisian mountains
3. Oum Er Rbia	600	Higher and middle Atlas mountains (Morocco)
4. Sebou	500	Intermediate Atlas and al-Rif mountains (Morocco)
5. Lekous	100	al-Rif mountains (Morocco)
6. Bou Regreg	250	Intermediate Atlas mountains (Morocco)
7. Moulouya	450	Intermediate Atlas mountains (Morocco)
8. Draa	1,200	Anti-Atlas mountains (Morocco)
9. Tensift	270	Higher Atlas mountains (Morocco)
10. Ziz	270	Atlas al-Kebir mountains (Morocco)
11. Chelif	490	Amour mountains (Algeria)
12. Athmenia	170	Tell Atlas mountains (Algeria)
13. Lower Senegal		Mauritania

**Report Labels Israeli Academic Center Director  
'Zionist Spy'***45000114 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 13 Mar 90 p 2*

[Text] The labor office of the al-Duqqi region has investigated the director of the Israeli Academic Center in Cairo concerning violations that the Center has committed against the Egyptian labor law.

The Zionist spy has persisted in not answering any of the investigators' questions, and the Center's attorney has assumed the responsibility for responding to the prosecutor's office.

It should be noted that the Israeli Academic Center conducts suspicious research in Egypt on the Islamic trend and various political associations, and that the current Zionist ambassador in Cairo, Shim'on Shamir, used to be the head of this Center.

**AL-WAFD Reports Work To Begin on Dead Sea Canal***900A0338A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 4 Mar 90 p 1*

[Article by 'Abd-al-Nabi 'Abd-al-Sattar: "Israel To Begin Implementing Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal Project Shortly; Fund-Raising Campaign Among American Jews Succeeds in Securing Canal Construction Costs"]

[Text] Diplomatic circles in Cairo have confirmed that within days, Israel will begin carrying out the preliminary work to open a canal between the Mediterranean Sea and the Dead Sea. This is in light of the success of the fund-raising campaign among U.S. Jews—a campaign that has managed to raise the costs of the preliminary works, amounting to nearly \$800 million.

The circles noted that Israel will begin building the northern section from the Gulf of Haifa through Marj Ibn-Amir [Plain] to Baysan along a line parallel to the Jordan River. Three months ago, Egypt asked the United States to intervene to stop implementation of the Israeli project which seeks to create an Israeli presence in the Red Sea. The Arab League has also warned of the danger of implementing this project.

In a related development, concerted Arab contacts have succeeded in persuading the U.S. administration to abandon the idea of transferring the U.S. Embassy to East Jerusalem in the next phase. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir had asked U.S. President George Bush to build a new premises for the U.S. Embassy in East Jerusalem, provided that Israel supply the land needed for building the embassy premises at soft terms. Cairo has warned Washington of the danger which will be posed to U.S. interests in the region by a transfer of the U.S. Embassy to East Jerusalem.

**PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS****Islamic Jihad Viewed as Most Dangerous Group***44230104B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 14 Feb 90 p 4B*

[Article by Uri Nir: "The Greatest Threat"]

[Text] The attack on the Israeli tourist bus in Egypt was not only the culmination of a series of murderous attacks of the same pattern carried out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in recent years, but also the practical implementation of the ideological framework of this fanatical organization, whose purpose is to struggle not only against Israel, but also against Arab governments that it views as corrupt. Ten years after its establishment, the Palestinian arm of the Islamic Jihad has become the most dangerous and daring Palestinian body which, together with their fundamentalist counterparts in the Middle East, today constitute the greatest infiltrating and terrorist threat in our area today.

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad was established in 1980 by two intellectuals from Gaza, Shaykh 'Abd-al-Aziz 'Uda and Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi. Both are graduates of Egyptian universities, young (37), have preached in influential mosques in the Gaza Strip, and were deported to Lebanon about one year ago. Fathi Shaqaqi, born in the Rafiyah refugee camp, comes from a family originally from a small village near Ramla; he studied medicine in Egypt at Zaqaq University, one of the strongholds of Egyptian fundamentalism, after obtaining a BA in mathematics from B'ir-Zayt University in the mid-1970's. During his studies in Egypt he was arrested on suspicion of sabotage activities. After his return to Gaza, he was tried and imprisoned twice for links to an armed team of the Islamic Jihad. Shaqaqi became active in the Muslim Brotherhood organization, but left it toward the end of 1974 because of ideological differences. He presented the basis of his ideology in a book entitled "Khomeyni: The Islamic Alternative and Solution," which was published one year later. Upon his return from Egypt as a general practitioner, he worked for a short time at the Al-Mitla'a hospital in Jerusalem, then opened a private practice in Gaza.

During the same period he began to gather young Muslim fanatics around him, most of them students or university graduates. One of them was Shaykh 'Abd-al-Aziz 'Uda, also from a refugee family, born in the Jabaliyah camp. In 1981 'Uda received a degree in Muslim religious studies and law in Cairo. He taught at Gaza University, where he won support for his ideas among the students. In 1984 he was arrested on suspicion of incitement, was tried, and was sentenced to 11 months in prison. Upon his release he returned to activities within the Islamic Jihad. One month before the outbreak of the uprising, the authorities issued a deportation order against him, which caused a great storm in the Gaza Strip.



'Uda and Shafaqi began spreading their ideas in the four mosques connected with the Islamic Jihad in Gaza, especially in the al-Qasim Mosque in Bayt Lahiyah, and the al-Salim Mosque in Rafiyah. Islamic Jihad members who went to prison established in several jails a new body of supporters. The organization very quickly secured a front-ranking position among the strict organizational division existing in prisons. Security sources reported that after the extent of the mobilization potential of the Islamic Jihad in prisons was determined, it was decided to choose deporting its activists, because of their undermining activities in jail.

The Khomeyni influence on the Islamic Jihad is what sets it apart from an ideological viewpoint, and the source of its national-Palestinian coloring. This point may be clarified by a brief examination of the term Jihad in the eyes of Egyptian fundamentalism, as opposed to the meaning of the term in Khomeyni fundamentalism. For the Egyptian Jihad movement, the Jihad, as expressed in a book by the founder of the organization, 'Abd-al-Salam Furayj, "The Abandoned Commandment," is basically a struggle against apostate and corrupt governments in Islamic countries that pretend to be Muslim governments.

The term Jihad according to Khomeyni's teachings, is more suitable to a fanatical national-religious movement like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, because of the emphasis put by the Shi'ite Jihad on self-sacrifice and death for Allah (shahada). Moreover, the Khomeyni idea of the liberation of Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque as the highest objective after the unification of the Muslim world, proved very attractive to the Palestinian Jihad. Shaykh 'Abd-al-Aziz 'Uda, in a rare interview for the weekly AL-FAJR in English, given three months before the deportation order against him, said: "We believe that the Islamic revolution is the most important liberation movement in the area, and that it must strengthen its alliance with its real representatives, the Iranian revolution."

Toward the end of 1987, a few months before the outbreak of the uprising, when the Islamic Jihad members felt that they had sufficient strength among the youth, for the first time they entered a public and direct confrontation with their rivals in the religious camp, the Muslim Brotherhood. That was in the electoral campaign of Gaza University. The Islamic Jihad members, who that year could boast a series of successes in the battlefield against the Zionists, mocked the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood who were content to "prepare people's hearts" for the establishment of an Islamic state.

A pamphlet circulated by the Islamic Jihad at Gaza University at the peak of the electoral campaign (November 1987) taunted the Muslim Brotherhood for concentrating on education and not sacrificing themselves for the Jihad: "Jihad does not mean only carrying arms. It calls for direct confrontation from the first moment that the heart feels the truth of the oneness of God in the saying 'There is no God but Allah.' The form

and means of the confrontation must be defined in accordance with action planning and possibilities, but the main thing is that there should be no cease-fire, postponement, or waiting."

The intifadah broke out one month later. Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement], which actually already existed in one form or another, clearly presented itself as the front line organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, and soon adopted the main principles of the militant ideology of the Islamic Jihad. Although it is difficult to pinpoint mentions of the Iranian revolution or Khomeyni characteristics, it can be clearly stated that the intifadah shifted the Muslim Brotherhood's emphasis from education to Jihad, from passivity and waiting to militant activities, and from a reform ideology devoid of nationalistic characteristics to a particular national ideology. Hamas' charter is replete with ideas and topics that were the domain of the Islamic Jihad.

With the emergence of Hamas, some people thought that the Islamic Jihad would disappear or be absorbed by it. That, however, did not happen. The Islamic Jihad remained a public power in the Gaza Strip with a very broad support base. One proof of that is that its members managed more than once to implement general strike orders throughout the Gaza Strip, in parallel to orders by Hamas and the United National Command. Palestinian activists claim that the Islamic Jihad, although it refused to join the United Command, preserved operational coordination with it.

The Islamic Jihad members' belief that there is no point in devoting efforts to implement the Muslim law in Palestine before its liberation from the Jewish disbelievers through armed struggle, was one of the main reasons for their strange alliance with the terrorist branch of Fatah. This operational alliance (which became evident from statements by Jihad members and by various Fatah members), led to a number of serious attacks and attempts. The most prominent among them was the hand grenade attack on Giv'ati brigade trainees and their families near the Wailing Wall in October 1986. The operational cooperation with Fatah did not include ideological rapprochement, but was pursued because of the relative handiness of using Fatah's infrastructure and operational experience.

The Islamic Jihad's disgust with the PLO's new policy at the head of Fatah, which was expressed in a series of very harsh pamphlets, brought the Jihad closer to PLO opposition organizations, primarily Ahmad Jibril's. Jibril's radio station, which broadcasts from Syria, offers permanent facilities to Jihad members and its spokesmen. Shaykh Asad Biud al-Tamimi, the "spiritual leader" of the Islamic Jihad, is a regular guest on radio Al-Quds. This Hebron Shaykh, a former al-Aqsa preacher who was deported to Jordan in 1970, was and is one of the leaders urging armed jihad against Israel.

The Islamic Jihad still has many activists and supporters, especially in the Gaza Strip, but also in several

areas in the West Bank (particularly Mount Hebron, Nablus, and Jinin). Each one of its successes, such as the lethal shooting ambush of an IDF [Israel Defense Force] jeep in Gaza last November and the attack on the bus in Egypt, contributes to increasing its strength and influence. The attack in Egypt was particularly successful from the viewpoint of the organization because it achieved several objectives at the same time: it caused loss of Jewish lives, it was an attack on Egyptian authority, it harmed normalization between a Muslim state and the "all-destructive Jewish monster" (according to Shaykh 'Abd-al-Aziz 'Uda in an interview for the Jihad publication in June 1988), and was meant to harm the political process, too.

At a time when the PLO has cut its armed actions to a minimum and when the Zionist movement and the Palestinian movement are closer than ever to agreement on some form of coexistence, it is once again becoming clear that the greatest threat to the future of the area comes from sources whose fanatical religious approach to the conflict rules out any chance of compromise.

### Despair Leading to Palestinian Extremism

44230104A Tel Aviv HADASHOT  
in Hebrew 16 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Yehuda Litani]

[Text] "The longer the delay in finding a political solution, the greater the extremism of Palestinians in the territories; that is clear. Those who were moderate Fatah supporters are becoming extremist Fatah; those who were moderate communists are becoming extremist communists, not to mention the fanatic Islamic Movement, which is continuously eroding support for the PLO," said one of the PLO policymakers in the territories this week, adding: "The process of growing extremism is a general process affecting our entire society. While you debate whether to allow one deportee or two deportees, or whether to have elections in East Jerusalem, you Israelis simply ignore what is happening in our society. Take me, for example—there is no comparison between my views today and six months ago. I have to admit that today I am more of an extremist. I, like many others in Palestinian society in the territories, am progressively despairing of a political solution any time soon, or even in the more distant future.

"In my opinion," the man continued, "we are on the brink of a blood bath. Yes, don't shrink from the words—a blood bath, from which both peoples will suffer. Bus No. 405 last year and the attack on the bus in Egypt were only the first signs. I may be able to understand the tactical and semantic differences between Shamir and Sharon, but most of the Palestinians in the territories simply don't grasp it. Most of them tell me the Israelis are toying with peace.

"And there is anger not only against Israel, but also against the United States, which is helping Israel in all its stalling schemes, and now the Soviet Union, too, suddenly opened

wide the gates to Jewish immigrants. Our fear is that most or some of them will settle in the territories. Once we had the feeling that we were indeed miserable, but the whole world was at our side. Today there is a feeling that we are even more miserable, but the world cares less about us. There are even those among us who think that the whole world is against us. They say: Look what happened in the Eastern Bloc, all of a sudden all those countries, which were our staunchest friends in the past, are beginning to fawn over Israel. It begins with trade relations and goes on to diplomatic relations. Although those states still claim that they are on the side of our just cause, it is clear that there has been a substantial drop in their support.

"And what happened last week in South Africa with the release of Nelson Mandela also has an impact on us. People say to each other: Look at this leader, he spent so many years in prison, not in luxury hotels, didn't fly around in jets from one capital city to another, and in the end he achieved much more than we ever dreamt of. Not only that, after being released he continues to call for armed struggle against the South African Government. And with us, Yasir 'Arafat calls for moderation, 242, 338, negotiations with Israel, and ceasing the armed struggle, and the more we despair of a political agreement, the more people criticize Yasir 'Arafat and his present policies. Small wonder that for the past three weeks he has been talking of resigning."

Israeli sources, too, agree that simultaneously with a certain abating of the intifadah, extremism has been growing both among PLO supporters and among the fanatical religious bloc. One Palestinian leader this week said that Israel was exaggerating the increased strength and popularity of the religious camp, but that there was no doubt that if the current protraction of the negotiations continues, the popularity of Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] will increase.

Israeli sources say that the most notable recent development is the rule of the street. The recognized intifadah leaders, they say, have lost their influence, especially in what concerns the killing of so-called collaborators. In spite of repeated urging by those leaders, the killings continue. The Israeli sources stressed the "so-called," in view of the fact that in more than a few cases, the killings were a matter of settling entirely different accounts, not necessarily to do with national reasons, or not to do with collaboration with Israeli security factors.

It may be worth recalling that the intifadah itself began from the bottom ranks, from among internal forces not guided by any political party. A combination of despair regarding a political solution in the foreseeable future, real increase in the strength of Muslim fanatics, and loss of control by the recognized PLO leaders is a dangerous combination that may signal a trend toward growing inner anarchy in the territories. That is bound to have an effect on Israel itself.

"When government authorities don't function properly and the old social order is slipping, as happened to us with the intifadah," said a prominent PLO activist from Samaria,

"there is a natural inclination among people to turn to religious figures to solve their problems. The latter become a source of authority the way they were dozens and hundreds of years ago. Religious leaders not only settle disputes, they also provide consolation and assurances of a better future, and in many cases, they also help needy people with money—and now there are many of those. If this trend continues, it will carry a threat to the future of peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and for peace in the Middle East in general."

About the middle of the week the Islamic Jihad circulated leaflets containing sharp attacks on the Jewish religion and Israel. The organization, which assumed responsibility for the murder of Israelis in Egypt this month, harshly attacked the United States and particularly the Soviet Union for the Jewish emigration to Israel.

Knesset Member Benny Begin this week reported on a Likud meeting held a few weeks ago at which Ari'el Sharon recommended distributing weapons to anti-PLO Palestinians, so that "Palestinians will kill Palestinians." It would seem that even without distributing weapons we are coming increasingly closer to a new situation in the territories. While we keep debating technical details concerning negotiations with the Palestinians, the basic assumption being that the PLO is the big enemy, a radical change is taking place right under our noses, in which the PLO is quickly becoming, from the major force, a force that has to share power with another group that for the time being is the weaker of the two. But what will happen when the process is caught in a dead end?

We have to believe what the Islamic Jihad wrote in its fliers this week, namely that the state they want will stretch "from the sea to the river." Their greatest majority is not inclined to accept compromise. They do not differentiate between moderates and extremists, as the PLO does. With them there will be almost no possibility of negotiations, seeing as they are the reverse image of the fanatics among us—Tehiya, Gush Emunim, and Rabbi Kahana's supporters.

But perhaps this is Ari'el Sharon's undeclared objective—to achieve anarchy in the territories, despair leading to extremism among all the secular and religious factions, and armed, violent struggle in which brother will fight brother. No negotiations, no discussions, no contacts, but a situation crying out for someone who will be waiting at his farm for the people to call for "order in the territories."

### **Economic Status of Palestinians Analyzed**

90OL0282A London AL-HAWADITH  
in Arabic 23 Feb 90 pp 56-57

[Interview with Ahmad Qari', director of PLO's Economic Department: "International Organizations Have Become Incapable of Implementing Resolutions;" first paragraph is AL-HAWADITH introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] AL-HAWADITH met with Ahmad Qari' (Abu 'Ala'), a member of Fatah's Central Committee and director of the PLO's Economic Department, at a time when the Arab world is facing the danger of increasing emigration to the occupied land and Palestinians are being forced out of their land and supplanted by new immigrants. AL-HAWADITH met with Qari' at a time when the PLO is fighting to preserve the Palestinian existence and to support that existence politically and economically so that Israel's growing expansion can be halted. The following interview with Qari' took place.

[AL-HAWADITH] Let us go back to the immigration of Soviet Jews because that subject is the biggest threat to the Palestinian people and to the Arab nation. It is known that these immigrants are coming from a country that has traditionally been a friend of the Palestinian people. So far, however, the explanations that have been offered by the Soviets indicate that the flow of immigrants is continuing and that it has not been stopped.

[Qari'] This immigration worries us very much. We are worried about it because we understand the Zionist plan quite well. Basically, the Zionist plan is based on the land and on those who reside on it. The Zionists confiscate the land; they build settlements on it; and then those who reside on that land are driven out and forced to leave. Ever since its inception and throughout all the stages of its existence, the Zionist plan has sought Jewish immigrants because Jewish immigration has been the strategic goal of the Zionist movement and its supporters. Jewish immigrants have been sought to establish the greater state of Israel, which the Zionist movement has been advocating from the very beginning and that Shamir spoke about recently. We've talked about the danger of this immigration in every dialogue we've had with our Soviet friends. At first, the number of immigrants was small. Now, that number constitutes a real threat. It is a human invasion whose aim is to bring approximately 750,000 Soviet Jews to this land to supplant resident Palestinians. The process of bringing Soviet Jews to this land then is a new operation to drive Palestinians out of their land and force them to leave. Our Soviet friends ought to understand that Soviet Jews are emigrating to occupied Palestinian land.

[AL-HAWADITH] If such large numbers of Soviet Jews are brought into the area, there will be a serious imbalance in the economic and demographic makeup of Palestine. Can Palestine tolerate such a high population density?

[Qari'] When we look at tolerance from an economic point of view, we do not use the area of land to measure that tolerance, but we measure it by the power that people have to build an economy. Not only does the subject at hand have economic implications, but, as we mentioned before, it is incorporated into the strategic, Zionist plan that revolves around the confiscation of land and driving away its residents. To force Palestinians out of their land, Zionists have to make it harder for them to earn a living. All houses must be shelled and

repression becomes a must. The enemy is using all these techniques, replacing the residents who were forced to leave with others who are brought in to take their place. The new immigrants are warriors, fighters, and military men. The danger of that situation lies in the fact that these warriors, fighters, and military men are there in addition to the Israeli military machine.

[AL-HAWADITH] People, especially those earning a modest income, are complaining about the Palestinian identity card. We know that the average Palestinian family is a family of five. If such a family is to get identity cards, it will have to pay \$500. Is it possible to find ways to alleviate the burden borne by families and students, for example?

[Qari'] Let us state, first of all, that this identity card is a real response to the declaration of independence. It is a response to that document that was approved by the PNC [Palestine National Council] when that council met in Algiers. This is a process that paves the way for Palestinian passports, which will be issued at the appropriate time. As far as the fees are concerned, the PLO set those fees to respond to certain pressures that are being placed on the organization because the Arabs have been indifferent to the need to ensure the requirements of the intifadah [uprising]. It is true that the fee might be high, but the fee for the identity card has been set so that revenues generated from it can be used to support the intifadah. All members of one family are not required to have their identity cards issued at the same time. The head of a household can work out a schedule whereby members of his family can get their identity cards one person at a time, depending on his resources. The identity card plan is a permanent one and an identity card will always be valid because it will not expire in one year or six months.

[AL-HAWADITH] What do you think about Europe's decision to open its markets to Palestinian products?

[Qari'] We don't look at Europe's decision from an economic perspective exclusively, but we also look at the political implications of that decision. There are several ingredients in Europe's decision that are extremely important. First, Europe's decision gives Palestinian goods preference over other goods in Europe's Common Market. This constitutes real and direct support for production projects in the occupied land. It is what the PLO has been aiming at in its effort to create an economic organization that can achieve self-sufficiency whenever possible in meeting people's needs. Second, in making its decision, Europe's Common Market approved the Palestinian certificate of origin, which the chambers of commerce and industry in the occupied land certify without any intervention from Israeli authorities, and it recognized that certificate as an acceptable certificate of origin in all 12 Common Market countries. Of course, Europe's decision has significant political implications as well. The European Community has confirmed the reality of dealing with occupied Palestinian land as an existing unit, and it established the

precedent of dealing with Palestinian chambers of commerce and industry as the organization one must deal with in conducting trade with the outside world.

But our business with the Common Market did not stop here. We are working with the European community in a total coordination effort on a program to provide assistance and development for the occupied land. The European Community is continually sending economic delegations and experts to study economic and social conditions in the occupied land. The European Community disseminates extremely important reports to diagnose the problems and to propose solutions that are compatible with our real tendencies. In that regard, the European Community has an annual budget for production and social projects in the occupied land, and that budget has been increased to 5 million European currency units (approximately \$7.5 million). In addition, each individual European country offers its support. One example is the Government of Italy, which adopted more than one important production project, such as the citrus processing plant in Gaza, which cost \$20 million. The Italian Government also took it upon itself to take part in the construction of a fishing port and a commercial port in the Gaza Strip. What the Italian Government has not done yet is to apply pressure to Israeli authorities to get them to allow it to build this vital facility, which will give the occupied land breathing space. The Government of Italy also took it upon itself to make a contribution to the subject of water in the Gaza Strip. As you know, the possibility of a water disaster in the Gaza Strip does exist because deep wells were drilled by Israeli settlements so they can draw fresh water out of these wells. At the same time, the wells, which had been in use before 1967, are either about to run dry or their water has been mixed with sea water and has become polluted. The Government of Italy will take part in establishing water treatment plants. There is an ambitious plan to build a water desalination plant.

In conjunction with the Italian Government, West Germany, too, has contributed up to \$15 million for infrastructure projects for the area of Jerusalem and neighboring areas. And France has its program of projects. So do Britain and the Netherlands. The European Community in its entirety is beginning to understand the magnitude of the suffering in the occupied land, and all the countries in Europe are looking for useful ways and means to support our people there.

[AL-HAWADITH] Speaking of ground water and pollution in the Gaza Strip, do the economic department and the PLO have information about the water situation in the West Bank?

[Qari'] There are 1.9 million cubic meters of water in all of Palestine. In the West Bank and Gaza there are 850 million cubic meters of usable, reserve water, but Palestinians are not allowed to use any more than 190 million cubic meters of this water. This figure represents allowable human water consumption for Palestinians as well



as water consumption for agricultural and other purposes. The rest of this water is either stolen by Israel for the settlements, or it is diverted to Israel. Israel installs meters on each water well to prevent Palestinians from pumping more than the fixed and limited amounts of water it determines for them.

Second, Israel forbids any drilling of new wells. That is why the water problem is a real and serious problem that represents a real threat. It is one of the most important issues and it will be one of the most important issues even in the future peace process. Water for Israel is a top priority issue. Israel's water policy has been defined since the first day of occupation. In any new, Israeli expansion operation, and such an operation is not unlikely, water will be one of the principal ingredients. The next disaster, in fact, will be in Gaza. There are some international reports indicating that if matters are not rectified soon, Gaza will have a disaster on its hands by the end of the century.

[AL-HAWADITH] Let us shift to the subject of the intifadah's needs. It is known that a study about those needs was submitted by the PLO and approved by the Arab Summit meeting. Are the figures in that study definitive or have new figures been added?

[Qari'] Actually, the intifadah has unlimited needs, and any plan that is devised to support it is modest compared to the real needs because the intifadah's needs are not like those of a political party, a movement, or a charitable society. The intifadah's needs are the needs of everyone in a nation; they are the needs of all the organizations, institutions, and sectors of production in that nation. The intifadah has endless and unlimited needs. This is a fact that our fellow Arabs are oblivious to because they think that a popular committee here or there can solve the problem of those needs or support the intifadah.

The intifadah needs industry, agriculture, institutions, small workshops, people's committees, education, health, transportation, communications, and municipal, and rural services. It needs services to the families of those who were killed and those who were wounded in action. These are opened needs and they are growing every day. The figures in the memorandum that was submitted to the Arab Summit are extremely modest figures because the intifadah was then in the process of taking off and it was presenting its initial requirements, which, unfortunately, were listed under two categories. The first category was a list of onetime payments, none of which has been paid yet. There is another resolution to support the intifadah by paying \$42 million a month. Except for Saudi Arabia, which is paying \$6 million a month; Iraq, which is paying \$4 million; and Kuwait, which is paying \$2 million, none of the Arab countries, unfortunately, has been paying. Libya has resumed its payments. Our Arab nation, unfortunately, seems to be unable to understand the importance of supporting the intifadah, which actually represents the first line of defense for the Arab nation against the advancing

Zionist threat which, as we mentioned previously, has been gathering strength as Jewish immigrants are brought into Palestine to supplant Palestinians who are being forced out of their land.

[AL-HAWADITH] How much of the intifadah's actual needs are being met by this \$42 million figure?

[Qari'] As I mentioned, the intifadah's actual needs are unlimited. Let me give you an example. We devised a plan to support the intifadah by supporting agricultural activity. We wanted to set up simple and modest agricultural ventures in an attempt to help the people become self-sufficient in meeting their daily needs. We wanted the people to be able to break the ties they were forced to have with Israel's strong economy. We devised this plan to set up agricultural ventures with the minimum allocation of only \$100 million a year. I am not saying, of course, that our fellow Arabs were to pay the entire amount. They were to pay only a fraction of that amount, and our people in the occupied land were to contribute their modest resources and get those ventures going. In the two years of the intifadah our people managed to close the gap in milk production from 75,000 tons a year to 65,000 tons. By economizing in homes and by having one cow in one household and another cow in another household, our people managed to increase milk production by 10,000 tons. If our people were to receive real support for the establishment of production projects, they will be able to close the gap in food production and in many areas as well.

The subject of home construction is a fundamental and an important issue, not only because Palestinians are suffering from a housing shortage in the occupied land—and this is an actual fact—but also because home construction has to block the movement of growing settlements on the land. We devised a plan to meet the minimum of modest needs and the dollar figure for that was between \$25 and \$35 million in these two sectors. We also need an economic organization for trade, and we need marketing centers, packaging centers, and so on and so forth. The figure for these needs is estimated to be about \$20 million. In the area of industry, we need to support existing projects whose ability to survive has been undermined by the enemy's practices against those industrial ventures and also by the taxes that are imposed on them. No other state in the world pays such taxes. Palestinians are coerced and forced to pay 36 different kinds of taxes.

The intifadah's requirements then are quite substantial, and we have not even mentioned what is required for defensive activities, for the strike forces, for the people's committees, and for the families of people who were killed in action, who are being detained, who have been wounded, and whose homes have been demolished. For the intifadah to survive, and it will survive, God willing, a serious Arab stance is a must. Why is it that when an Israeli goes to the United States he comes back with millions of dollars but when a Palestinian goes to Arab countries, he comes back, unfortunately, with millions of

rumors? Why does that happen and what is its purpose? It is time for everyone to take a serious stance and to support this intifadah because it is the intifadah that actually represents the defense for the Arab nation's borders and for its national security.

[AL-HAWADITH] What can you tell us about your relations with international organizations? What is your assessment of what happened in the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], which was punished by the United States because of its relationship with you?

[Qari'] It is in that context that we started our activity. A number of resolutions were issued in our favor by the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN General Assembly, the UN Organization for Industrial Development, and FAO. The resolutions issued by all these organizations supported occupied Palestinian territory and supported the establishment of production projects there to serve the needs of our people. But a storm broke out recently in the FAO. What was the reason for that storm? This storm was brought about specifically by the United States even though the resolution issued by FAO did not differ from those issued by the other UN organizations, such as the Trade Development Organization, the Industrial Development Organization, the Health Organization, and UNESCO.

It was a fierce storm that raged in the FAO. The United States, acting unfairly and spitefully, cut its allocation to the FAO because this was something that had to do with the subject of land and natural resources in Palestine. What was it that was new in the FAO plan? The new feature in that plan was the assistance and support it offered for agricultural activities in the occupied land and the coordination of those activities with the PLO. But the decision to coordinate with the PLO was part of all the resolutions issued by UN organizations. Is it because FAO's resolution had to do with the land that it was singled out? We continue to ask that question.

International organizations are unable to implement resolutions issued by the international community to help the Palestinian people. The simplest and the smallest example of that is this: Two years ago Japan donated \$1 million for the construction of an egg hatchery in the occupied land. But Israeli authorities did not give the Japanese Government a permit to set up and operate this project. The Japanese Government had applied for such a permit through an international organization, namely, the UN Development Program. And why wasn't a permit issued? Because that project too had to do with the land. Thus, we come to realize that Israel's policy, which from the very beginning has been built upon and based on the land and its residents, is a sequential, tripartite policy of occupation, supplantation, and forced evacuation.

## BAHRAIN

### Government's Role in Stock Market Discussed

90OL0252A London AL-MAJALLAH  
in Arabic 6 Feb 90 p 46

[Interview with Dr. Fawzi Bahzad by 'Abd-al-Muttalib al-Sayrafi: "General Manager of Bahrain Stock Market: We Are Ready To Trade Government Project Stocks"; first two paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction; in Bahrain, date not given]

[Text] Dr. Fawzi Bahzad, general manager of the Bahrain Stock Exchange, asserted that in the next phase the stock market will offer several investment tools to stimulate trading. He said: "These tools will include, among other things, market-maker and investment portfolio management companies."

Dr. Bahzad called for standardization in GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] stock exchanges a prelude to linking these markets together.

[AL-MAJALLAH] It has been noted that the stock market performance (volume prices) is still modest compared to the prestock exchange phase. How do you explain that?

[Bahzad] When we began organizing the local stock exchange, we drew up a three-phase plan. The first phase was to establish the market and it includes legislation, trading regulations, and the preparation of periodic reports on company performances. This phase is almost completed.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But traded stock prices are still weak and do not reflect company performance or financial position?

[Bahzad] We do not expect an upturn in prices in the founding stage because such a move denotes a defect in the system in practice. With time, however, the trading volume and value of transactions started going up, as indicated in the market's weekly reports.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you have any notions to stimulate market trading?

[Bahzad] After we finished setting up the market's basic structure, we began studying an integrated plan to stimulate trading. This plan includes the creation of investment portfolios open to small investors and providing joint-stock company performance data because this kind of information will have a bearing on trading prices and the removal of limits on individual ownership.

[AL-MAJALLAH] The government has officially announced that certain publicly owned projects will be offered for public subscription. Is the stock market ready to implement the ownership-transfer procedures?

[Bahzad] We are ready for such a move. We must not forget, however, that more important than ownership-transfer is the creation of a market where such stocks can be traded or what is known as a fringe market.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Why aren't government bonds traded?

[Bahzad] The market is ready to trade government bonds, but for such trading to serve its purpose, we have to wait for the decision to be made and for the right time.

The stock market can serve as the last outlet for government bonds as well as the first one for sales promotion and issues rating.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Some clients complain that buy and sell procedures take a little too long to complete?

[Bahzad] This is not true. Under the system in use, procedures are completed the second day following the transaction. This is not a long time.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do brokers have a defined role in the stock market mechanics?

[Bahzad] Naturally, brokers are subject to stock market control and their obligations of providing money for buy orders, following up the issuance of certificates of ownership and regulating buy and sell securities traffic are clearly outlined.

[AL-MAJALLAH] A long time ago the government announced measures allowing GCC nationals to own shares in joint-stock companies, but their presence is not tangible yet. Moreover, are you giving any thought to linking the area's stock exchanges together?

[Bahzad] I will answer the second part of the question. Linkage requires that stock transfer and transfer of ownership barriers be reduced. By barriers I mean the part pertaining to legal measures and providing information to investors.

The most important step in linking the area's stock exchanges (Oman-Kuwait-Bahrain) together is standardization whereby a citizen living in Bahrain, for example, can buy stock listed on the Kuwaiti exchange and vice versa.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is there a ceiling for price movement?

[Bahzad] In the stock market we go by the written bid system and have set a price ceiling of up to 15 percent up or down in one day.

Our monitoring of prices shows that all listed stocks have not gone beyond the 15 percent rate, which is more than reasonable.

## EGYPT

### Ambassador Comments on U.S. Middle East Policy

90OA0332A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH  
in Arabic 7 Feb 90 p 11

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Ridi, Egyptian ambassador to the United States, by Hadiyah al-Sharbini: "Bush Supports Holding Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue, American Administration Wants Flexibility in Distributing Foreign Aid"; Washington, date not given; first two paragraphs are AKHIR SA'AH introduction]

[Text] A year after President Bush's administration assumed the reins of government in the White House, and more than a year after the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, we find that the Middle East issue, especially the Palestinian issue, is passing a new turning point. Discussion is now about how to arrive at Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

The American administration is trying to hold a three-party meeting at the foreign ministers' level between the United States, Egypt, and Israel to promote opportunities for this dialogue. The following interview with Egypt's ambassador to the United States, 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Ridi, took place against the background of these developments and against the background of a visit by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid and by Dr. Usamah al-Baz, President Mubarak's political affairs adviser, and the economic delegation accompanying the two men.

[Al-Sharbini] The first question concerns an evaluation of the Middle East policy of the Bush administration, now that a year has passed since it assumed the reins of government in the White House.

[Al-Ridi] Objectively, we can say that President Bush's attitudes toward the Middle East can be considered very good. He has a very warm friendship with President Mubarak. His initial stands are good. This is clear from what he has said about the need to end Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, his opposition to building settlements on occupied lands, and his support of the political rights of the Palestinian people. All these are good initial stands. We also see that President Bush's administration is now working to support the idea of holding a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue and is trying to hold a three-party meeting in the context of promoting opportunities for this dialogue.

On the Lebanese issue, the positions of President Bush's administration are also good. It supports the al-Ta'if agreement and the unity and independence of Lebanon.

However, if we speak from the point of view of implementation and practice, despite these good positions, in 1989 a series of other international issues appeared. These have monopolized the attention of the American



administration. The parties concerned with the Middle East issue must, therefore, work to make this issue an object of attention.

#### **Making Israel Face Its Responsibility**

[Al-Sharbini] Hope was set on holding the three-party meeting between Egypt, the United States, and Israel in the first half of January 1990. However, the date for this meeting has not yet been set. Some people say that Shamir's government has indeed succeeded in thwarting peace efforts and in ruining chances for holding the three-party meeting. Is there any hope for holding this meeting in the near future?

[Al-Ridi] No final date has been set for the three-party meeting. As I see it, the Israeli Government is supposed to have accepted Baker's five points. If this acceptance is a fact, Shamir's government must work to support this plan, not to thwart it and resist it. We, at least, hope this is the case. There is no reason to raise doubts. If Israel says it supports work toward reaching a peaceful settlement, that is all the more reason for us to make Israel face its responsibility and not give it a way to escape from responsibility.

#### **Maintaining American Interest**

[Al-Sharbini] American Secretary of State James Baker has warned the parties involved in the Middle East that if his efforts to support the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue do not yield results, he will be forced to wash his hands of the Middle East. Do you agree with him in this?

[Al-Ridi] This administration has expressed its readiness to promote the peace process and has, in fact, taken steps in this regard. As proof of this, we cite the number of contacts that have taken place between it and the parties in the Middle East—an enormous number of diplomatic and telephone contacts between President Bush and President Mubarak, and between James Baker and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid. However, two points must be mentioned:

First, this administration does not want to get involved in a subject and fail in it. Its moves are marked by caution. It does not like to be hasty.

Second, certain extremely large issues have arisen, such as Eastern Europe and conditions in the Soviet Union and Latin America. These important issues concern the American administration. If they find that the parties in the Middle East are not ready to respond to each other, there is real danger that the administration's concentration, activity, and energy will go to other issues that have arisen. We must, therefore, work to maintain interest and concern for the Middle East issue on the part of the American administration.

#### **Follow-Up by Egypt**

[Al-Sharbini] The visit by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid and by Dr. Usamah al-Baz, President Mubarak's political affairs

adviser, and the economic delegation accompanying the two men was a visit with two dimensions: political and economic. How would you evaluate the results of the talks that the Egyptian delegation recently held in the American capital?

[Al-Ridi] As for the political part, the visit by Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid and the accompanying delegation, as well as the important talks that were held with Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and the meeting with congressional leaders were excellent. Egypt's initial stands on promoting the peace process and the Palestinian stand on dialogue with Israel were clarified. In addition, the large scope of Egyptian-American relations politically and economically and the central role that Egypt plays in various areas—Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and Arab and African politics—these things require that there be constant high-level contact between Egypt and the United States. There is need for more high-level visits. There is constant need for follow-up and consultation, especially since important issues are under discussion—particularly, the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

The second part of the visit, the economic part, was related to the process of economic reform and to reaching agreement with international financial organizations and the United States. In this regard, Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid met with the American side and with the chairman of the IMF and the World Bank. The meetings were excellent. There was discussion of the continuing process of economic reform. The Egyptian program stems from a vision that is interested in carrying out economic reform, while at the same time averting the burdens of this reform from the classes unable to sustain them. Against this background, it is also important to have continued contact to clarify positions and to promote the process. Participants in the talks included Dr. 'Atif 'Ubayd, minister of state for administrative development, and Dr. Salah Hamid, overseer of the Central Bank. As a result, a delegation from the World Bank has decided to visit Egypt.

#### **Administration Has Right [To Decide]**

[Al-Sharbini] Senator Robert Dole, head of the Republican minority in the Senate, has called for cutting aid to certain countries, including Egypt, by five percent, and for giving this amount to the countries of Eastern Europe. Is this request receiving the support of the American administration?

[Al-Ridi] The American administration always wants to have flexibility in distributing foreign aid. It wants the proportion and amount of aid to be proposed by the American government, not by the American Congress. The American administration wants to have the right to apportion and distribute aid to foreign countries. In any case, Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid used the opportunity of his visit to the United States to raise this subject with minority leader Robert Dole and other congressional leaders. He also spoke in this regard with Secretary of

State James Baker. We took care to explain Egypt's position to the congressional leaders and Egypt's concern that American aid should not be lowered.

#### **America Welcomes Restoration of Relations**

[Al-Sharbini] What is the position of the Washington administration on the restoration of relations between Egypt and Syria and between Egypt and Libya?

[Al-Ridi] America welcomes Egypt's return to exercising its leading Arab role, because this means that Egypt, a country that follows a moderate, balanced policy and that advocates peace, will have a more influential role than previously. The Washington government is convinced that this Egyptian role will have a positive influence, as was visible in the Casablanca Arab summit, which ultimately approved the Palestinian peace initiative.

As for the restoration of Egyptian-Syrian relations, we know that the United States has relations with Syria. There was absolutely no annoyance on their part. As for the Egyptian rapprochement with Libya, we know that the United States has been disturbed by some of Libya's past policies. But in the end, I think they are now more convinced that the gain from Egyptian-Libyan relations will be positive for the victory of the policy of moderation and peace in the region.

#### **Parliament Opposition Alliance Lists Grievances**

90OA0321A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 6 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by Fayiz Zayid]

[Text] Alliance deputies launched a harsh attack against the government in the People's Assembly during their response to the government's announcement, which disregards the issue of the application of the Islamic *shari'ah* [Islamic law]!

Alliance deputies warned of the foreign debt disaster threatening Egypt's economy and of the passive attitude toward the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, which poses a danger to the Arabs.

They demanded a halt to the arrests and torture to which innocent Muslim youth are being subjected and an increase in the salaries of state workers.

The alliance deputies stressed that democracy is the only way to protect the regime and the ruler, and that we do not want "decor" democracy, "falsified" elections, or emergency laws.

Dr. 'Isam al-'Uryan spoke first, strongly attacking the government, saying: I recommend that the government adopt the report of the parliamentary committee formed by the People's Assembly to respond to the government's announcement. I recommend that it regard the report as its working program, because the program submitted by the government to the People's Assembly will become neither fat nor rich because of hunger!

He added: If we are experiencing the democracy of "dosages," I know, as a physician, that as long as the patient does not take his medicine at the prescribed time, he will die! We are in urgent need of new doses of democracy.

#### **Where Is the Law?**

The alliance deputy asked: Where is the law to prosecute ministers, which is stipulated by the constitution?! There has been assembly after assembly, and we have not seen the prosecution of ministers who committed violations against Egypt! Are ministers above the law? Ministers must be models. A minister who deviates should be prosecuted so that the people receive a realistic picture, and so that it can be said that we have a democratic system.

#### **The Government's Announcement Is 'Ambiguous'**

Majdi Husayn began his remarks by stating that: Elections to the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council were a full "apostasy" from democracy and 100-percent decor. Totalitarianism is currently ruling Egypt, and party pluralism is "false." The Egyptian people must enjoy full freedom and elections without falsification.

Dr. Rafat al-Mahjub interrupted, stating: How can totalitarianism exist when you are here along with a huge number of opposition deputies. Denying the truth endangers the gains of democracy that you enjoy!

Majdi Ahmad Husayn responded: Totalitarianism is not only in party pluralism, but also the right to rotate power. Is it not so that pluralism has become a mere clamor and that the National [Democratic] Party [NDP] will rule forever!!

An outcry in the ranks of the NDP deputies interrupted Majdi Ahmad Husayn's remarks.

#### **Stop the Immigration of the Jews**

Alliance Deputy Basyuni Ibrahim launched a strong offensive because of the cotton disaster, stating that: It is necessary to call to account everyone who caused the deterioration of the cotton crop and the decline of its production. This deterioration caused excessive damage to the production of oil, oil cake, and fodder derived from cotton seed, and a decline in the import price of cotton, leading farmers to refrain from growing it. Therefore, the government must establish a sufficient price for cotton before it is sown.

Deputy Ibrahim Basyuni indicated that the deterioration of the cotton crop caused Egyptian cotton to lose world cotton markets. He stressed that the income from this cotton, which could total \$14 billion annually, could pay all of Egypt's debts.

He advocated eliminating the cooperative market, returning to the old system of cotton trade, and creating

a strategic cotton reserve, which the government could offer in world markets at favorable times.

He asked: Who benefits from our export of cotton thread at prices that are \$1,000 per ton lower than the export prices of cotton wool?

He then moved to the problem of the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, asking: What has the government done regarding the immigration of Soviet Jews to the occupied land and the vicious attack against the Muslims in Azerbaijan in the Soviet Union?

Justice al-Ma'mun al-Hudaybi commented on the remarks made by Kamal al-Shadli, saying: We are the ones bearing the burden of the attempt at change. We have paid a price, this we have paid, and we shall receive our reward from God. We are actually living in Egypt on the margin of democracy and freedoms!!

An interruption from the NDP deputies, led by Deputy Mahmud Turkiyah!

Justice al-Ma'mun al-Hudaybi continued his remarks: We want to establish this in the constitution, so that there will not come a day when we are deprived of this right. There are actually constraints on the establishment of parties. This is contrary to logic and fairness. No political party shall be established except by declaration of the NDP! The entire Parties Committee is composed of the ruling NDP! And the Emergency Law is a danger that must finally be eliminated.

#### Save Egypt

Alliance deputy Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Habib spoke, criticizing the government for its insistence on borrowing from abroad, thereby increasing Egypt's debts, which have become a disaster threatening the Egyptian economy. He implored President Husni Mubarak and the government to stop the loan "hemorrhage," which could destroy Egypt!

Dr. Muhammad Habib then addressed the Palestinian problem, stating: From here, under the dome of the Egyptian People's Assembly, I salute the Palestinian uprising.

He asked: Where is the government's practical support of the Palestinian uprising?! What is the Egyptian Government's position on the leveling and assault operations carried out by Israeli Jews against the holy places there?! There is Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, who is tortured! We call on President Mubarak to support all that is happening there.

The alliance deputy advocated aiding Sudan, saying: We are opposed to military coups. We are opposed to Sudan's revolution by the parties and unions there. But this revolution faces whirlwinds coming from the south. "Garang" has destroyed mosques and tortured women!

Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Habib called on the government to abrogate the Emergency Law, lift constraints on freedoms, apply the Islamic *shari'ah* in all domains of

life, purge the information agencies of anything contrary to Islam's teachings, and to stop arresting innocent Muslim youth.

#### A Raise in Salaries, O Government

Alliance deputy 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Uthman spoke, saying: The committee formed to respond to the government's announcement has stated that democracy is the only way for society to flourish and to be stable.

Deputy Dr. 'Atif Sidqi, the prime minister, called for the quick submission to the People's Assembly of a state employees law to address the increase in prices, which rose by more than 50 percent while the wages of state workers rose by only 40 percent! He also advocated closing loopholes to correct the conditions of state workers who obtained advanced qualifications during their service, and he called for solving the problem of children of Egyptian women married to foreigners.

#### The Government's Announcement Is 'Deficient'

Alliance deputy 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Ilm-al-Din attacked the government's policies, stating that: The government's announcement was deficient and lacking! The parliamentary report of the committee formed to respond to the government's announcement complements it! The deputy disclosed to the assembly the failure of local government leaders in the governorates to solve the daily problems of citizens, especially problems related to public utilities, drinking water services, electricity, sewers, road paving, bread, and the unavailability of food at reasonable prices for all levels of people!

The alliance deputy raised the issue of public sector losses, stating that: the public sector is the resource of the entire Egyptian people and it cannot be neglected. The state must work to develop it, on the condition that it lift its guardianship over the public sector and make efforts to free its administration. The public sector is Egypt's only "refuge" from danger, because it supported Egypt after the setback. The government must seek to ascertain the causes of the losses of public sector companies and remedy them. Another problem is the unavailability of foreign currency to purchase the raw materials, machinery, and equipment needed to refurbish factories. The public sector must be saved, so that it does not some day die at the hands of the government! Do not oppress the public sector, because our sale of the public sector is not in the interest of the government or Egypt.

#### Minister Rejects Water War Idea, Offers Reassurances

90OA0361A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH  
in Arabic 21 Feb 90 pp 10-11

[Interview with Engineer 'Isam Radi, minister of public works and water resources, by Suhayr al-Husayni: "AKHIR SA'AH Faces Minister of Public Works in Candid Interview: Problems in Headwaters of Blue Nile

Denied; What Is Truth About Ethiopia's Projects; 'Egypt Is Not Under Threat of Drought; the Water We Have Is Enough';" date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The question I asked Engineer 'Isam Radi, minister of public works and water resources, at the beginning of our interview with him is a question that shows anxiety. "Some people are saying that drought in Egypt is inevitable. Is that really true? And how much truth is there in the assertion that the next war, which could break out in the Middle East, will not be fought for political reasons but that it will rather be fought over water and because of conflict over the waters of the Nile River?"

The minister of irrigation is exasperated, but he speaks very calmly and says, "I categorically reject this question because it implies that the area is being threatened with war and destruction, and that is just not so. I categorically reject the notion that the waters of the Nile River will be the cause of the next war because I am convinced that friendly relations between the different countries, especially those of the Nile River basin, advance people's rights.

"I believe that the fears that are being articulated now are the result of what is being said in conferences and meetings about the waters of the Nile River. The Journalists' Association, for example, discussed the water question and the difficulties that the Nile River could face in the absence of a responsible water official to clarify the facts and explain those matters that require an explanation. And yet, I myself am optimistic, and I am quite convinced that, God willing, the future will be better than the past."

#### The Truth About Ethiopia's Projects

[AKHIR SA'AH] The fear and anxiety may be the result of the concrete facts that are being talked about. For example, construction on Ethiopia's Finch'a'a Dam, which has actually started, is being done with Italy's help, in accordance with an Israeli plan and with American financing. Ethiopia is building this dam over one of the most important tributaries of the Blue Nile, the one from which Egypt has been receiving 84 percent of its Nile waters. That will have an effect on Egypt's water quota in the near future. It is also being said that Ethiopia is making plans to build 33 projects on the river.

[Radi] First of all, the 33 projects represent Ethiopia's basic plan, and not all these projects are irrigation projects. There are, however, electricity projects among those 33, and the Finch'a'a Dam, which is a small project to irrigate a small area of land where sugarcane is cultivated, was the only project to be implemented. That land consumes no more than one-third of a billion cubic meters of water. No other projects have been implemented or are about to be implemented.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What about the remaining projects in Ethiopia's plan?

[Radi] All the projects that Italy and the United States studied have come to a standstill because there are no funds. International financing institutions have also declined to go ahead with the Upper Nile projects in general, not just in Ethiopia, unless there is agreement with the countries of the Nile River basin to ensure every country's water quota and rights.

As far as the Israeli studies are concerned, these studies are merely studies of areas that are located outside the Nile River basin and the collection area. This is the area that is connected with the tributaries that deliver water to Ethiopia and Somalia. And yet, we find that the relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt is a stable one. Neither country does anything that would affect the other or limit the other's water quota or its rights to the waters of the Nile.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Are there agreements between Egypt and Ethiopia governing the relationship between the two countries and how each one, as well as the six countries that share the waters of the Nile, can utilize the river's waters and benefit from them?

[Radi] There are old agreements between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia, including the 1902 and the 1926 agreements. These agreements stipulate that no country that receives its water from the Nile may build any project that might affect another country's water quota without consulting with these countries. The countries of the Nile River basin are engaged in a joint project for hydrometrological studies on the Equatorial plateau. Ethiopia is participating in those studies as an observer.

The United Nations Development Program [UNDP] is studying joint projects between the countries of the Nile River basin to bring about the integrated development of water sources, hydraulic power, and fish resources as well as social development and protection of the environment. The purpose of the UNDP is to see to it that these projects serve all the Nile countries. As soon as the work plan is approved and the necessary sources of funds are found, this study will begin. Experts from the countries of the Nile River basin are participating in this study. They will submit this work plan to the ministers in the countries of the Nile River basin for their approval and recommendations.

#### Water Recovery Projects

[AKHIR SA'AH] It is also being said that the water we get from the Nile represents no more than 10 percent of the water that the Nile carries to us. What do you think about that? Eighteen billion cubic meters of water are lost before this water from the Upper Nile reaches Egypt and Sudan. It is also being said that preservation of billions of cubic meters of water that are lost will be possible by establishing a few projects.

[Radi] The Egypt and Sudan Joint Technical Committee on the Waters of the Nile studied a plan to recover some of the water that is lost in the swamps in southern Sudan. This plan takes preservation of the environment into

consideration. Water recovery from these projects is estimated to be approximately 18 billion cubic meters. The initial stages of implementation were started with the establishment of the Jonglei Project, only 70 percent of which has been implemented so far. It is expected that as soon as security conditions in Sudan stabilize, this project as well as the remaining projects will be completed. Water recovery from this project is estimated to be approximately 4 billion cubic meters, which will be shared equally by Egypt and Sudan and added to their water quota in accordance with the 1959 agreement between the two countries.

The remaining projects are the Bahr al-Ghazal Project, which will save 7 billion cubic meters of water; the Mashar Area project, which will save 4 billion cubic meters; and the second stage of the Jonglei Project, which will save 3 billion cubic meters. As I mentioned, the total amount of water that these projects will save is 18 billion cubic meters, [as published] and that is the amount that will be deducted from the amount of water that is lost. Recovery of this water will have no effect on the environment.

[AKHIR SA'AH] It is being said that Egypt will be afflicted with drought in the coming years. Given the projects that you mentioned, is Egypt still living under such a threat?

[Radi] What has been said about the possibility of a drought in Egypt is not true. In fact, such a statement is unscientific, and it is based on opinions and principles that are neither scientific nor logical. One cannot make long-term predictions about a river's water supply because a river's water supply is subject to weather cycles: water supplies are sometimes scarce and sometimes abundant. That is why Egypt's High Dam was built: to serve as a long-term reservoir in which water may be stored during years when the water supply is abundant and used during the years of drought.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Your excellency, are you then ruling out the possibility that Egypt might be subject to a drought?

[Radi] No one, no matter how knowledgeable he is, can say whether or not the waters of the Nile will dry up. As we said, however, the Nile goes through cycles: sometimes the water supply is low and other times it is abundant. This has been our experience since the oldest of times. We have known that since the days of St. Joseph, may God's peace be with him.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Does Egypt have accurate devices that can measure water conditions in the Nile River and predict river conditions as well as rainfall during the coming years?

[Radi] At the present time the ministry is working with UNESCO to set up a center that will use satellites and sensors to predict rainfall and river conditions. This center will be connected to stations in countries in the

Nile River basin so these countries can share information. That will enable officials in charge to estimate the river's water supply and how heavy the rainfall will be over the area where the headwaters of the Nile are located.

### The Importance of Winter Damming

[AKHIR SA'AH] Given the trouble one must go through to get a drop of water, has Egypt thought of devising a plan or building a project to save 2.5 billion cubic meters of water, which are lost in the Mediterranean Sea in January of every year because of winter damming?

[Radi] Studies for using the northern lakes to store water, which is lost during the winter damming season, and during times when the need for water is at its lowest level are now under way. This water would then be used to irrigate the land nearby, whether it is old farm land or reclaimed land. Part of this water will also be utilized to help irrigate a winter crop cultivated on land located on the northern coast. An extension of al-Salam Canal will be used to accomplish that.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Mr. Minister, Egypt is considered the only country using pure, fresh water to spray the streets, water public gardens, and spray garages and construction sites. Isn't it time to devise a plan and place tight controls on water consumption?

[Radi] This matter concerns the Ministry of Housing. At any rate, the amount of water that is used for nonagricultural purposes is very small.

[AKHIR SA'AH] It is also known that per capita water consumption in Egypt is 1,000 cubic meters: the highest rate of per capita water consumption in the Middle East. Is there a plan to advise people on reasonable water consumption in Egypt?

[Radi] One cannot measure or compare per capita water consumption in different countries because there are differences in the number of people in those countries and in the amounts of water they have, whether that water comes from rainfall, torrential streams, or rivers. There are also differences in the areas of cultivated land as well as differences in the people's level of sophistication. That is why per capita water consumption in Egypt cannot be compared with per capita water consumption in any other country.

In general, people in Egypt consume no more than 2.7 billion cubic meters of water. Agriculture consumes more water than that: 48 billion cubic meters. The use of water for agricultural purposes is where proper guidelines are needed so that water, in any amount, can be saved. And yet, I would appeal to Egyptian citizens to use water wisely and carefully at all times, no matter how small the amounts are. Such wise use of water will give us more development projects, whose need for water is greater than ours. Using water wisely will also decrease the pressure on sanitary drainage systems.



### Changing the Irrigation System in Egypt

[AKHIR SA'AH] You mentioned that agriculture receives the largest share of Egypt's quota of Nile River water, which is 55 billion cubic meters. Agriculture gets 48 of these 55 billion cubic meters. Experts have asserted that we can save 10 percent of that amount if the irrigation system in Egypt is changed. What would you say about that?

[Radi] At the present time, the ministry is implementing the National Project for the Development of Irrigation in old farm land. The ministry is doing this to make water transportation and distribution more efficient and to upgrade the efficiency of field irrigation and recover the water that is lost. We are also concentrating on maintaining water streams and fighting weeds that grow in water. Therefore, it is projected that water consumption per feddan next year will be 5,200 cubic meters. In previous years, it was 6,500 cubic meters. This figure is less than that of advanced irrigation systems, which are found in many countries where advanced surface irrigation techniques are used. The ministry is also working with the Ministry of Land Reclamation to put emphasis on the fact that the irrigation method used in all new farm land employ the advanced irrigation techniques of sprinkling, dripping, and other methods. When the irrigation development project is completed, water needs per feddan will decrease even further. We can thus achieve the lowest level of water consumption to meet plant needs.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What is the cost of irrigating one feddan in Egypt at the present time?

[Radi] For the peasant, there is no cost because Egypt does not sell water used in agriculture.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What then is the state's irrigation cost per feddan?

[Radi] One meter of water costs 23 milliemes. This figure represents project costs and maintenance costs. As I mentioned, each feddan consumes 5.2 billion cubic meters of water. Thus, the cost of irrigating one feddan is about 150 pounds.

### Utilizing Ground Water

[AKHIR SA'AH] Has Egypt come to a point where it can really utilize water in drainage canals and ground water? Has Egypt come to the point of considering sanitary drainage water an important source of water, especially since we don't have much rainfall in our country? Is Egypt treating this drainage water?

[Radi] Yes, ground water and sanitary drainage water are now being utilized. We are also trying to increase our use of this water in accordance with a well-considered plan. There are projects, now under way, to increase our use of this water, and the most important of them might be the al-Salam Canal project, whose water comes from al-Siru and Haduth drainage canals. Other projects include the main al-Gharbiyah drainage canal project, the al-'Uyun

drainage canal project, the al-Bats drainage canal, the Wadi al-Rayan drainage canal, and many others.

[AKHIR SA'AH] Given our current water resources, do we have enough water for the state's declared agricultural expansion plan? Do we also have enough water for the plan to reclaim 150,000 feddans per year, as scheduled?

[Radi] We certainly have enough water to meet [the requirements of] the land reclamation plan. This is the water that has been made available by recycling drainage water and ground water in al-Wadi al-Jadid, in the Delta, and in the Western desert, and by reclaiming winter damming water. Then there is the water we save as a result of irrigation development. When we add Egypt's water quota from the Jonglei Canal Project, we have a total of approximately 12.7 billion cubic meters of water.

The land reclamation plan will require approximately 10 billion cubic meters of this water only. The rest will cover the expected increase in consumption of drinking water and water for industry.

[AKHIR SA'AH] We noticed that you are talking about new sources of water, which are still under construction. When will they be put to use?

[Radi] At the present time 4.6 billion cubic meters of agricultural drainage water, 2.6 billion cubic meters of ground water from reservoirs in the New Valley and the Delta, and half a billion cubic meters of water from the reservoir in the Western desert are also being utilized. The remaining amounts of water that will be saved will be made available annually and successively before the year 2000 so that all water needs, especially those for the land reclamation plan, can be met.

### The Water We Have Covers Our Needs

[AKHIR SA'AH] You announced in the Advisory Council that by the year 2000, Egypt will need 70 billion cubic meters of water because of the increase in the population and also because of expansion in agriculture and industry. Our water quota from the Nile, however, is 55.5 billion cubic meters only. Is there a specific plan to make the remaining quantity of water available?

[Radi] Egypt is now using approximately 60 billion cubic meters of water, which is our water quota from the Nile plus, as I mentioned, agricultural drainage water and ground water. We will get to the point of having more than 70 billion cubic meters of water available by utilizing drainage water, winter damming, ground water, and other methods that will save 12.7 billion cubic meters. Thus, by the year 2000, we will have approximately 72.7 billion cubic meters of water. God willing, this will be enough for all our needs.

[AKHIR SA'AH] As you said, the flood this year was average. Will the river's water supply this year be enough to meet our various needs, or will we have to draw upon our water reserves?

[Radi] The amount of water that will be coming into the High Dam lake until the end of the water year in July will enable us to withhold on discharging any additional water from the lake, and that means that water levels in the lake by the end of the water year will be the same as last year's.

#### Protecting the River From Pollution

[AKHIR SA'AH] All environmental protection agencies are now working on fighting pollution in Egypt. In this plan to fight pollution, how much attention is being given to protecting the Nile River from pollution?

[Radi] In accordance with Law No. 48 for 1982, we have been diligently fighting pollution in all water streams and in the Nile River. All sources of pollution, be they individuals, organizations, or private and public institutions, have been narrowed down, and a copy of this list of polluters has been sent to the various governorates and ministries. Accordingly, approximately 36,000 violations, representing more than 50 percent of all violations, have been removed. The ministries of industry, housing, and local government have an intense program to give priority to waste treatment projects that will treat waste materials, which are being discharged into streams by factories, villages, and cities. The ministries want work on these projects to be completed during the third plan.

As far as the remaining violations for polluting the Nile are concerned, the ministry's agencies are working with the surface water police. Local agencies and the Environmental Affairs Agency are working on removing these violations or working with the violators to clean up the pollution in accordance with health standards comprised in the law.

[AKHIR SA'AH] In your judgment, do we need to stiffen and strengthen the law that is supposed to protect the waters of the Nile from pollution so that the goals that are required can be achieved in the coming stage?

[Radi] Law No. 48 for 1982, which protects the Nile and water streams from pollution, comprises all the strict penalties and the special standards for specifications that must be met by liquids that may be discharged into water streams. Violations for polluting the river and the water streams decreased by over 50 percent as a result of the application of this law.

[AKHIR SA'AH] What you say in your interviews and in the statements you make makes us always feel that you are very optimistic about the future of water in Egypt. What are the reasons for your optimism?

[Radi] I am not optimistic, but I do base what I say in the statements I make and the interviews I give on scientific principles and a well-considered scientific plan. What I say is also based on accurate and confirmed data. It behooves us to say here that statements and declarations should be made only by specialists to ensure their accuracy.

#### Writer Voices Optimism for Gorbachev Regime

90OA0334A Cairo AKHIR SA'AH  
in Arabic 7 Feb 90 pp 3-5

[Article by Muhammad Wajdi Qandil: "Looking at the Nineties: What Will Gorbachev's Fate Be? The Winds of Change and the Soviet Empire; What Will Become of Gorbachev and the Second Empire?"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] It is not possible to predict what Gorbachev's next step will be. Nor can one predict what he will decide to do to strengthen reform measures and remove the strict restrictions that are still thwarting his movements. It is also not possible to predict what he will do to abandon the compromises that hard-line conservatives in the party are still intent on.

It may be said, however, that Gorbachev is not Khrushchev and that his fate in the foreseeable future will not be like Khrushchev's because he understands the mistakes made by his predecessors in the Kremlin who ruled under the umbrella of a communist government. Gorbachev's fate will not be like Khrushchev's because Gorbachev understands that the spirit of the age will not tolerate forever the repression and subjugation of Soviet citizens. [passage omitted]

It may also be said that what the United States finds disturbing is the possibility that Gorbachev might fall and perestroika might collapse. The United States finds such a possibility disturbing because it would mean a return to the cold war, a return to the nuclear arms race, and a return of the hard-line communist regimes in Eastern Europe. That is why after it was rumored [that Gorbachev would give up his position as president of the party and keep his position as head of state], President Bush promptly contacted Gorbachev, the friend, to find out how he was and to assure himself that he was still in power and in command in the Kremlin. [passage omitted]

This seems to make it clear that there is no evidence that Gorbachev's position has been weakened and that he is preparing himself for a new stage, following the meeting of the Central Committee, in which he would be able to put into action the radical decisions that are necessary for a reform policy. [passage omitted]

So far, Gorbachev is still able to avoid the difficult question that covers his enormous troubles: is perestroika a process of change or is it a revolution? It is a question that has become even more acute because of the problem of nationalities and the ethnic conflict that erupted in the republics that lie beyond the Caucasus.

When perestroika or restructuring was first introduced, it was first thought that perestroika would be facing an economic problem and that it would try to get the Soviet economy out of the slump it was in. But the fact of the matter is, that perestroika, too, was facing the perilous problem of nationalities. [passage omitted]



It would be unfair to blame Gorbachev for the events in Azerbaijan. It would also be unfair to blame him for using force to intervene and for sending the army to suppress the internal unrest between Shi'ite Azeris and Armenians. Gorbachev had to use force to intervene and to stop the murderous ethnic conflict that was turning into a civil war in the southern Muslim republics.

It would be unfair to blame Gorbachev because what happened was the product of years of neglect. For many years the deep-seated roots of the problem were neglected and ignored, and that is one of the elements of the crisis in which the Kremlin's top man finds himself.

Approximately two years ago Gorbachev had described his philosophy of change, perestroika, as a revolution without gunfire. But because of the ethnic conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, perestroika turned into a revolution with gunfire after Soviet troops used force to intervene in and suppress the growing unrest. Gorbachev had no other choice. [passage omitted]

It seems that indications of a civil war in regions beyond the Caucasus left Gorbachev with no other choice and created a special situation, which could only be dealt with by the use of force. As commentators in Moscow say, "If Gorbachev made a mistake, his mistake was that he did not send the army sooner."

Despite what happened in Azerbaijan, however, Gorbachev remains determined to hold on to his democratic policy for reform. He insists that there will be no return and no retreat from the previous principles. At the same time, he warns that calls for independence and separation from the Soviet Union, which are being made in some republics, and attempts to break up the Soviet Union could destroy his reform program and his political position. This was what Gorbachev said when he talked with the public in Lithuania. Gorbachev was actually facing a difficult choice as he faced his hard-line opponents in the Kremlin. [passage omitted]

Thus, American interests in Eastern Europe coincide with Gorbachev's policy and with stability in the Soviet Union. It would not be in the interests of the United States if the Soviet giant were to collapse and if chaos were to pervade the Soviet Union. Nor would it be in the interests of the United States if unrest were to prevail in the Caucasian, Baltic, and other republics. Sending the Soviet army to put an end to the conflict between Azeris and Armenians is one thing, but what would Washington do if Gorbachev were to send the army to silence those voices that are calling for independence in the Baltic republics?

This U.S. position resembles that that was taken on the possibility that the Soviets might intervene in Romania after the Ceausescu regime fell. At that time U.S. Secretary of State Baker said, "The United States will not object if Soviet soldiers are sent to Romania to mop up what is left there of the Ceausescu regime."

It seems that the U.S. administration is making a distinction between an acceptable and an unacceptable use of force. An

acceptable use of force would be to use Soviet troops to lay down the foundations of democracy and to put an end to ethnic conflict. The unacceptable use of force would be to use force to silence legitimate political expression.

The demands made by the Baltic republics, however, are more difficult. The United States has maintained the position of not recognizing the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The Bush administration, however, preferred to say nothing; it refrained from expressing full support for these republics' demands for independence from Moscow so as not to embarrass Gorbachev. In fact, the Bush administration turned a deaf ear to the calls that were being made for political change. Washington would not acknowledge the existence of these calls, not because it sympathizes with Gorbachev, but because it sympathizes with its own interests. [passage omitted]

Thus, the magnitude of the challenge that Gorbachev is facing and that is threatening the Soviet empire becomes clear. This challenge manifests itself in the eruption of national feelings, ethnic conflict, and independent tendencies. This earthshaking development is a greater threat to the Soviet entity than the collapse of communism itself would be.

The crisis lies in the fact that Lenin and his successors, including Gorbachev, believed that such a day would never come. [passage omitted]

Lenin thought that he could turn the vast, multi-ethnic empire into a single nation, and Stalin thought that the Red Army and the KGB had the ability to control the empire and to hold it together. However, history proved that both men were wrong. Gorbachev came along and understood the mistake, but to what extent did he understand it?

Gorbachev was convinced that since the winds of change were blowing, there was no choice but to change so he would not lose control over the far reaches of the empire. Change was the only choice: with change history would not repeat itself, and the Soviet republics would not break away from the empire, leaving it with no other republic but Russia. This is the strong weapon Gorbachev is using against "the conservatives."

That is why betting now that Gorbachev will fall seems to be a losing proposition. It seems hasty and short-sighted for several reasons.

1. In confronting the difficult challenges and the mounting problems that previous administrations left behind, such as the economic problem, the ethnic conflict, and the pro-independence and separatist tendencies, the top man in the Kremlin has not put all his cards on the table. Gorbachev has proved that he can make a 180-degree turn. He proved that, when necessary, he can use a measured amount of force as an alternative to dialogue to protect the internal situation and to keep the Soviet empire intact.

2. Among the hardliners there is no alternative to Gorbachev. Ligachov cannot confront the changes that are taking place on the Soviet and international scenes by going back to Stalinism because doing that would be anachronistic. Accordingly, progress is to be made by moving ahead with perestroika, not by going back to what preceded it. If such progress is not made, the Soviet empire will disintegrate and its mainstays will collapse no matter how much force is used. At the same time, the hardliners find Gorbachev to be better than others, and they have no alternative to his policy.

If what is being said turns out to be true and if Gorbachev does at some point in time resign his position as leader of the party while keeping his position as head of state, that will not mean that he is giving up power. Quite the contrary, such a move would strengthen Gorbachev's power. The symbolic nature of the position of head of state in the Soviet Union will change after Article 6 of the Constitution, which gave the Communist Party the leadership role, is repealed and the principle of multiple parties is adopted. This would mean that power in the Soviet Union would shift and that Gorbachev's rule would be based on parliamentary legitimacy and not on party legitimacy, as is the case now. It would mean that Gorbachev would not have to defend the party in case of its possible collapse, as was the case in Eastern European countries.

With regard to political maneuvers, a game which Gorbachev has mastered, Gorbachev is holding a winning hand that contains many cards.

With regard to confronting the hardliners or the "conservative wing" of the party who have been accusing him of being less than firm and vigorous in dealing with ethnic unrest, Gorbachev's intervention with the army in Azerbaijan refutes that claim and proves that Gorbachev is maintaining firm control.

With regard to the deterioration of economic conditions, Gorbachev is capable of using poor economic conditions as evidence that the compromises favored by the conservatives to preserve socialism are no longer useful. That is why a shift to radical reform solutions is mandatory.

The announcement of the U.S. military budget at this time, with the reduction it showed in military spending and the eventual closing of U.S. military bases abroad, especially in Europe, gives Gorbachev a strong argument he can use to confront criticism from hardliners and from the military establishment that making concessions to the West in the matter of arms reduction and nuclear disarmament does not pay off. [passage omitted]

#### **Military Factory Explosion Kills One, Injures Four** 45000113 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 13 Mar 90 p 5

[Text] One worker was killed and four others were injured in an explosion in the ammunition loading department of Military Factory 45.

The injured were taken to the Armed Forces hospital in al-Ma'adi and the prosecutor's office has begun investigating the causes of the incident. It has been reported that the technical report was completed for submission to the prosecutor's office.

The concrete walls surrounding the department kept the explosion from spreading into the factory's other departments.

#### **Tough Tactics Against Religious Extremists Urged** 90OA0358A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 18 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by 'Ali al-Dali: "The Making of a New Khomeyni?"]

[Text] What does it mean that there was a plan by the leaders of terrorism in Egypt to release test balloons after the departure of Zaki Badr and the coming of minister "Shaykh al-'Arab"

Is there a plan to penetrate security?

As for minister "Shaykh al-'Arab," he was up to the responsibility and demonstrated indeed that the post of interior minister cannot be penetrated.

Penetrating security is one of the terrorist plans. When President Husni Mubarak issued his decree replacing the interior minister, not a citizen in Egypt thought that this change had come to benefit terrorism and to give the leaders of these groups free rein to make Egypt explode from one end to the other and to kindle the fires of strife, that through them might emerge a new Egyptian Khomeyni, as happened in Iran. Egypt's Khomeyni may now be in the process of formation. He may be being prepared by hidden forces—the same hidden forces hostile to Egypt's revival that aborted Egypt's renaissance in the age of Muhammad 'Ali. These forces have lain in wait throughout history to abort the Egyptian renaissance, whenever the sail of this renaissance appeared on the horizon.

Egypt's newly made and programmed Khomeyni is now being prepared. He is, in fact, being readied to abort this renaissance in the name of Islam. (Muhammad's religion is to be a tool of destruction, not a tool of construction; a tool of backwardness, not a tool of civilization.)

In the mind of a terrorist leader or [Islamic] group commander such as 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, religion is now the best means available to abort Egypt's modern renaissance. The terrorist moves we are seeing against Islamic scholars, against the arts, and against ideas and culture in general are but a prelude to the darkness coming upon us from dens of bearded men and commanders of disaster, misery, and boredom.

Now they beat writers and artists in the Palace of Culture of al-Minya with chains; and the minister of culture doesn't know, or doesn't make a move!

Why doesn't any government official move to confront terrorism seriously? Now only brave, stalwart policemen, who have always risked death, are moving. They strive with unmatched bravery, but no Egyptian helps or aids them—despite the fact that they are dying as martyrs for Egypt.

Forward, "Shaykh al-'Arab"!

What does it mean that on the outskirts of 'Ayn Shams the earth suddenly spews forth 20 bearded, masked criminals, who surround a police car and begin to set the passengers on fire with bombs and kill them with knives? What does it mean that people stand watching the bloody scene and do not intervene?

Is it fear of chains?

Yes, it is fear of bloody violence. I know for a fact that violence must be confronted with even stronger violence to stop it. The terrorists are not going to drop their chains, guns, and Molotov cocktails because of polite exhortation, dialogue led by a high-sounding jurist, or a statement from the Islamic scholars of Egypt.

The issue is too big for hushed, abject dialogue behind closed doors or on the television screen. The problem is that terrorism in the name of religion is an imported plot aimed at bringing Khomeynism to power in Egypt, so as to transform Egypt from advancement to setback and from building to battles and wars in the name of the Koran, as happened in Iran. Just as Khomeyni, the Murderer, came to the fore during a political explosion inside Iran, terrorism is now attempting to make Egypt explode politically, so that Egypt's Khomeyni can appear, ushered in by foreign intelligence agencies, carrying a Koran, ruling with fire and the sword, and violating the peace, so that Israel...It gives one pause! The problem is not one of youths wearing galabias and carrying chains. The problem is much, much bigger.

The problem is that Egypt's Khomeyni has already been produced and scheduled. The stupid, imbecile information media have to publish his pictures in the newspapers. They have to hold dialogue with him. They have to hurry to him to hold a press conference in al-Fayyum, as if he were a great political leader, a leading thinker, a proponent of culture, or someone with a glorious past.

Nothing but a *faqih* ["jurist"—used to designate Islamic scholars qualified only to teach children in traditional rural Koranic schools], like the millions of *faqihs* that we hear every day echoing worn-out, yellowed words repeated from worn-out, yellowed, boring books that extinguished the rays of the resurgence and destroyed the culture of Islam!

A *faqih* in al-Fayyum moves. He moves according to an imported program, yet his moves are announced, and lawyers, journalists, engineers, doctors come to his assistance with statements in the name of freedom and democracy issued by the administrative councils of these unions, which the bearded ones have infiltrated. In the

absence of the majority, these have become the people who speak for the Egyptian elite, i.e., for people of knowledge and thought.

Gentlemen, the problem is bigger than the problem of a cowardly, bearded youth.

It is bigger than the problem of a knife-wielding young man who stabbed a police general a few days ago in al-Azhar Street. The general, Muhammad 'Isam-al-Din, was inside his car. He had committed no crime, other than being one of the guardians of Egypt who are now destined to oppose terrorism in Egypt alone, while every responsible person in Egypt, be he journalist or minister, looks on and shows off in his ministry or newspaper. What is the use of having a Culture Ministry in Egypt that does not launch a powerful intellectual current to alert the people of Egypt against the terrorist groups and unite their minds in confronting this great tribulation?

Yes, what is the use of a Culture Ministry that has no role in defending or warning the mind of the generation?

What is the use of a national press that does not oppose traitors?

After the attempted murder of a police general in al-Azhar Street by a bearded scoundrel controlled by a programmed leader in al-Fayyum, what do we expect?

After the organization of simultaneous armed demonstrations in Asyut, al-Fayyum, and Cairo, allegedly to test the position of "Shaykh al-'Arab"...?

Has "Shaykh al-'Arab" come to pave the way for a new Khomeyni and to usher him into power with a police escort?

Even the opposition press has admitted the plot made by the programmed supreme commander in al-Fayyum. From now on, he has to be surrounded with silence. No newspaper ought to publish a picture of him or a word of his. The newspaper AL-SHA'B, the organ of the Muslim Brotherhood, takes this murderer under its wing. It publishes interviews with him and enlarged pictures. AL-SHA'B is hawking religion in the halls of politics to further its owners' stupid political ambition.

Setting police officers on fire at their posts and killing them with knives while they cross the street—what next?

Isn't this the same plot as that of the Muslim Brotherhood during the forties, when they firebombed police stations and tried to kill policemen in a truck in front of 'Abdin police station? But for the kindness of God and the fact that the fuse of the bomb did not burn, more than 30 policemen and officers would have died at the hand of that criminal Muslim brother.

The events of 'Ayn Shams, al-Azhar Street, and Thabit Street in Asyut all occurred simultaneously last week. Shouldn't these events awaken our minds just once, so that we change our attitude toward the so-called Islamic groups, so that we as a people and government deal with

them on the basis of their being armed criminal gangs that must be eliminated in order to save Egypt from the Khomeynism that is on the march now in the name of democracy to eliminate culture?

As for the writers who work in the national newspapers and who edit whole pages every week describing this current of crime and treachery as "the Islamic current," we must speak out against them, exposing their destructive role in supporting Egypt's planned future Khomeyni.

What is now on the move with chains, knives, and bombs in the cities of Egypt is not this Islamic current. It is a current of gangs of highwaymen working on behalf of Khomeynism on instructions from across the borders to plunge Egypt into a swamp of backwardness.

In recent years, this current that the writers of Khomeynism in Egypt describe as "Islamic" has produced the sort of people who threaten Egypt and the security of the people—people who lead criminal operations either bloody or economic to tear Egypt apart.

This current has produced the likes of al-Rayyan, the wonder of international criminals—and rightfully so! He was able to destroy thousands of Egyptian families, scatter the money of thousands of young men and women, and bring grief, suffering, and misery upon hundreds of thousands of victims who came to have not even a mouthful of bread to assuage their hunger.

It has produced the likes of the bloody mufti of al-Fayyum, who admitted before a gathering of Muslims in an Iranian Islamic club in London three years ago that he had received the *fatwa* [formal legal opinion in Islamic law] to kill Anwar al-Sadat. The killing had occurred; he was proud of it, boasted of it, and gloried in it.

It has produced the likes of the holy war commander in Manfalut who led the Asyut demonstrations a few days ago, smashed jewelry stores, and opened fire on the police. Before him, the accursed current produced the likes of the hireling murders who killed more than 100 unarmed soldiers and officers in Asyut on the day of the reviewing stand incident.

This criminal current produced the criminal who killed the police officer in 'Ayn Shams a few months ago. It produced the illiterate commander who practiced the profession of car theft and attacking women with chains.

This current has produced a mindless, uncultured, unpatriotic generation whose goal is to destroy the fatherland and set fire to the country.

What are we waiting for?

Can one confront this criminal current that hired pens classify as "Islamic," can we eliminate it by democracy and dialogue?

This is a question that requires a national convention of the National [Democratic] Party, which now is absent

from the entire political scene and from the professional unions, with the result that terrorism has them all to itself, and the programmed Khomeyni in al-Fayyum directs them.

#### **Al-Minya Police, Copts, IJ Leader Discuss Violence** *90AA0012A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 13 Mar 90 p 2*

[Article by Ashraf Khalil and Qutub 'Arabi: "At Center of al-Minya Incidents; as Usual, Everybody Accuses Everybody Else; It Is Time for This Criminal Series to End; Muhyi-al-Din 'Isa (Alliance): Many Reasons for Flareup; Frankness and Openness Necessary To Deal With Situation; General Director of Awqaf: We Denounce Position of All Parties; Islamic Jama'ah Amir: 'Prostitution' Network Is Actual Reality; Instead of Exposing It, Security Turned Around To Strike Us; Incidents Are Rebellion To Avenge Violated Honor; Our Role in Incidents Is Limited; al-Minya Governor: I Have Issued Orders for Dismissal of Any Radical Involved in Sedition From Schools"]

[Text] The regrettable recent incidents in al-Minya Governorate have aroused numerous questions and suspicions on the true nature of these incidents, on the role Islamic and Christian groups have played in them, and on whether the rumor that young Muslim women were seduced and forced to engage in prostitution is true.

Moreover, what are the real "accumulations" or reasons behind these incidents? What is the position of the various parties and what are the visions projected to prevent the recurrence of such incidents?

AL-SHA'B went to the site of the incidents and met with all parties, listening to them and recording their testimonies.

Even though we disagree with some opinions and object to the principle of dividing the nation into two separate and warring elements, we emphasize that the security methods with which such incidents are tackled intensify the incidents and fail to draw a clear solution for them.

We also emphasize that it is necessary to form a neutral factfinding committee to investigate the facts and to set matters aright in order to preserve the unity and cohesion of the nation's two elements and so as to expose the foreign plots aimed at our national unity.

To begin, we interviewed Major General 'Abd-al-Tawwab Rashwan, al-Minya governor, who tried in the interview to understate the matter and to belittle the dimensions of the incidents. He said that he issued his instructions to the executive leaderships to tour the governorate's villages and centers in order to respond to the rumors that had caused the regrettable incidents experienced by the town of Abu Qurqas in the wake of last week's Friday prayers to intensify. After the prayers, the congregators, led by a number of radical youths who had instigated the citizens with the story of young

Muslim women being seduced and violated by Christian youths, proceeded to attack a number of churches and businesses owned by Christians and to set them afire. However, the security forces were able to gain full control of the situation. The prosecution is currently investigating the incidents so that the culprits may be punished.

Regarding dialogue with the Islamic Jama'ah youth, the governor said: More than one meeting has been held with them. But dialogue with some of them is futile because they accuse us of failing to serve the citizens. When we succeeded in dealing with certain aspects of the failure, they proceeded to spread a new series of suspicions and rumors. This is why I have issued a decree providing for the dismissal of any radical who takes part in creating sedition and for transferring teachers to office jobs.

#### Security Observes Incidents

In an endeavor to find out how the incidents started, we listened to Lieutenant Colonel Fahmi, al-Minya intelligence chief, who said: The situation exploded with the emergence of a leaflet distributed by the Islamic Jama'ah to the citizens, entitled "Wipe Out the Disgrace, O Muslims." In the leaflet, the Jama'ah speaks of a prostitution network led by a number of Christian youths who seduce young Muslim women. The leaflet says that this network is part of an international scheme aimed at humiliating the Muslims. When people got hold of this leaflet, they got angry and demonstrations broke out everywhere.

[AL-SHA'B] Why did not the security agencies investigate the true nature of what was mentioned in the leaflet?

[Fahmi] This is what actually happened. Some members of the Jama'ah gave me the information they had. I took it seriously and began to actually investigate in order to discover more details about the alleged network. However, I found out that this rumor was groundless and that it amounted to no more than sick fantasies expressed to them by a young woman under pressure and threats, and that the whole thing was no more than relations between a group of secondary school boys and girls, some of them Christian and some Muslim, who took walks along the corniche and sat together at seaside cafes.

These are the statements of al-Minya security and administrative officials. But what does the first party to this problem, namely the brother Copts, say?

This is why we interviewed numerous Coptic leaderships, headed by Abba Arthyanus, al-Minya Governorate Orthodox Coptic bishop, who assured us that these incidents will end and that love and peace will be restored.

He added: The solution to this crisis is to find out those who created this situation and to take the necessary legal measures to prevent them from committing such acts again.

He added: The church has ecclesiastic penalties with which to put every culprit in his place. The church is also

inclined to investigate the recent incidents independently of the judiciary investigations.

The bishop announced that he appeals to his Christian brothers to tackle matters wisely and not to be carried away by rumors.

Abba Arthyanus instructed Reverend Saydarusi Matta, the vicar of Prince Tadrus Church in al-Minya, to answer all our questions.

#### Church and Position Toward Incidents

Regarding the start of the incidents, Reverend Matta said: They erupted suddenly in al-Fikriyah and Abu Qurqas. There was no prior warning to alert one to expect individual incidents of dissension to occur because the Muslims and Christians in Abu Qurqas are united. What has happened is due to some leaflets rumoring that there are those who commit debauchery and the proscribed in an Islamic society and that the victims of this debauchery are some young Muslim women. These leaflets angered young men and women and the populace, thus leading the incidents to a painful path without any thought or consideration.

[AL-SHA'B] Why did not the church move as soon as that leaflet was distributed and denounce the perpetrators, if the details are proven to be true?

[Matta] As soon as the rumor spread, we contacted the Islamic Call and *awqaf* [Islamic religious endowment] people in al-Minya. Shaykh Ahmad Hindi, the *awqaf* director, instructed mosque preachers to refute these rumors. The Christian churches and associations also denied these rumors.

[AL-SHA'B] But why didn't you respond with a written statement?

[Matta] We cannot answer a leaflet with a written leaflet. We, as churches, are not entitled to do this. All we can do is preach and make personal contacts with friends. Such preaching is performed every Friday at Prince Tadrus Church under the leadership of Abba Arthyanus.

[AL-SHA'B] But the Muslims have not heard that you have condemned anybody?

[Matta] We say this in our churches. I am a participant in al-Minya information caravan. We conduct tours with the Muslim ulema to clarify these matters. We cannot respond with written statements so that nobody may print leaflets in the future and attribute them to us.

[AL-SHA'B] We have heard from some Muslim youths that there are manifestations that provoke them, such as the construction and renovation of numerous churches without a permit.

[Matta] These are excesses.

Regarding the Copts' position on the Islamic *shari'a* [Islamic law], Reverend Matta said: It has been proven to us historically that Christianity has lived in complete



peace in Egypt since the Islamic conquest. Therefore, we have no fear of having the regime characterized as being Islamic. We appreciate the efforts al-Azhar makes in connection with the laws that prevail in Egypt.

#### At Center of Incidents

AL-SHA'B left the church premises to meet with another number of Christians who have been harmed, including Kamil Tamir, a member of the Council of the Queen of Peace Catholic Coptic Church; Dr. Camille, Kamil Tamir's brother whose pharmacy was completely destroyed; 'Adil Munir Zaki, a shop owner; 'Adil Kamil Bibawi, and Subhi Bishri whose shops were also destroyed. They told us how the incidents developed after prayers two Fridays ago when some ordinary citizens set the shop of Sa'd Habib Sayyidayn (Ashraf's father) afire and then began to burn the pharmacies, destroying some of them completely and smashing the others. Some shops and vehicles owned by Christians were also burned. All this was done while the security stood still.

#### We Accuse Security

We also met with a number of Christians from the Virgin Mary Church, part of which was destroyed by fire, led by Reverend Yunis, the church pastor. At Mar Jirjis Church which was fully burnt down, we met with another number of Christian youths. At Manhari monastery near Abu Qurqas, we met with Archpriest Ya'qub Mattiyas who declined to speak to us (on ecclesiastic instructions from the bishopric) whereas youngmen proceeded to tell us about the harm they suffered from the incidents. Each of them described what he suffered in detail.

Majdi Hilmi, a lawyer and a Christian leader, said: The incidents did not end with the burning of the carpentry shop owned by 'Adli Hanna Bulus in al-Fikriyah on Wednesday evening. The culprits were not arrested. The same happened in al-Barba al-Kubra.

Hilmi added: All of us as Christians accuse security of extreme failure (the rest of those present at the church agreed with him). The security forces did not move till long after the incidents had taken place. We mention in particular Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim, the intelligence chief, and Major Nizar Fikri, the assistant intelligence chief.

The charges they made against Lt. Col. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim include the charge that he performed the Friday prayers at al-Haqq Mosque with the Islamic Jama'ah, that he had known that the Jama'ah would stage a demonstration, that he did not act promptly to confront the violence, that he had taken away the ammunition from the weapon of the soldier on guard in front of Mar Jirjis Church, and that he rebuked Dr. Murad Danyal and refused to help him when the doctor told him that he had been attacked by Muslims. They demanded that these two officers be dismissed or transferred from Abu Qurqas.

#### Rumors Against Security

At the Abu Qurqas Police Center, we met with Lt. Col. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hakim, the intelligence chief, and confronted him with the charges made against him. He said: Regarding the charge that I performed the Friday prayer at al-Haqq Mosque with the radicals, that I had known they they were going to stage a demonstration, and that I had agreed to it: it is untrue. I performed the Friday prayers at the Police Center Mosque, along with a large number of colleagues. This is attested to by the mosque preacher and the center commander. As to the allegation that I did not do my duty regarding the report filed by Dr. Murad Danyal, it suffices that he came to us and declared that he had not made any statement saying such things to AL-AHALI. He apologized to us and thanked the police for their efforts. This information was confirmed to us by Archpriest Ya'qub Mitlir.

Lt. Col. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim added: As to the statement that I had taken away the ammunition from the weapon of the soldier on guard in front of Mar Jirjis Church, let whoever saw this come and face me. As to whoever says that I did not act as soon as the incidents broke out, he is an outright liar because I and all the police forces were in the street before any fires broke out and as soon as we learned that the citizens had gathered immediately after the Friday prayers. We sent the congregators away after the prayers. Then the fires broke out at various sites far from the mosque. A total of 37 individuals were arrested while attacking some places. I personally arrested a large number of them. Any reports we receive are investigated immediately and security steps are taken to prevent the outbreak of violence.

In our search for the true dimensions of the incidents, we had to meet with the Islamic Jama'ah youths about whom allegations and rumors have been coming in succession, some charging them with igniting the sedition fires and some with committing the reprehensible, all without anybody listening to these youths. So we met with Shaykh 'Ali al-Dinari, the amir of al-Minya Islamic Jama'ah, who is a youth in his thirties.

[AL-SHA'B] How did you discover what you call the prostitution network—a discovery in whose light the violence erupted?

[Al-Dinari] We discovered the network when we went to advise a young woman on her illegitimate relationship with a young man. The surprise came when the young woman said: I am not alone. There are 22 school and university female students with me. She then mentioned the matter of the dangerous network before her brother, giving details, names, and addresses. When we asked her about the place of the network, she gave us the address [which turned out to be that of] a Christian woman who accompanies the young women to be seduced to an apartment on the pretext of visiting a relative or of getting a lecture book from a colleague in the apartment. There, the young woman to be seduced finds a young man who tries to have sex with her by force. When the

woman fails to fight him and capitulates, the couple is photographed. A university student then waits for the seduced woman at her school gate and threatens her with the photograph until she gives in!

Shaykh al-Dinari added: The young woman also detailed what occurs in that nest and mentioned the positions which we would be ashamed to mention and which cannot possibly be a figment of the imagination. The girl mentioned the names of couples who engage in sex and we checked the information and found it to be completely true.

[AL-SHA'B] Why didn't you notify the responsible authorities?

[Al-Dinari] (Smiling) How can we deliver the lamb to the wolf? Regrettably, the responsible authorities in al-Minya pay no attention to such issues. They get angry at the mere mention of the proliferation of these violations. There is more than one precedent in which we notified the authorities concerned only to find the matter turned against us. Add to this the fact that an officer is involved in this network. This officer gave one of the whores a card with which to get into the officers' mess at the center of the camp! Even if intelligence shows interest, issues citations, and prosecutes, then what is the law in accordance with which these people are punished? It is a positive law which contains a thousand loopholes by which these people are found not guilty. Even if they are convicted, what is the punishment they get?

Al-Dinari added: The *shari'a* considers this sort of act an act that spreads corruption through the land and one for which the penalty is obvious, namely: "The punishment of those who wage war against God and His Apostle, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting of hand and feet, or exile from the land." God is always true.

[AL-SHA'B] But security accuses you of escalating the incidents and of igniting the situation in Abu Qurqas?

[Al-Dinari] To the contrary. Security is the party responsible for the escalation. Instead of directing their efforts to arrest this network's members, the security people have turned their attention to the Islamic Jama'ah, harassing it and arresting a number of its members. As for the Abu Qurqas incidents, they started when the inhabitants saw the security forces (nine armored vehicles) positioned next to the mosque during the Friday prayers. During the sermon, the security forces moved closer to the mosque, thus arousing the congregators against the security and almost causing clashes to erupt. When the prayers ended, the citizens felt that the security was going to annihilate the Jama'ah youths and so they poured their wrath on both the security and the Christians to retaliate for the acts they had committed and to avenge their honor.

[AL-SHA'B] But you instigated the citizens to commit those acts?

[Al-Dinari] We did not instigate anybody. Abu Qurqas is an independent town that is remote from al-Minya. People there do not need us to instigate them. The provocative acts the Christians commit there are deeply implanted in the people's hearts.

[AL-SHA'B] Assuming that the matter of this network is true, then should we rebel because of whores?

[Al-Dinari] It is not for the whores but, first, for those who could be trapped and embroiled, especially since the network resorts to threats with photographs, with murder, and with inducement with a lot of money.

Second, because this cell is a cell of depravity and corruption that is capable of flooding the entire society.

Third, because it is intended to trap Muslim women.

Fourth, because the presence of this network must raise the question: Where are the security agencies that have allowed this network to spread corruption throughout two years?

Fifth, because the number of those involved has exceeded 40 young women, most of them seduced.

Sixth, because of the presence of foreign elements in the network. This means that the films photographed are shown outside Egypt. Isn't this cause enough to rebel?

Finally, Shaykh al-Dinari stressed that he does not exclude the possibility of the presence of radical Christian elements who participated with the citizens in burning the churches with the aim of instigating the security and the various authorities against the Islamic Jama'ah. In this regard, he referred to the three Christian youths who were arrested on this charge but who were then released like other citizens due to the lack of evidence.

We then met with Shaykh Ahmad Hindi, the *awqaf* director general, who condemned the incidents and blamed all the parties that participated in them. At the outset, he commented on the leaflet distributed by the Islamic Jama'ah, stressing that it is in conflict with the teachings and principles of Islam which dictate that wickedness may not be publicized. The leaflet mentioned names and this mention has harmed other people with similar names.

His eminence added: Anybody who accuses a Muslim of suffering from a fault has to bring four witnesses to confirm the accusation, else Islam punishes him for slander. Shaykh Hindi noted that the leaflet deals with suspected or conjectured incidents learned from a contestable source, namely the young woman whom the Jama'ah alleges confessed to having lived sinfully for a long time. So how could her testimony be accepted?

After condemning the leaflet, his eminence turned to the other side, namely the Christians, saying: There have been some violations and these have prepared the people to accept the information in the leaflet.



He also denounced the weak position taken by the Christian leaderships toward the incidents. The mufti and the minister of *awqaf* have visited these leaderships to erase the effects of the incidents on their souls. These leaderships should have proven their goodwill and told us what they have done, keeping in mind that they are aware of the dreadful steps that have been taken against those who attacked them. Why haven't we heard their voices and why haven't these leaderships issued a statement commenting on the circulated rumors.

#### Escape From Confrontation

We have tried to interview Major General Mahir Hasan, al-Minya security director. But he has refused to talk to us and has avoided confronting the accusations raised by everybody regarding the security agencies' responsibility for the eruption of violence and regarding the agencies' laxity in dealing with the crisis, even though they had been aware of it since the start of the incidents.

#### Frank Approach Is Needed

At the conclusion of our tour in the center of the incidents, we interviewed Engineer 'Isa Muhyi-al-Din, the alliance deputy and one of al-Minya's Islamic leaders, who stressed that it is necessary to deal with the roots which led to igniting the situation in this manner. He said: The issue must be tackled frankly and with openness, not with glittering slogans about national unity. The minister of *awqaf* and the mufti will not solve the problem with their visits but by penetrating to the deep roots of this problem which will continue to be flammable at any moment. Even though I doubt some of the leaflet's contents, I still stress that the last issue [mentioned by the leaflet] specifically has been known to the security agencies. It has been known for a time that students from the girls secondary school go to furnished apartments and engage in prostitution. Yet, nobody has made a move. If the security and government role disappears, then we should not condemn strongly some ardently enthusiastic youth if they fight this reprehensible activity.

The Islamic deputy asked, wondering: Why is it that when the phrase sectarian sedition is uttered, only Muslims are mentioned as a party to this problem. Why isn't the Christian side mentioned? Protecting national unity is a responsibility shouldered by all parties. To speak differently is to provoke the Muslims, especially when the officials and the security men focus their attention on the Islamists only, arresting and torturing them. There are now 150 detainees suffering most severely at a time when the Christian culprits have been released, even though they should have been subjected to a just and open trial, without allowing the matter to assume a sectarian character. The church must take a definite position on whether it accepts or rejects this sort of behavior and must declare this position.

Muhyi-al-Din 'Isa added: The Christians have committed numerous mistakes throughout the years. Generally, the Christians must, says Muhyi-al-Din 'Isa, prove their goodwill as we try to prove our goodwill and our sincere intentions on every occasion. With such a spirit,

we can end this tension forever. This issue has touched off a problem which must be solved in a fundamental manner. Else, the tragedy will reoccur, and then neither the minister of *awqaf* or the minister of interior or the president of the republic will solve it.

These are the incidents and this is the position of the various parties toward them. We have put them before you so that you may see the truth. It remains to be said that none of us will permit or accept another "Lebanon" in our country.

#### Asyut Security Agrees to IJ Seminars in Mosque

45000110 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 14 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] An agreement has been concluded between the security apparatus and the Islamic Jama'ah [IJ] in Asyut that the IJ will not undertake any demonstrations or violent actions in return for permission to hold seminars and religious studies in the al-Jam'iyah al-Shar'iyah Mosque, which is now being renovated.

In fact, the IJ was permitted to hold seminars in the mosque and in scattered areas last week.

#### Students Seek Open Borders With Israel for Jihad

45000109 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 14 Mar 90 p 1

[Text] A conference of the al-Azhar University Student Union has called on the kings and presidents of the Arab countries, and particularly President Husni Mubarak, to open their borders with the Zionist enemy so that Muslim youth may fight for the cause of God to liberate the holy places that the Jews in Palestine have desecrated and to stop the migration and settlement of Soviet Jews in Arab lands.

At the end of the conference, which was held last week, the union sent a telegram to American President George Bush and one to the Zionist enemy prime minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, affirming that the descendants of Khalid Ibn-al-Walid and Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi will return once again to liberate Jerusalem and al-Aqsa Mosque from the hands of Zionism and the enemies of Islam.

## IRAQ

#### Iraqi Airways Purchases French Aircraft

44000237 London AL-HAWADITH  
in Arabic 26 Jan 90 p 44

[Text] The director general of Iraqi Airways, Nur-al-Din al-Safi, announced two important events:

First, the company made \$35 million in profits during the year 1989;

Second, the contract with France to purchase five "Airbus" aircraft. The aircraft will enter into the service of

the airline's fleet for the first time as a new step to modernize the fleet at a cost of \$500 million.

Al-Safi said that the airlines saw a large increase in the number of travelers during the past year (a 73-percent increase over the previous year). The number of travelers in 1989 reached 1.25 million passengers, and the shipping capacity reached 26,000 tons, resulting in a significant increase in profits.

Al-Safi said that the new aircraft from Airbus are of the A-310 variety. Within a few days he will celebrate the special voyage of one of the aircraft, which is expected to reach Baghdad for the celebration of the 44th anniversary of the founding of the airline on 29 January.

## ISRAEL

### Minister Without Portfolio Magen Profiled

90OL0294A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV  
in Hebrew 2 Mar 90 p 3B

[Article by Ya'el Paz-Melamed: "David Magen: Everybody's Pal"]

[Text] It may be a matter of age, or perhaps of accumulated experience in winning and losing. Whatever the case, potential minister without portfolio David Magen is not what he was. You can't catch him even inadvertently saying a bad word about Ari'el Sharon, David Levy, or Yitzhaq Moda'i. Even Peres and Rabin don't get a bad press from him—not to mention Shamir, Arens, and the other veteran and respected party members.

Altogether, he looks at things very lucidly, quietly, even optimistically. He seems to be the last torch bearer of the famous Jabotinsky glory. For example: "David Levy? Let it be understood, we are very good friends. Ariq Sharon? We have very good, friendly relations. At the personal level, our relations are as good as ever."

About Knesset Member [MK] Ben-Elisar, chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Commission, who did not include him in any subcommission and made sure that Magen didn't attend any of his commission's sessions, until the high priest of transfers Rehav'am Ze'evi replaced him: "Now we are friends. We had a meeting some time ago, discussed all the problems, and today our relations are very good."

And so forth and so on. How do you write an article with all this milk of human kindness flowing? Who's interested in a politician who does nothing but praise, like, and appreciate? But we must remember, even if he would like to forget, that this is the man who only four years ago, at the explosion of the 1986 Herut convention, at 0400 grabbed the microphone, turned the lights off, and shouted into the dark void that Shamir's career was over. Today: "For me, Shamir is the elected leader of the Likud Party, and the entire party must rally behind its leader."

What nevertheless saves the situation is the fact, in itself unfortunate, that his Likud friends are not answering him in kind. At least some of them, as we will see in a moment, don't think only good thoughts about him. They have doubts about his talents and his ability to be a minister, as well as Shamir's judgment in preferring Magen over Ben-Elisar, Benny Begin, or 'Uzi Landau. That did not stop them from warmly congratulating him on the fact that Shamir chose him to be a minister to the people of Israel. That's how things are in politics: One hand slings the mud and the other washes it off with a fake smile—as if one cared whether the other got dirty.

He is not a minister yet, although everyone already treats him with due respect. That, by the way, is not half bad. Yosi Sarid, who always manages to express things better than others, met him in the Knesset and said to him: "Your situation is the best. Everyone treats you as a minister, but you don't have to worry about the troubles of this government."

[MA'ARIV] Were you disappointed when, last Monday, the government did not approve your appointment because of the dispute over returning Weitzmann to the cabinet?

[Magen] "No, I was not. If it wasn't this week, it'll be next week, or in two weeks. It's not urgent. This is not the main issue today."

Moderate, thoughtful, calm, patient. If it were up to him, he would talk only about the enormous importance of immigration absorption and resolving Israel's social problems.

David Magen is a pleasant man, at least toward the accidental acquaintance who will never compete with him for any position. He speaks quietly, doesn't get angry when faced with provocations, waits patiently for almost one hour for the glass of water he ordered although his throat was getting hoarse, and says that this is how he really is, "although it may not sound genuine to you." For some reason, his political views also sound moderate. He certainly doesn't have anything of the feisty and uncompromising fanaticism of several of his "good friends." Once, when he was still Sharon's diligent student and a member of his court, he was described as standing to the right of Tehiya. Not that he, God forbid, abandoned the idea of Greater Israel, but his enthusiasm isn't what it used to be.

At the Knesset he shares an office with Foreign Minister Moshe Arens. It is to be hoped that if and when Arens entertains a foreign diplomat in his office, people remember to remove the small, modestly covered cushion from the green couch standing in a corner of the rather small room. His desk is neat and orderly and there is not a superfluous piece of paper in sight. Everything is arranged in a leather file holder on his desk which he opens once in a while, then quickly closes. On one side of the desk are his cigarillos. When the coffee finally

arrives, Magen lights one, leans back in his directorial chair, and exhales a pleasant puff of foreign-smelling smoke.

When the discussion turns to his past, to the far-away days when he and his wife Rachel, a kibbutz member from Gil'ad, were young and had dreams, he begins to enjoy himself and a small smile spreads over his face. The same happens when he talks of his four year-old-son. As it is, David Magen is well represented in the kibbutz movement. His wife, as we said, is a former kibbutz member; his sister has been a member of Sede Boquer for years; his cousin is in a Shomer HaTza'ir kibbutz; he has many friends among the Working Settlements, and before marrying he went out only with kibbutz girls. Sounds like he really can be invited for an evening with Sarale Sharon. He has nine brothers and sisters, all of them married to Ashkenazis.

There were also beautiful times between 1976 to 1986 when he was mayor of Qiryat Gat. Those years were so good that Magen would like to be buried there. There, between the Sugat and Polgat plants, he felt great satisfaction. Everyone there agrees that he was an excellent mayor and that he gave the town a boost. From there he went on to national politics when the Likud chose to include popular mayors on its Knesset list.

Going back to current politics, after Shamir bravely accepted Ari'el Sharon's resignation from the government, David Magen knew that he was about to become a minister. There was agitation around: Ben-Elisar thought it might be him, 'Ovadya 'Eli hoped, and other names were mentioned. Magen sat quietly. This time he was sure the appointment was in his pocket. It is true that when the present government was formed, too, he was sure that Shamir would pick him, and also one year ago he thought that Ehud Olmert was soon going to Washington and that he would join the happy elite eating burekas and fruit every Monday. This time, however, it is different. He knows this is it. David Magen, 44, a boy who grew up in an immigrant transit camp and then in a poor neighborhood in Jerusalem, was going to be a minister.

Perhaps because he was so certain, he was not excited. Any expectation to hear him deliver old cliches like in movies about ambitious men who decided, persisted, and struggled until they succeeded, fails to materialize. He views the appointment like an employee whose time has come to be promoted on the job; something that clearly was bound to happen.

Nevertheless, Shamir—and this is said of Peres, too—could fill a stadium with people who were given promises which weren't kept.

"That is not so in my case. The prime minister told me more than once that I would be a minister, and he kept his promise."

As informed people told me, Shamir did not choose Magen only because he had promised. Keeping promises

is not the prime minister's strong suit. He had quite a few complicated considerations. First of all, David Magen has broad support among the Likud Central Committee. In the last internal elections he was elected sixth out of a list of seven, ahead of Benny Begin and immediately after Bibi Netanyahu; at the time he was not that well known in the Central Committee, and people thought he was both an electoral asset and a man who could get things done.

This achievement can only be chalked up to Magen's credit and genuinely reflects his support base. In spite of the fact that at the time he still belonged to Sharon's camp, at least formally, he did not run on behalf of that camp. Shamir, I was told, knew that by coopting Magen to his camp he was assured of new supporters who didn't quite belong before. The princes may be contributing great honor, but not as many new supporters, which Magen delivered; and new supporters was what Shamir needs today more than anything else.

Magen does not believe that this supposition is correct. Actually, he thinks that the era of camps within the Likud Party is coming to an end: "The importance of the camps is waning. The electorate is fed up with them, and so are the Central Committee members. They are slated to disappear. The louder they shout, the less they count. They are shouting precisely because they know what they are worth."

He said that last Wednesday, the day when everyone in Likud was fighting against everyone else. The constraints ministers called a meeting at the fortress and Moda'i and his friends were once again threatening to leave henceforth. "Nonsense," said one senior Likud member. "David Magen, too, is aware of the camps; the camps existed and will continue to exist for a long time yet, to my regret. Shamir knows this, too, and that's why he needs Magen. In my opinion, strange as this may sound, Magen now has a greater following than David Levy. Shamir chose him as a minister because he indeed had promised, and he didn't want to open another front, this time against Magen and his supporters."

When Magen defected from Sharon's camp, this was precisely his calculation. He knew that as a defector his power was greater than as a member. Magen, of course, does not think of himself as a defector. If you ask him, he never quite belonged, and he certainly wasn't very close to Sharon. It is true that in the Lebanon war he was Sharon's almost only supporter, and it is true that he thought then and still thinks that Sharon reported only the truth to the cabinet and informed the ministers before each move he planned. As at that time, he is still convinced that the findings of the Kahan commission were wrong and that an injustice was done to Sharon. He still believes so, and it has nothing to do with practical, national considerations, or narrow party reasons. Perhaps.

David Magen more or less made his fortune within Likud in the wake of the resounding success of his

organizational efforts in the local elections to which he led the Likud. Even the Alignment will admit that Likud's organization in those elections was amazing and was one of the major reasons for their success. One day after that victory, David Magen went to Shamir to request his reward, for which there was only one possibility: a seat in the government.

Magen: "That's not true. There is no price for that. I didn't go to request anything."

Others: "And how he did. And how he waved that amazing victory around, and asked for a reward."

Not that it isn't legitimate. Those are the rules of the game, and David Magen knows them backwards and forwards, to the point where it sometimes seems that he invented them. This is not said against him. The opposite may be more correct. Anyone who goes into politics, especially in the Likud, must know how to pull his own chestnuts out of the fire, because no one else will do it for him. Magen had a good tutor—the best possible. Years spent in Arik's company will give one a few aces in the political game.

Another reason cited by those who offer to decode Shamir's considerations is Magen's ethnic origin. David Magen was born in Morocco. Although he came to Israel when he was three years old and sees himself as a native—and justly so—he is the example that the Likud always holds up to Sephardic youth from development towns, who found a home in the Likud and dug their heels in and managed to make their way up rung by rung. Me'ir Shitrit and, of course, Moshe Qatzav are among that group.

The media said that Shamir told his close associates that he was choosing a Moroccan to counterbalance the other Moroccan, none other than David Levy. Since the prime minister's office did not deny that sentence, many came to the conclusion that it must be true. "Even if he had wanted to very much, Shamir could not have chosen Benny Begin, or Ben-Elisar, or 'Uzi Landau as ministers, after he surrounded himself with Ashkenazis. It was clear that he had to take David Magen. It may not be nice to say this, but it's the truth. All those things count in politics."

David Magen is a big man, with a pot belly that cannot be hidden, and a height that forces anyone standing next to him to look up into his eyes. We would not have mentioned that unless Magen himself had done so at a meeting with party reporters immediately after the victory in the municipal elections. "What happened to you, David Magen?" reporters asked him then, as anyone who met him recently was inclined to do. "You were once a forceful man, with the image of one always running forward, stepping on bodies here and there, turning off lights, not particularly minding what he said. Where has the forcefulness that was your trademark gone?"

Magen answered: "I was never forceful. It was only an image that stuck to me. Why? Anyone who is over 1.86 meters tall and weighs more than 100 kg always appears forceful."

So now, on the eve of joining the government, he decided that instead of going on a diet in order to change his image, it's much easier to say that everyone is everyone else's friend, they are all nice, everything will be all right, and Shamir is the absolute ruler. If he repeats it many more times he might come to believe it himself, and with him, the entire public.

### New Rightist Movement Seen Emerging

44230103D Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR  
in Hebrew 21 Jan 90 p 11

[Article Gadi Yatziv: "New Israeli Right"]

[Text] It may actually be that a new radical-right party is growing here in Israel, one that yearns for annexation and rejects peace, of a type unknown heretofore.

"Tzomet," under Rafal's leadership, is acting as if it is gradually abandoning the totally irrational and immoral excuses that have characterized the radical right thus far and is entering the arena of rational, deliberate struggle without giving up anything from its traditional message.

Thus, without the messianic fervor, without the burning belief in unique justice which only Jews merit, without the spittle on their lips accompanying the vilification and abuse of "the leftist traitors," without the abysmal scorn for the elementary rules of democracy, without the burning hatred toward the Arabs, without the raucous wailing speeches we have become accustomed to—without all of those the heads of "Tzomet" are formulating logical excuses against any possibility of peace now and for the annexation of the territories. More than that, they are not drafting God into the ranks of their party and still call fervently to draft the members of the Yeshivas. If this is indeed the trend of the "Tzomet" appeal, then we are truly facing a new sort of Israeli right.

Against this new Israeli right we will no longer be able, thank God, to argue in the name of the "sane camp," but will have to deal with it in substantive terms. There are, perhaps, many in our camp who are sorry about this, but it seems to me that it is a very positive development.

### Jihad Activists Gathering in Egypt

44230103E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 5 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Ze'ev Shif]

[Text] Israel recently expressed her concern to Egypt after it became clear to security elements that Islamic Jihad elements had begun to concentrate there along with many people wanted in the Gaza Strip for involvement in terrorist acts and murder. The consensus last night was that the attackers of the Israeli bus came from

among those groups, but it may be that they got the cooperation of opposition elements in Egypt. Even before the attack the feeling in Israel was that Egypt could have done more to neutralize those radical groups.

The Egyptian security services concentrated more on the activity of fundamentalist groups that might endanger internal Egyptian security. Nonetheless, they reacted very nonchalantly to talk of the possibility of an attack on Israeli targets in Egypt or across the border within Israel. Because of that, it was decided to bring the matter to their attention and express Israel's concern over what was going on.

Following Cairo's decision to adopt the PLO, Egypt became a transit point and refuge for various elements involved in terrorism. Islamic Jihad people and members of the PLO's security and intelligence systems regularly spent time in Egypt. Some even chose to live there without any opposition from Egypt. Among others escaping to Egypt were the murderers of the soldiers Sasportas and Sa'adun, who belong to Islamic Jihad. It is assumed that those who attacked the military jeep in Gaza and killed two Israeli soldiers also found their way to Egypt. The number of "Most Wanted" from the Gaza Strip who escaped to Egypt amounts to several dozen.

The activity of those people has focused on attempts to smuggle money, weapons and sabotage materials into Israel and the territories. The smuggling route is through Sinai. Al-'Arish has also become a concentration point for those radical elements, and the road between the canal and Al-'Arish is therefore thought to be targeted for retribution. Occasionally those radical elements have tried to carry out terrorist acts and the capture of hostages in Israel, but all attempts at penetration have been quashed. The Egyptian security services have demonstrated a certain willingness to cooperate, but mostly in a limited way.

It is not out of the question that it was the failure to penetrate Israel that led those groups to attack Israeli targets within Egypt and therefore chose the tourist bus. The timing that was selected suited the attackers from a political point of view, as well—to cause a tremor that would impede the peace process being actively mediated by Egypt.

#### **Central Commander on Arab, Jewish Regional Trends**

90OL0288A Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE  
in Hebrew 28 Feb 90 p 7

[Interview with Central Command General Yitzhaq Mordekhay by Dor'am Gunt and Rahel Zamir; date, place not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] "The behavior of the residents of Qedar after the wounding of their member, the settlement's regular security coordinator Moshe Mikhali, is unacceptable to me," the General of the Central Command, Yitzhaq Mordekhay, told BAMAHAANE. At the beginning of the

week, Mordekhay visited the place where a charge detonated in Mikhali's hands. The charge had been hidden on the water pipe in the settlement. It should be noted that the general, who was also his commander when he served as an infantry officer, visited Mikhali in the hospital and chatted with him. Mikhali lost three of his fingers and his hand was wounded. "The wounded man is healthy in body and spirit, especially in the way he understands things," Mordekhay added. "Nevertheless, his colleagues' breaking of the codes as expressed by the return of their identity cards and reserve papers is something I cannot understand. They closed the settlement and prevented the brigade commander from coming in to talk with them. They even scattered roadblocks and burning tires inside a Jewish settlement. As a citizen and a commander, it would be an understatement to say that I am not accustomed to that sort of thing and am not about to accept it. Still, I will continue meeting with the residents to do everything we can to assure that there are no breaches in the security area. The residents will calm down, the system will get back to normal, then we will gladly come and listen to every problem they bring up. In general our relations with the Jewish settlements in the territory are very good," said Mordekhay.

[BAMAHAANE] Recently the Shin Bet [General Security Service] has racked up a number of successes in trapping gangs of terrorists, especially in the Nabulus area. Have you changed your methods of operation against the organized gangs?

[Mordekhay] Most recently there have been a number of successes in trapping people on the wanted list, and there are even the first signs of those who are turning themselves in or who stay in their homes and show signs of wanting to be exposed and caught. In my opinion the reason for that is their fear resulting from knowing the fate of the Black Panthers and Red Eagles, terrorist activists who were perhaps bolder and more sophisticated than they. Nevertheless it is still too early to see this as a regular phenomenon and there are still many wanted people in the territory. One way or the other there is no doubt that we have improved and developed sophisticated methods of dealing with them. There are gangs that are caught today where a year ago it was much harder for us to do deal with them. The improvement in our accomplishments is mainly due to continuing efforts and the concentration of intelligence, together with a great deal of sophistication and modern, varied methods on the part of the operational units. Those caught sometimes don't even know how they were caught. The more we increase our ability to operate in a pointed fashion, the more confusion we will cause among the hard core—we will lessen its ability to operate in the territory.

[BAMAHAANE] At the beginning of the intifadah the struggle focused on mass demonstrations; afterward it moved to the realm of a stone tossed here or there, to the hard core and to the murder of collaborators. Today does there seem to be an attempt, at least on the part of the hard core, to bring the people back to mass demonstrations?



[Mordekhay] In no way are there today demonstrations on the order of the magnitude that we saw at the beginning of the uprising. The population is exhausted and every large demonstration is a one-time event following some exceptional incident. The residents know that there is a price to these demonstrations, a much higher price than two years ago.

The way we deal with it today is concentrated in three areas: the stones that are thrown, generally sporadically, but which still damage a very large number of civilian and military vehicles; the violence on Arab streets, the murders and investigations that hurt mainly the Arabs, but are carried out under our rule; and dealing with the maintenance of law and order and putting life back on an even keel.

[BAMAHANE] Recently there was talk of distributing magnetic cards to those who go to Israel from Judaea and Samaria, like the cards that were distributed from Gaza. You say that the uprising has waned, but, on the other hand, we have a step like that. Why?

[Mordekhay] When I served as general of the Southern Command, I initiated three big projects: Exchanging the identity cards so as to prove to the residents that they could not move anywhere without the certificate; renewing vehicle license plates, intended to solve transportation and security problems and make methods for locating vehicles more sophisticated; and distributing exit permits to Israel. From our point of view, the project was a great success. In Judaea and Samaria, when we conclude that statistics and time demand that we employ these measures, we will. For the time being, in my opinion, we are still considering it and have not yet made any decision.

[BAMAHANE] Were you mistaken in your evaluation of the Arab population's ability to suffer?

[Mordekhay] The Arab population has real problems: Economic and social problems, problems of violence and disruption of life. Despite all those problems, both sides have gotten accustomed to the situation. Along with the problems, the local population has a lot of motivation to continue the uprising. We are not employing all the means of pressure at our disposal so their staying power against us is higher. In the perspective of time, when one of these days history judges our actions, the Arab population will also learn to appreciate the principles and rules by which we have acted and especially our restraint. The fact is that when a soldier with a gun and flak jacket only shoots as a last resort, that testifies to our strength. It is the weak person who would shoot in all directions.

I want to sum up by expressing my great appreciation to the Shin Bet, to the field commands, to the civilian administration, and to the soldiers in both regular and reserve service who are dealing with a difficult assignment in a very good way and who are advancing step by step to achieve goals and missions. Their assignment is a matter of pride and blessing to all of us.

### Weapons Authority in Need of Change

44230103B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 24 Jan 90 p 1B

[Article by Re'uven Padhatzur]

[Text] In the struggle over the future of REFA'EL [Combat Means Development Authority] expression is being given to Israel's defense industry problems in general: The uncontrolled growth in the "fat years," the massive reduction of orders from the defense establishment in the wake of budget cuts, the business and salary set up that befit better times, the heightened competition in the world's weapons markets, and the confusion and overall lack of planning by the Defense Ministry which directly controls the large plants and has decisive influence over all the others.

What is unique to the crisis of REFA'EL is the decisive contribution of the Defense Ministry and the role, sometimes hidden from the eyes of the public, of the decision-makers in the decline that led what was set up as a national laboratory, the goal of which was R & D, to accumulate losses in excess of \$200 million.

REFA'EL is an authorized unit of the Defense Ministry and as such acts as a closed economic entity. Direct responsibility over its activities lies with the minister of defense, who also serves as its owner, although all of the defense ministers have shirked that responsibility. As long as defense budgets streamed into the industries almost unchecked, no problems came to light in REFA'EL either. But when the cuts began, it became clear that REFA'EL had become much fatter than necessary.

Up until two years ago REFA'EL submitted no financial reports to its owner. Nobody knew what really went on there. Nor was anyone interested in the effectiveness of its workers or the cost of its products. Thus a national laboratory employing 1,500 workers was able to grow into a giant plant employing 7,300. REFA'EL's growth began, uncontrolled and with no strategic planning whatever, in the mid 60's. Those were the years in which the Authority's managers were not necessarily guided by economic considerations.

Once it became clear that it was no longer possible to postpone the inevitable and ignore what was going on there, Rabin was forced to take real measures. He implemented two actions: The appointment of General (Retired) Moshe Feld as general manager of REFA'EL and the appointment of a committee headed by Professor Yehoshu'a Yortner to review the situation at the Authority and come up with recommendations to improve it.

Rabin sent Feld into battle with one overall directive: Make REFA'EL healthy. It was easy to say but very difficult to accomplish.

Feld made one decision in principle and, acting upon it, prepared his recovery program. The decision was that the clock could not be turned back to the formula of a laboratory employing less than 2,000 people. The

recovery plan thus had to be carried out on the existing formula—an R & D laboratory with an associated plant.

But it was clear that recovery would require a reduction in the number of workers and a significant increase in the efficiency of its work. Over the last two years the number of employees at the plant has dropped to 6,100 and their output has risen from about \$40,000 per worker to about \$62,000 per worker. In order to be profitable the Authority has to reach an output of at least \$85,000 per worker. It is hard to imagine that the Authority will reach that level any time soon. The cost of a worker at REFA'EL is also 10 to 15 percent higher than that of workers in competing plants in Israel. "Most of the Authority's workers are government workers," says Rabin in explaining their high cost and low output, "and that fact prevents the management of REFA'EL from getting the number of workers in sync with the budgets at its disposal."

Against this background the struggle at the Authority is now entering its final stages. The management has presented the workers with an ultimatum, while the latter are contending with management, hoping to defeat it and get back to "business as usual." The ultimatum given to the workers demands their agreement to the firing of 350 of their fellows, a salary cut of 10 percent for each of them, and an effective increase in the number of each worker's work time by 200 hours per year.

Meanwhile the Yortner committee has also finished its work and presented its recommendations. The most significant recommendation, the implementation of which alone, it would seem, can extricate the Authority from its present crisis, is that the Authority must be split into two separate economic entities that are reciprocally tied to each other. The one, relatively small in scope, would serve as the national laboratory for weapons R & D. That authority would not be judged by strict economic standards, and it would be the job of the Ministry of Defense to set its budgets.

The second authority, the one that would continue manufacturing the weapons systems developed by REFA'EL, would be judged by profit and loss standards and would have to prove its staying power in the competitive local and international market. The two authorities, according to the committee's suggestion, would be under one management. The next step, which the Yortner committee refrained from pointing out but which follows from its recommendations, is turning REFA'EL, or at least its manufacturing arm, into a government corporation. Past experience proves that an effective economic system cannot be set up in the framework of an authorized unit.

The future of REFA'EL is not a matter for its workers and managers alone. The struggle being waged now far from the eyes of the public has to occupy senior policy planners. The decision about the future shape of REFA'EL must not be left to the Defense Ministry. Its seniors have already failed in the past in their job as

owners. Other government ministers should also show real involvement in the decisionmaking process. This is also an opportunity to ask the Defense Ministry to submit an overall policy on the issue of defense industries since in the coming years its plants will be forced to implement systems overhaul and retrench for the changes expected shortly.

### **Squabbling for Budget Within IDF**

44230103F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 5 Feb 90 p 1B

[Article by Re'uven Padhatzur]

[Text] With unsurprising proximity to the date for the submission of the state budget to the Knesset, personal tensions and disputes, which had been suppressed with great effort since the government decided to cancel the Lavi project, are pushing their way to the surface.

In the shadow of the debate over the size of the defense budget, the defense system has become the arena for the contest between two of its branches which, in normal times, would stand shoulder to shoulder against any "budget cut plots" woven in the corridors at Treasury. Recently the details have leaked to the media, and the murky system of relationships between the upper echelons at the Defense Ministry and the senior IDF [Israel Defense Force] officers has gone public. The source of the tensions between those two establishments and the crisis of confidence among their leaders goes back to the not-so-distant past and is connected with the people who filled key positions in the chapter of the life and premature death of the Israeli fighter plane, the Lavi.

Now, about two and a half years after the government decision to cancel the Lavi project, the people manning the upper echelons of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff are those who were on opposite sides of the barricades in the protracted and bitter struggle that swirled around the future of the Lavi. The General Director of the Defense Ministry and the strongest man in it is David Ivri. During the period of his tenure as Air Force commander the ministerial committee on defense matters made the decision to enter into production of the Lavi, and in the subsequent period when he was deputy general director of the Defense Ministry, he was forced to carry out the government decision that he opposed: to put an end to the dream of a fighter plane of Israeli manufacture.

On the other side of the barricade, in two of the key positions of the General Staff, are those who led the campaign to scrap the Lavi, to Ivri's extreme consternation, and who were eventually successful—Chief of Staff Dan Shomron and Air Force commander Aviyahu ben Nun.

Anyone who expected, when the decision was made in August 1987 to cancel the Lavi, that those involved would rise above personal considerations and put their shoulders to the task of extricating the IDF from the

crisis into which it had fallen in the mid '80's, was sorely disappointed. No one has forgotten, and no one has any intention of forgetting.

The effect of murky relations between the general director of the Defense Ministry and his senior staff on the one hand and the upper echelons of the IDF on the other goes far beyond the quality of work in the defense establishment. It radically aggravates the already existing problem in the pattern of decisionmaking within this establishment and damages its ability to draft the optimal policy. Given the lack of professional evaluation, test, and simulation bodies in the Defense Ministry capable of examining IDF work programs from a doctrinal-military-professional point of view, the upper echelons of the ministry are forced to base their decisions in large measure on the data and evaluations presented by the military.

Thus the IDF, in effect, becomes the formulator of the State of Israel's national defense policy. Without sufficiently effective systems of supervision and control to counterbalance the IDF, senior officials in the ministry are forced to react late and after the fact to the annual and multiyear work programs prepared by the IDF, which enjoys broad autonomy in the course of its preparation. Those programs in fact constitute a framework that obligates Israeli policy at the strategic level. Added to these problems are, as noted above, suspicion and personal calculations, and things have reached the point of real confrontation about professional concepts.

The joint discussions held by the senior members of the two establishments became an arena for controversy. A hint of the differences of opinion expressed in these secret discussions has recently leaked to the media. The basic economic assumptions upon which the military based its multiyear work programs were not realistic, according to claims made last week by senior elements in the Defense Ministry. Even when the program was presented to the government ministers, it was not a realistic program.

In reaction, senior elements in the General Staff leveled sharp criticism at the approach of policy planners in the Defense Ministry and said that they are not prepared to participate in the burden of cuts and prefer to shift all responsibility to the IDF. But they are aware of the fact that with the financial resources allotted it, the military has no way of presenting an operational response to expected threats in the Middle East arena.

And so the duel of words continues. The ministry people accuse the military officers of presenting unreal data about the cost of IDF activity against the intifadah, and the officers reply that "the Defense Ministry cannot evade its responsibility of presenting the government with the needs of the IDF by impugning the military's calculations and considerations."

One of the negative results of the great tension prevailing in the upper echelons of the defense establishment is diverting the discussion between the military and

civilian sectors from matters of principle to personal struggles. Thus once again the opportunity to produce a serious and obligating explanation of the programs for equipping the IDF and its future image has soured.

The shattered system of relationships within the defense establishment prevents policymakers within the civilian branch from carrying out their mission of controlling and overseeing IDF activity. The suspicion between IDF seniors and the upper echelons in the Defense Ministry must be of some concern to the minister of defense, who is in charge of the military and responsible for what goes on in his own ministry. But Minister Rabin, so it would seem, does not have time lately, because of his political business, to look into what is happening inside his ministry. It would be very worthwhile for the Minister to get into the thick of things and set his house in order. The price of continuing with the existing situation might well be too high.

#### **IDF Planning Enlistment of Soviet Immigrants**

90OL0288B Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE  
in Hebrew 28 Feb 90 p 9

[Article by Galit 'Ofir]

[Text] The overall IDF [Israel Defense Force] program to deploy for the wave of immigration was authorized last week by Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dan Shomron.

The program focuses on two planes: Organizing the military system for the absorption of immigrants as soldiers in the IDF and social assistance for immigrants aimed at their rapid integration into Israeli society. "Together with that," says Lt Gen Yosi Lipman, deputy chief of the Manpower Branch, "it is not our intent to replace the government bodies that handle immigration, like the Absorption Ministry, the Agency, and the Housing Ministry, but to help out as much as possible."

According to the guidelines of the Manpower chief, Gen Ron Goren, the deputy chief of Manpower will be in charge of staff work on this issue and will also head the committee dealing with the IDF setup for absorbing the immigrants as soldiers. A second team, headed by the chief education officer, will deal with the issue of the social absorption of the immigrants.

Among other things, a new profession was decided upon for female soldiers—immigration noncom. The word "immigration" itself is also an acronym [in Hebrew] for: Hebrew, escorting, Israeli geography, and propaganda—which represent the components of the immigration noncom's duties. The special course to be prepared by the immigration noncoms will be held at the educational training base. For the moment, it is still being firmed up. Likewise, there is also consideration of how to integrate the immigration noncoms with the female instructors and youth leaders. "In order to be accepted to the course, it is desirable for her to be fluent in a foreign language, though that is not a requirement. Empathy, common

sense, and kindness are no less important attributes for being accepted into the course," explains Lt Gen Lipman.

The overall IDF program for immigration absorption has five levels. The first is the preparation of the immigrants for IDF service and setting up the draft system. The Gadna command will deal with this issue and will arrange for the immigrants to join its summer projects. It should be noted that there will be no special preparatory program for the immigrants, though there will be special emphasis for them on the basis of programs existing today. The draft offices will bring in noncoms, officers, doctors, and mental health officers, all of whom speak the relevant languages. Beginning with the first call-up, each immigrant will be treated individually in the draft offices. Likewise the aptitude exams will be translated into different languages.

The second layer of the program consists of integrating the soldiers into the IDF. "Our purpose is that everyone who needs a Hebrew course at one level or another will get it at the beginning of his service and at service expense," notes the deputy chief of Manpower. In the future we will also include female soldiers who speak foreign languages in all IDF installations that have contact with the population: city officers, Soldier's Houses, central infirmaries, induction center, etc. Even now there are 20 female soldiers preparing for jobs at the Agency. An additional layer in the area of absorbing immigrants into the IDF is the organizing of a training system, among other things, by introducing special lessons for improving the absorption of the new population into the various IDF courses.

An additional area is education and propaganda. Soon study time and conferences will be set up for the senior officers as well as sensitivity training on the immigration issue for "weak populations."

As to direct absorption: Activities will be implemented in the absorption centers in the area of language learning, tours of IDF bases and throughout Israel, the integration of immigrants into military ceremonies and Israeli holidays and their adoption by central military units.

Our most immediate goal is assistance for hosting immigrants at the Passover Seder on various IDF bases and quickly getting ourselves ready for their social absorption into the IDF.

[BAMAHANE] Deputy Manpower Chief, when, in your estimation, will the first immigrants be drafted?

[Lipman] You have to remember that by law the immigrants get a period of about two years to get organized in Israel. Therefore it seems to me that the lion's share of the immigrant draft will not begin until 1991. At the moment, the first goal we are dealing with is preparing the Gadna and the draft system. I estimate that within two to three months both of them will be sufficiently organized to do their duty.

[BAMAHANE] Are there any attractive proposals or programs for getting immigrant academicians to sign up for the regular army?

[Lipman] In my opinion one of the mistakes we might make would be to start compensating immigrants. There is no reason why the normal rules about regular military service that apply to all Israelis should not apply identically to the immigrants. They must be allowed full entry into the Israeli experience and to be exactly like us.

[BAMAHANE] Will the large wave of immigration cause the number of reserve days to be reduced?

[Lipman] We feel it to be a central task of the IDF for the coming year to make things easier for the reservists; this is not connected to immigration since the immigrants will not be drafted before next year.

Things will be easier for the reservists as early as this year.

### Changes in Guard Duty on Northern Border

44230092A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 15 Jan 90 p 3A

[Article by Dan Margalit, Menahem Horowitz, and Tzvi Zerahiya]

[Text] The IDF [Israel Defense Force] is aware of the guard requirements of the confrontation settlements. But within the framework of the reduction in reservists' days that was imposed upon it, the IDF may send fewer reservists to guard duty on the northern border and their places will be taken by soldiers on regular service, Chief of Staff Dan Shomron said yesterday to the joint committee of the Education and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees of the Knesset, chaired by Haguy Merom (Alignment), which visited in the IDF Spokesman's unit.

Official IDF sources and the chief of staff himself said that the IDF's plans for a budget cut—by, among other things, a cut of approximately 700,000 reservists' days a year in this operational year—would not reduce the number of guards that the IDF allocates to the settlements on the confrontation line in the north.

In his reply to a question from MK [Knesset Member] Haguy Merom, the chief of staff confirmed that the IDF is indeed considering the possibility of reducing the number of reservists on guard duty on the confrontation lines in the north, but that the quota of guards that the IDF provides to the settlements would not be reduced. The practical implication is that the IDF will send regulars for guard duty in the settlements on the northern border, which it had generally refrained from doing until now.

These statements by the chief of staff, and the IDF's official clarifications, came as a response to the outcry over the weekend from the leaders of the northern settlements, due to the fear that the reduction in the number of reservists would increase the burden of guard



duty on the residents. A statement by the IDF said that the IDF is responsible in every way for the security of the residents in the north, including the guarding within the settlements themselves, in the educational institutions, and in the other public buildings in the north. The cancellation of these duties for reservists would be done according to operational considerations and according to the security requirements, which the IDF sets itself.

#### **Difference Between Versions Was Examined**

During the visit, the methods of gathering, processing, and reporting information by the IDF Spokesman were examined. Dadi Zucker (CRM [Citizens' Rights Movement]) asserted that there was a difference between the version of Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin and that of Chief Military Prosecutor Amnon Strashnov on the question of the investigation of the former commander of the Giv'ati Brigade, Colonel Efi Fein. Zucker said that Rabin had announced that there is an investigation into the matter, based on testimony on Fein's role in the instructions to soldiers to harm Arabs. This testimony was given during the trial of Giv'ati soldiers, according to Rabin.

The chief of staff noted that there is no complaint against Fein, and that no investigation is going on, and if the minister of defense said otherwise—he erred. But he believes that there are no inaccuracies and contradictions in the versions of Rabin and Strashnov.

During the visit, the staff of the IDF spokesman were queried about the film of the ABC network, which showed an event in which soldiers were seen firing towards masked individuals, one of whom was killed. Nahman Shay explained that the IDF spokesman's unit had published the material exactly as it received it. When it was found that these facts were not exact, it was decided to do another examination. The chief of staff stated that the testimony of the officers and the soldiers should be accepted as credible, but when there is a difference between the versions, the subject is re-examined. That is the manner in which they acted this time, as well. The testimony of the soldiers who were involved in the incident that was filmed by ABC are being investigated by the Military Police Investigations unit, and the testimony that was given by policemen of the Border Police was turned over for police investigation.

#### **Saguy: There Will Be a Goal-Oriented Army**

Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee member MK Yehoshu'a Saguy (Likud) submitted an urgent proposal for the Knesset agenda on the subject of the damage that was liable to be inflicted on the security of the state as a result of the cut in the defense budget.

Saguy said that a cut of 700,000 reservists' days means a serious impairment of the readiness of the reservists, and that the cut in the size of the regular army is a banal solution, which, every time it was introduced, impaired the fighting part of the army.

Saguy believes that a cut in the guard duty quota of the reservists in the settlements of the confrontation line will necessitate that the residents of the region make up the quota of guard duty that is required for security. This will result in the disappearance of the economic basis for the existence of the settlements, and the conversion of the settlers into regular soldiers throughout the year.

MK Saguy further stated that the reports on the intention to cut approximately 1 billion shekels from the defense budget for immigrant absorption necessitates that the government and the Ministry of Defense develop preconditions to convert the IDF from a multi-purpose army to a goal-oriented army, in accordance with the guidelines that were laid down in the defense conception that was determined by the Meridor Committee, which dealt with the battlefield of the future.

Former Chief of Staff Rafa'el Eytan proposed that unemployed persons from the north be trained for guard duty in the settlements in place of the reservists whose service the Ministry of Defense intends to cease, due to the cut in the defense budget.

#### **Crisis in Legal System in Territories Viewed**

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[Article by Yosi Torpshteyn]

[Text] In the office of a well-known attorney, a judge who had resigned, a property owner of moderate political views, about 20 court orders have piled up calling for the eviction of tenants who have refused to pay their rent, from his property and that of his clients. In desperation the man appealed to one of the officers at the town police station and asked him to assign a police escort so that he could implement the orders. The executive authority refrains from carrying out court decisions in civil cases because of the danger involved and because, for a year and a half now, the police no longer accompany the executive officers. After an exchange of words, the policeman replied impatiently and sarcastically to the Palestinian attorney: "Go to the intifadah, maybe they will help you carry out the orders. The local policemen resigned because of them. Maybe they have a solution; I don't."

This scene is largely reflective of what has been going on now for about two years in the area of civil jurisprudence throughout the West Bank. The judicial system's inability to bring law enforcement to bear in carrying out judicial decisions is one of the main factors in the decrease in the legal system's effectiveness and importance in the territories and in the sharp reduction in the number of people who turn to the legal system with civil complaints.

In the various areas of the West Bank there are civilian courts that operate subject administratively to the legal staff officer at the headquarters of the civilian administration in Bet El. These courts hear both civil and



criminal cases. The small claims court (of the Al-Salah school) deals with civil suits where the claim does not exceed 250 dinars. The "district" court (of the Al-Badayah school), which is also considered a court of first resort even though its authority exceeds that of the small claims court, handles all other cases. In Ramallah there is an appeals court, which also sits in the High Court of Justice on administrative matters. Alongside the courts are the law enforcement bodies: local prosecutors, the executive and, of course, the police, who back up every legal system but operate completely independently. Apart from all these, the territories also have military courts and a military appeals committee that handle security and land issues with no connection at all to the local civilian courts.

### The Judges Work an Hour a Day

The significant drop over the last two years in the number of people requiring the aid of the legal system is brought home by the following statistics, drawn from the appeals court, to which cases filter down from the entire West Bank. From January-September 1989 this court handled 131 civil cases as compared to 192 cases in the corresponding period of 1988. That is a drop of about 31 percent. In 1987, 472 cases were dealt with. That is, in 1988 there was a drop of about 60 percent. The overall decline in the number of cases in 1989 as compared to 1987, the year preceding the intifadah, is about 72 percent. In the area of criminal cases over the same periods of time there has been a similar trend, but sharper: a drop in the overall rate of 82 percent in 1989 as compared to 1987. It must be remembered that in 1987 there was an increase in the number of civil and criminal cases of 11 percent and 14 percent, respectively.

The intifadah, which broke out on 9 December 1987, has thus significantly undermined the operation and functioning of the courts, whose image and public trust had immeasurably improved since the difficult upheaval of 1985, when the corruption purges began. A senior personage who is privy to what is happening in the legal establishment outlined the situation: "Today the judge has about one hour of work a day." In the past, in the preintifadah days, the judges' agenda was overloaded.

Why has the number of people turning to the courts dwindled to such an extent, where precisely in these hot days they could serve as a counterweight, not necessarily contrary to the will of many inhabitants, to the difficult situation that has prevailed in many areas of the life of the population? Is the legal order about to crumble? Is Palestinian society marching toward a situation where "Everyone who is violent is a hero?" Is the intifadah leadership actually leading the tendency to lessen the authority of the courts with a call to boycott the civilian administration in all of its offices and institutions?

Except for a few instances, the leadership of the intifadah, perhaps unexpectedly, has refrained from applying excessive pressure on the judges and court officials. In only one bulletin from the "United National

Headquarters," in bulletin 29 (from November 1988), were the judges called upon to resign immediately in order to put an end "to the phenomenon of cooperation with the occupier."

But this demand appeared only in one of two versions of the proclamation, the version signed by the leftist elements who favor accelerating the pace of events toward full civil rebellion. Instances are known in which judges and some plaintiffs were threatened, and in one instance a senior judge in Nabulus was even beaten by masked men; but that was against a background of renewed excessive closeness to the Israeli Government, or of cooperation with it, and not because of the judicial activity itself.

It can be supposed that the leaders of the intifadah understood that the resignation of the judges would not properly serve their interest since after all is said and done, the judicial establishment in the territories, unlike the police, is manned entirely by Palestinians and functions within and for Palestinian society relatively independently of other institutions. Its neutralization would thus hurt, primarily, Palestinian society and lifestyle without undermining vital interests of the Israeli administration. The reason for the drop in functionality of the courts must, thus, be found elsewhere. Every court also reflects the economic life of the environment in which it works. The serious economic decline on the West Bank since the outbreak of the intifadah, and to a certain extent even before it, impels many residents of the area to focus their financial means on assuring their subsistence and prevents them from any spending not forced by circumstances. Therefore they prefer to avoid judicial entanglements entirely (just as they avoid credit sales and demand cash for every deal), or to settle disputes while they are still fresh through their own resources, at a much higher rate than in normal times.

The financial difficulties involved in handling judicial complaints against a background of the crumbling economic situation are felt in the fee payments a person must make to file the complaint.

He has to pay monetary sums amounting to 4 percent of his claim for the court fee, 3 percent to get a certified copy of the decision and 4 percent more for implementation of the decision by the executive. Sending out a notarized payment demand costs the plaintiff 31 dinars. To all of that must be added the lawyer's fees.

### After the Palestinian Police Resigned

The overall court fee was doubled by the civilian administration, beginning 1 April 1989, from 250 dinars to 500 dinars. This increase was actually intended to fill the dwindling coffers of the judicial system, but it seems that its timing has only added fuel to the fire since it increases the avoidance of relying on the judicial system and does not serve the Israeli interest in normalizing systems of government relations with the population.

Therefore it is no wonder that in this period in which the income of most of the inhabitants has been reduced, both from wages and from commerce, the value of the currency has dropped about 50 percent—the rate of the Jordanian dinar, legal and in wide use here, had dropped from 6 shekels last year to at least 3 this year—prices have risen and there is significant unemployment, judicial costs are oppressive and discourage the individual.

Another central complex of factors has to do with the manner in which the police function in the territories and, as a result of that, the functioning of the prosecution and executive systems.

The resignation of most of the Palestinian policemen, who constituted most of the Israeli police in the territories, and especially at the ranks of foot patrolmen, began in waves within the first few months of the intifadah, in response to the force of pressure and threats directed at them by intifadah leaders and activists. Thus a vacuum resulted in the execution of police assignments, which the limited numbers of Israeli policemen could not fill. The latter were instructed to deal only with the most serious and urgent cases (like murder), with security violations and with everything having to do with the Jewish sector on the West Bank.

Palestinian residents desirous of lodging complaints were usually directed to the local prosecutor. At a certain stage the police command even decided to lock the gates of some police stations, but changed its mind under pressure from government bodies.

The almost complete paralysis of the police in regular civil and criminal matters had a stultifying effect on the work of the prosecutors, who act as a connecting link between the police and the courts. They could not meet the workload of taking the complaints and preparing the cases, so most of the complaints were left with no efficient treatment. The residents quickly learned there was no point in bringing complaints.

Without judicial backing, the executive system does not carry out most of the court decisions it is supposed to enforce, apart from the participation of executive representatives in tax collection campaigns arranged by the Israeli administration.

The police and civilian administration pin some hope for an improvement of the situation on the drafting of policemen from among Israeli Arabs, some of whom have already been positioned in the territories. But some Palestinians doubt the ability of the police to go back to their former functionality simply by adding some policemen. Even if they were able to fill out their ranks, which is by no means certain, their people would still require army escorts themselves in the existing circumstances, and it is hard to imagine that the IDF [Israel defense Force] would agree to that, given its assignments vis a vis the intifadah.

Beyond that those same persons note that changes have meanwhile occurred in the field. The intifadah has

almost become a fact of life. Among some parts of the population a state of mind has settled in, fed by the guidelines for social solidarity appearing in the bulletins of the United National Headquarters, which decries confrontations, friction, and legal suits between people at a time like this. Indeed, people have not stopped quarreling with each other, but many are deterred from lodging complaints or suits. Thus it is doubtful whether renewed normal functioning of the police, if that, in fact, should happen, would change the functioning of the courts.

Be that as it may, anyone who feels his rights were violated at the hands of his fellow man will now think twice before bringing his complaint to the formal judicial system. Not only will he have to pay a high price for the judicial process and risk criticism that will be levelled at him all around, but in the end the decision will not be carried out and the whole affair will culminate as a total loss from his point of view.

That's how the judicial establishment, with its various appendages, seems to that toothless man. Still, in order to prevent a loss of rights, there are those who register their complaints at the courthouse, in those cases that cannot be delayed (like checks and rent payments) and postpone the rest of the process for when the unrest subsides. When things get right again, other lawyers predict, the courts will be flooded with cases that were frozen because of the hardship of the times. The kinds of complaints that are carried forward to the end despite all this are those in which suits are brought against factories, commercial companies, insurance companies (almost all of them Israeli, especially in accident cases), banks, etc. Those pay as required and the question of implementing the decision usually never comes up. Also, in cases of land ownership there is no question of implementation, just of the decision itself.

Therefore the public now resorts more often to traditional arbitration or tribal law (the law of Shari'a) and to arbitration under the auspices of the popular committees of the intifadah. Traditional arbitration means that traditional notables "sit in judgment," listen to the complaints of the opposing sides and decide the controversy with the assistance of the rules and procedures of popular jurisprudence. But they don't have any effective means of enforcement to bring about a voluntary agreement of the parties and rely on a certain amount of social pressure for carrying out the decision. The flourishing of this simple kind of justice, against the background of the declining influence of the courts, has been slowed somewhat because of its drawbacks. These arbitrators occasionally operate from motives of graft and they are not always reliable. Sometimes they even award large sums of money that cannot be paid.

#### **An Unreliable Address**

The arbitration of the popular committees is occasionally forced upon the population. This trend is reflected in the bulletins of the intifadah. As early as March 1988 a

bulletin was circulated calling for the establishment of "popular justice committees," the objective of which was to guard property and bring peace to feuding neighbors. In August 1989 elements identified with the "Democratic Front" organization distributed an "intifadah" broadside announcing that the popular committees were the arbitration authority on matters of rent, while the workers committees would settle disputes as to workers' rights.

Instances are known in which masked gangs threatened residents in order to make them stop some action that aroused friction (like building on disputed territory). In general the older committee activists, in their 20's and 30's, are the ones involved in the arbitration processes. But as far as we can tell they are not always perceived by the populace as a particularly reliable address to turn to for justice. There are those among them who exploit their new position to settle personal, family, or political scores. Still, the phenomenon exists and to some extent meets the need for tools to settle personal controversies.

The bulletins of the intifadah also allude to the existence of "popular courts," but there is no clear indication of their institutionalization. This issue would seem more to reflect the general tendency of the PLO to organize its own judicial system in the territories as part of its effort to lay an active basis for the Palestinian state, alongside existing institutions or within them. As far as we can understand, the things are not directed at destroying the official judicial system, but if the latter should continue to grow weaker, the importance of the popular judicial frameworks would increase, both those identified with the PLO and those of traditional arbitration.

In summary it seems these days that the name of the game in the judicial arena on the West Bank is adjustment. As in other walks of life, so, too, in the judicial sphere; after the initial shock, the population was forced to adjust to the new circumstances in order to prevent a slide to complete anarchy. According to a lawyer who serves as legal advisor to several large corporations on the West Bank: "On this scale of justice on the West Bank, the main loser is the little guy, even if he has adjusted to the existing situation and even if it is convenient for him to avoid paying rent, for example. He knows that in the future he will pay interest on top of interest as the payoff for the present. Who wants to live with a feeling of uncertainty with no fair legal defense?" Still, the population in general is ready and willing to continue putting up with this situation for the sake of achieving its national aspirations. The real solution for the harsh judicial reality is a political settlement on the West Bank.

### Cabinet Secretary Rubinstein Profiled

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[Article by Hanah Kim: "People Said He Was a Genius"]

[Text] "If I ever see this Rubinstein again with his jokes, I'll climb the walls." (Secretary of State James Baker, talking to a senior U.S. diplomat two weeks ago).

The mouth is his most prominent feature. It has helped Elyakim Rubinstein fight his 15-year long verbose war of attrition about the future of Israel. Having in the past served two RAFI [Israel Labor List] members, Moshe Dayan and Shim'on Peres, he, too, divides his sentences in three parts: In the first part he presents an assumption, which he gently rejects at the end of the sentence, while in the middle part, which is often the most important, he slips in a joke. The final result is a sentence that sounds logical but unclear, and the manner in which he delivers it may well put the listener to sleep, so that by the end of the speech the listener can only agree with Rubinstein, nod politely, or hint irritably to the passage of time. Otherwise Rubinstein will continue to prate and chatter, prattle and drone, bringing forth clever sayings from the Talmud and rocking his body back and forth as if in the trance of his daily prayers at the Bet Yosef Synagogue in Jerusalem. The respectful terms of address he uses ("Dear Sir" and "Your Worship") tend to daze his interlocutor even further, until the whole topic of the discussion is forgotten—or, to be more precise, the topic of debate—and all he wants to do is make a small request: Please, Mr. Rubinstein, stop this flood of words!

An acquaintance with the exhausting and exhausted secretary of four Israeli governments (Shamir; Sharon and the constraints ministers; Rabin; Peres and the dismantlers) makes one assume that the chattered or written word has the power to activate, but especially to paralyze any chance of a genuine peace initiative in our area. From the yellowing Camp David accord until today, Rubinstein has been living in the world of top-ranking whispers and the small print of secret documents dispatched on the Jerusalem-Washington-Cairo-Tunis line. And so far everything was more or less all right.

All of a sudden, in the past month, this man, always somebody's aide or secretary, became a punching bag. The draft he brought back from Washington, the wintry mood of the U.S. secretary of state, and Senator Robert Dole's warning about cutting U.S. aid, all served to draw attention to him. And he, who is still not accustomed to hot television cameras on his face after cabinet meetings, feels a bit scared.

He does not want to be interviewed. "And at that time, the secretary will keep quiet," he says, giggling nervously and pointing to a sign above his office door, which says: "Stop babbling." All he's willing to do is tell some of his jokes, read a page from "He Who Wants To Live," or cite a Russian joke he told Ronald Reagan. Or, in his version: "At such a sensitive period as this it is not desirable for me to be interviewed, although I have nothing against the press, as long as it sticks to the truth, because it's not the mouse who's the thief but the hole, and most of my complaints are against people who leak things. And if you ask me, Camp David was greatly successful because the media was not in on it, because had it been, the publicity would have invited pressure on both sides, and it is doubtful whether the accord would have been signed."

He also doesn't say a word about his wish to exchange his current job for that of legal adviser to the government [Attorney General], as an interim stage toward the final objective: the Higher Court of Justice. Although it is not a secret; Rubinstein doesn't want to be Roni Milo; he prefers Professor Aharon Barak as a model. This desire is growing at the same rate that he finds himself sinking more deeply in the bog of Israeli politics. After all, Barak, too, a former legal adviser to the government, could have achieved a brilliant career for himself in politics after Camp David, but he chose a seat on the Supreme Court. And Rubinstein, if he managed to get there with the help of God and his faithfulness to Yitzhaq Shamir, will be the religious answer to Barak the secular.

Rubinstein no longer conceals the depressing effect that his present job, "which is taking a great toll on me," as he tells his friends, has on him. "I'm not sitting with a stop watch in hand, but it's very, very difficult." Especially difficult was the affair of the draft he brought back from Washington, the contents of which were leaked to the press. Unlike his wont, he raised Cain at the prime minister's office where no one made a secret of their suspicions of Director General Yosef Ben-Aharon. Rubinstein went to Ben-Aharon to find out, after which he told his friends, in his forgiving manner: "Yosi told me he didn't leak anything, and I believe him. Whoever did caused great damage to the State of Israel." So who was the author of the leak? The prime minister?

So how long can he hold out in this dark cave? How long can he continue to travel again and again to Washington to move another comma and come back to yet another series of dialogues between the offices of Rabin, Peres, Arens, Levy, and Moda'i? All the while knowing that the secretary of the government is the government's broom, because who today wants to deal at all with the matter of "assurances" for talks with a Palestinian delegation, and who has the patience to read all that small print. Elyakim Rubinstein today keeps saying, especially to himself, that Shamir really wants to promote the peace process. Is it possible that he is worrying this question because he has doubts? Is it possible that Shamir is using him to gain a bit more time? Perhaps today Rubinstein understands that instead of rescuing the people of Israel, he has been building castles in the air for three and a half years as government secretary?

It has been 12 years since Camp David and there is no peace. And he, the consensus man who keeps talking about "Israel's unity," knows very well that this government is split. He also knows that if a narrow Alignment coalition is formed, Peres and Rabin don't owe him anything. He may be rewarded with an embassy—no, not in Washington, he is identified with the Likud too much. And if this government stays on, Shamir may throw him a bone, doesn't know exactly what, because he's not exactly identified with the Likud.

Rubinstein, a servant to all masters, is today one of the few people who manage to bring a smile to the prime

minister's wan face, and everyone says: Eli is Shamir's pet. Except that he has already tasted betrayal. In 1985, when he served as consul in Washington, Shamir promised him the position of ambassador to the United Nations. Rubinstein began wearing bow ties and was all set for a representative's job. Then, however, Moshe Arens began putting pressure on Shamir, and keeping the pressure up, until Binyamin Netanyahu won the position. And until Shamir finds a new broom, poor Rubinstein will continue to air his jokes in Washington.

Elyakim (Eli, to his friends) Rubinstein, 43, is considered a genius even by those who have to suffer his smart Talmudic remarks. He has been wearing this description ever since the time he was helping Moshe Dayan and Menahem Begin to put the peace treaty with Egypt in legalistic jargon. He is also described as "well-mannered," because he is mindful of people's feelings. He tries not to be too threatening to those around him, and he has learned that it is better they need him than the other way round. He sticks out among our politicians and their followship. He is short, rather round, smiley, and twice a week he attends a Talmud class. "I don't think he ever played hide and seek, and if you ask me, at age four he must have already been behaving like a 60-year-old," said one of the insiders of four Israeli governments, who also thought, though, that Rubinstein was a genius. Except that recently, this scholar's image has been cracking.

Is it possible that he misread a sentence on the 5-page draft he brought from his last visit to Washington (the one saying that the United States will not impose on Israel negotiations with the PLO within the "current efforts")? He, of all people, who is versed in the fine nuances of sensitive documents? Did he not sense that the combination of "current efforts" would immediately raise the blood pressure of the three constraints ministers? "If they don't make a big deal out of it, then it won't be a big deal," he claimed in his defense, explaining that that was the American formulation and that it did not mean that the United States was going back on its position. However, Baker later announced that he was fed up with Israel's playing around with the peace initiative, and Dole came up with his threat of cuts.

That was not the only time that he put his foot in it. Before that, he received from then Secretary of State George Shultz the principles of his peace plan, in which another combination of words appeared, namely "international factor." Rubinstein did not realize, or once again, did not want to realize, that the reference was to the abominable "international conference." "There is no international conference," he announced to Shamir. Our Washington correspondent then reported that the United States had given up on the international conference. It turned out, however, that Rubinstein once again had misunderstood the American wording, or had not wanted to understand it correctly. Are the glasses he wears on his nose at meetings with senior U.S. officials painted pink on purpose? If so, then why do people point



an accusing finger at him? Perhaps if it were up to him, things would look altogether different. So long as they don't shoot the messenger.

Rubinstein says that he hates being bored. In his small jacket pocket he keeps a small, plastic covered Talmud book, which he consults even during important events in Washington. A characteristic scene, for example, is the following: At the strategic talks between the two countries held this year in Nebraska, the Israeli government secretary was glimpsed, between the broad shoulders of Israeli and American generals, turning the pages of his Talmud book. When his turn came to speak, he stood up and delivered a learned speech on the general ballistic missiles situation in the world, which showed that Rubinstein knows quite a lot about the world military deployment since serving as deputy legal adviser to the Defense Ministry.

That is not his only advantage compared to other young men like Meridor, Olmert, and Milo. Rubinstein is the only active survivor left of the participants in the Camp David agreement: 'Ezer Weizmann is out of things, Aharon Barak sits on the Supreme Court, Menahem Begin is on Tzemah Street, Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated, and Me'ir Rosen is busy with the bonds. Only Elyakim is left. Since Shamir fell in love with the accord for which he didn't raise his hand to vote, and has been holding on to it as the last recourse, Rubinstein has been the professional word crafter in the protracted negotiations that may perhaps return us to Camp David. "On the one hand," said someone who worked close to him, "Eli is in favor of holding on to Judaea and Samaria, but on the other hand he definitely closely identifies with the Camp David accord."

When it comes to Rubinstein there is always on the one hand, but on the other. He is what is known as a moderate in the hawks' camp, like, for example, Zevulun Hammer. Six years ago he told Ran Edelist in an interview for the FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT that he had voted for the NRP [National Religious Party]. Since then he has been trying to blur his views. "I am not a Likud man. Not that it's a shame to be one. I work with the prime minister and I try to do so honestly and without libeling. I believe in the ideology of religious Zionism," he has recently been saying. In a lecture he gave about two months ago at the Strategic Studies Institute, he sounded like Begin in the days of his blossoming vision: "Our greatest enemy is inner division....The vultures circling above hope we will be weakened by it," and added: "The urgency of the initiative was also to neutralize outside initiative that may not agree with our interests." Rubinstein believes that we must initiate peace plans mostly in order to preempt claims that Israel is not doing anything. The question is what to do after a plan is initiated.

Tzahi Hanegbi: "He told me that Camp David was the best means of holding on to Judaea and Samaria, because the model of the Sinai will never be replicated, and if autonomy is adopted under the obligation of the

United States and Egypt, we are on solid ground." Rubinstein still calls for settlements, and he does his reserve duty in Ramallah, at the military court. In the 1970's he was close to Gush Emunim, but he removed himself from it as he began to ascend the rungs of the hierarchy. It was this hawk that polished and shined the paragraphs of Camp David, including the one on the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." And now people reproach him for not sufficiently toning down Shamir's stubborn positions.

A compulsory scribe, he writes reports on all his actions and talks, reports that are not conspicuous by their clarity. For Rubinstein, claim those who know him, there are no main issues and side issues. There are both. At times he gives Shamir documents marked "Eyes Only" and "Top Secret." "As a public employee," he tells his friends at the Foreign Ministry, "when you come to a certain crossroads, you have to have a personal and reliable relationship with the policymaker. There is personal chemistry between myself and Shamir, and it came to be because of trust. By definition, if you cannot live with the policy, you have to get up and leave." In the meantime, he is not yet allowed to leave.

The same friends said that sometimes he does try and succeeds in softening Shamir's stand, as for example in the matter of including the two deportees in the Palestinian delegation. Except that Shamir still doesn't dare come out in public with that decision. In that respect, Rubinstein is no different from Ehud Olmert and Dan Meridor (both of whom appreciate and respect him). Like them, he does not pound on the boss's desk. Despite the obligation he feels for the Camp David accords, Rubinstein is one of the yea-sayers currently surrounding the prime minister.

While writing a protocol, Rubinstein also drinks his tea, laughs, bites into a sandwich, tells a joke, and pays attention to his writing. He is a great scholar. But there is one thing he avoids, namely allowing anyone to see what he is really like. He is also careful not to be caught in political meetings in Shamir's office. As opposed to Director General Yosi Ben-Aharon, who appears at panel and seventh Herut meetings, Rubinstein is keeping a low profile and hedges his bets between two governments. Consequently, on his office walls he has the portraits of Yitzhaq Shamir and Shim'on Peres (when he was defense minister), Menahem Begin, Hayim Herzog, Theodore Herzl, George Bush, George Shultz, and Cyrus Vance. And of course, a big picture, with a personal dedication, from Moshe Dayan. Ah, Dayan.

Dayan was the man who discovered this child prodigy and Rubinstein's talent for manipulating the small print. Yosef Chechnover, currently director general of Discount Bank and at the time Dayan's legal adviser, introduced the two. After a few years, after Rubinstein took Chechnover's place at Dayan's side, a rift occurred between them, not unlike the tense relations between Rubinstein and Ben-Aharon.



Rubinstein was a green youth of 26 who had just finished studying law and Middle East Studies at Tel Aviv University when Dayan asked him to represent him before the Agranat Commission. Dayan was cleared and Rubinstein accompanied him to the Foreign Ministry and throughout the Camp David process. Snapshots from that time show him walking with Aharon Barak and Me'ir Rosen, and ahead of them, Dayan and Begin deep in thought. Rubinstein has also been known to walk behind Begin and al-Sadat, jotting down their off-the-record remarks.

That was an exciting time, so different from what is happening to our Elyakim today. Since he was transferred to Yitzhaq Shamir, when the latter was foreign minister, Rubinstein was sent to the Washington Embassy, and returned to Israel as secretary of the unity government. Shamir spotted his talent for finding a way out of the thicket of the tiresome verbiage of international agreements. And Rubinstein, who was responsible for closing the Embassy doors in the faces of the pursued Pollard couple, was immediately tasked with taking care of the affair, just as he handled the Irangate affair. Shamir used his talents to the last drop of ink.

Rubinstein's jokes can sometimes drive to distraction otherwise reasonable, logical, and analytically minded men, like Yitzhaq Rabin. He's been known to tell him again the one about the "commissary clerk who was decorated for working above expectations" [pun on expectations, a popular candy bar]. As it is, Rabin and Rubinstein are complete opposites. Nevertheless, it was this couple that began weaving the fabric of the Israeli peace initiative. Rubinstein, Shamir's envoy, and the defense minister closeted themselves in the Qiryah offices many an evening, fought, and compromised on the commas of what later came to be known as the "14 May plan," the blueprint for the Israeli peace initiative. After that, Rubinstein rushed to Peres' home in Ramat Aviv, from there to Arens, and finally the four met all together, Shamir, Peres, Rabin, and Arens, and Rubinstein, too, and brought out this initiative, which in the meantime no one knows what will become of it, just like the Camp David accords, on the wording of which Elyakim worked so hard.

Meantime time is running out. Especially when it comes to Baker's boys. Dennis Ross, the head of the U.S. secretary of state's team dealing with the Middle East, has been Rubinstein's pal ever since the Washington days, but recently he was been warned by Egyptian diplomats and Arab intermediaries to stop giving breaks to Rubinstein and the Likud policies, and now Ross is being careful.

Baker boy No. 2, Dan Kretzer, who has known Rubinstein since the days of Shabat morning prayers at a Washington synagogue and from the autonomy talks in Egypt, can no longer allow Rubinstein to waste time. All the more so since the jokes of the Israeli government secretary have begun to annoy Baker.

And Rubinstein is afraid. He knows he is annoying, but what can he do? Besides, Ross and Kretzer know that, in contrast to the average Israeli diplomat, Rubinstein does

not immediately run to tell the bunch at the Foreign Ministry what people discuss with him. And they must understand that he cannot tell them what Shamir really thinks above and beyond tactics. They have to understand that he is the one who currently represents the decisionmaking factor in Israel, and that's what there is.

In the meantime he continues to tell them jokes. Like the one that is "a good joke for moments of tension during negotiations," according to him: "A man sits in a restaurant, half drunk, and tries to stick a fork in an olive; he keeps trying and missing. A waiter stands to the side watching him; after half an hour he's had enough, takes the fork, puts it through the olive, and says: 'There, I made it.' 'Big deal,' says the drunk, 'after I tried it out for half an hour.'"

Now one can ask who the olive is: Rubinstein, exhausted by his job, the exhausted peace process, or the citizens of Israel, tired in general and specifically, or all three.

Elyakim Rubinstein lives in the Rasko area of Jerusalem, a modest middle class neighborhood inhabited by many MAPAM [United Workers Party] voters. He is proud of his wife Miriam, in charge of labor conflicts at the State Attorney's Office, and of his four talented daughters. Perhaps some day, after he retires from the Supreme Court, he will write his memoirs and eternalize the notes he collects today, and then it will turn out that people actually didn't understand him and didn't know how hard he worked to promote the peace process, while preserving Greater Israel. In any event, things don't depend just on him. Consequently, until then he will continue doing what the boss says: The prosecution will please be silent.

#### [Box, p 6] Two Versions of the Harish Affair

About two months ago Elyakim Rubinstein almost managed to fulfill his dream. Yitzhaq Shamir listened to his entreaties to release him from his job, and all that was left was for him to clarify a few matters with Yosef Harish concerning his prerogatives as deputy legal adviser to the government. Except that something happened between the two and the deal was off. Despite what is customarily believed, Harish is not totally oblivious to things concerning his seat. Why does he need Rubinstein allegedly under him but in practice over him? Harish has not forgotten that the legal handling of the Pollard and Irangate affairs were put into Rubinstein's hands, and that it was his rival who served as Shamir's legal adviser and passed on to the United States Shamir's testimony and those of the other factors involved in the two affairs.

Consequently, in the past year, Rubinstein has been trying to jump straight into the legal adviser's job. There are two versions of this story, both originating with what is known as reliable sources. According to version A, Dan Meridor responded to Rubinstein's pleas and agreed to remove Harish; Shamir intervened in his behalf and asked to leave Harish in place, after the latter came and begged for pity, shortly before his ruling that the bank directors should not be put on trial "for lack of public interest." According to version B, it was actually

Dan Meridor who blocked Rubinstein's appointment as legal adviser to the government because he was afraid of an adviser with balls.

But Rubinstein is not giving up. He knows that the road to the Supreme Court can follow one of two tracks: through a district court, or through the office of the legal adviser to the government. When Moshe Nisim was justice minister and offered him a bench as a district judge, Rubinstein showed no enthusiasm. He preferred, and still prefers to get there through the legal adviser's office, which holds considerable power, the position that made Professor Aharon Barak.

Rubinstein is still a real candidate for the job. If he gets it, he can change the face of the country with one sweeping law. He may be thought of as the moderate among the right-wing hawks, but if Dan Meridor was the man who allowed shooting at masked men in the territories, Rubinstein as legal adviser may become the legal umbrella for additional rulings along the same line.

Rubinstein has never appeared in court, except for his military service at the Ramallah Military Court. He still has not managed to complete his doctorate in law. The only book this researcher-statesman ever wrote was "Judges of the Land," brought out 10 years ago by the Shoken Publishing House. Some respected jurists already say that the book is not impressive, to put it mildly, or in plain words, that it is a mediocre book. The jurists in question did not want their names cited in this article, which is not quite fair to Rubinstein, but their claims are based on the contents of the book, not on the personality of the author.

According to them, the documentation of the book is based on unverified secondary sources and some of the documents cited were not original. For example: In order to examine the question of the status of the British and native judges in Palestine under the mandate as compared to the status of judges in England, Rubinstein did not study English rulings of the 50's, but cited a secondary article published as a manuscript in Israel under the title "And It Was in the Time of the Judges." The above jurists also asked how a jurist like Rubinstein could not have looked at the original rulings, something that belongs to the sacred principles of a jurist's work.

Elyakim Rubinstein said in response: "The end of that book was written in the tense days of the negotiations with the Egyptians on Camp David. My wife proof read it at the last moment."

### Science Suffering for Lack of Funds

44230103C Tel Aviv HADASHOT  
in Hebrew 22 Jan 90 p 21

[Interview by Gal 'Ukhovski]

[Text] The European Parliament last week decided to break scientific ties with Israel. MK [Knesset member] Shim'on Shitrit, who was at the European congress, claims that the reason was the harsh impression left by pictures of the Peace

Now demonstration in Jerusalem. It seems that the Italian representatives who were in Israel and participated in the demonstration were the direct instigators of the decision. Hayim Harari, president of the Weitzman Institute, says that at this stage the force of the announcement seems to be mainly declarative. Totally unrelated to that, he agrees with the opinion that Israel's strength as a scientific power is on the decline.

[HADASHOT] Does the announcement of the European sanctions surprise you?

[Harari] It surprises me because I find it very strange. I'm also not clear as to what it really means.

[HADASHOT] Why?

[Harari] It is strange because it is like reacting in one arena to demands from another arena and generally in the scientific world, it is very, very uncommon to react to political problems with scientific sanctions. It's really something that is not common anywhere and is also illogical since the scientific world is so intermixed from an international point of view.

[HADASHOT] Does the decision have any immediate significance?

[Harari] I must say that I really don't know since there is a relatively small number of research grants that the European Community finances in Israel. So in a theoretical way we can be hurt. But it will be much more serious if the Common Market countries heed that decision; i.e., if the governments of Germany, France, or Britain were to heed it, it would be more serious, but I don't see a sign of that happening.

[HADASHOT] Do you see this as just a declarative problem?

[Harari] It's hard to judge if this was done at the initiative of some more radical members of the European Parliament or if there is a trend here; and if there is a trend here, it is very, very serious. It could cause enormous damage, but I hope that is not the case.

[HADASHOT] Can we have an influence?

[Harari] I understand this came somewhat at the initiative of those Italian members who participated here in a Peace Now demonstration and are angry at what happened here. Israel's ability to counter something like that or oppose it is, again, in the political sphere—i.e., by trying to influence our friends in the European Parliament. Really the people you should ask are Israel's and the Foreign Ministry's representatives in the European Parliament, from whom I am amazed not to have heard anything about this and about the seriousness of the decision.

[HADASHOT] Have you read the research of Arye Shahar from the Hebrew University? He claims that Israel is losing her position as a scientific power. It may be that she is simply becoming a country with which a break in scientific ties is no disaster.

[Harari] No, I don't think that is it at all. I can assure you that those same members of the European Parliament who initiated this decision have no concept whatever of Israel's scientific ties.

[HADASHOT] Is there any retreat at all in Israel's scientific strength?

[Harari] Yes. First of all, unequivocally yes. There is such a retreat.

[HADASHOT] Can you see a connection between the European action and the process of retreat?

[Harari] It is true that if you are at a low level it is easier to break ties with you. It is no accident that Israel has been playing basketball in the European arena for many years already and is very respected while in soccer they do us a favor if they bring us in at all. That is, everything is a function both of politics and of your level. Just as in basketball we have a much higher level than in soccer, so in any area in which we are better we will be welcome guests without looking at scores; when that is not the case they will settle scores. But if I am to translate the whole story into the language of science, then, without a doubt, our level has dropped.

[HADASHOT] A drop that you have been warning about for several years.

[Harari] True, and the government is responsible for it and, to my great dismay, the country will pay the price. Were the government and the people responsible for this going to pay the price, I would be less concerned. But we will all pay the price. The ones responsible are that small coterie of people who don't understand the need to invest in science.

[HADASHOT] How is the drop expressed?

[Harari] It is expressed in the fact that there are whole spheres of science that we don't go into today because of a lack of resources.

[HADASHOT] For example?

[Harari] I don't want to start enumerating them at the moment but there are whole technologies in areas of electronics, physics, and biology that we don't get into.

[HADASHOT] Is the change in situation a function of budgets?

[Harari] Mainly. In fact, yes. I can say categorically yes.

[HADASHOT] Where does the decline begin, in a decline in the primary education system?

[Harari] I don't think so. What is happening in the primary and middle school system is very serious, but I don't think there is a connection between the two things. If you were to come and put \$50 million on the table for me and tell me to give it either to science or to primary education, I am not sure what I would do because there is a terrible need in both of them.

[HADASHOT] Don't problems in the education system have an influence on science?

[Harari] The answer is no. A drop in the quality of primary education would take 30 years to influence anything else. If you look at those 100 people who are the pillars of Israeli science, then it is of no consequence to them what elementary education they received since they are generally good enough to exploit any kind of education.

[HADASHOT] That research study claimed that Israel had slipped from the group of very developed countries to the intermediate group of semi-developed ones.

[Harari] I think all the explanations in this area are imprecise. There are still areas of science where we are among the best in the world, there are areas that don't exist at all, and there are areas in which we have become weak. On average there is no doubt we have gone down.

[HADASHOT] In which areas have we become weak?

[Harari] There are all kinds of areas in which we have gone down because of an inability to invest in constant innovation. Perhaps some areas of chemistry, some technological areas, there are a whole lot of areas. Don't forget that science itself is composed of hundreds and thousands of sub-areas and you can be outstanding in one sub-area and so-so or below in another.

[HADASHOT] Should someone suddenly decide to send money your way, are you ready for it?

[Harari] There are programs. I presented such programs at the Weitzman Institute and other institutions have presented them. There is no lack of either ideas or of vision. The lack right now is of money.

#### **West Bank Investment Opportunities Said Growing**

44000239 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
(Investment Supplement) in English Mar 90 p 25

[Article by Joel Bainerman: "Intifadah Alters Investment Trends"]

[Text] Despite the rock throwing and curfews, investment opportunities for foreign investors both in Israel and the administered territories seem to be flourishing.

It also appears that residents of the territories are directing more of their income toward investments. For instance, before the intifadah, residents directed 80 percent of their savings toward housing. Now, for the first time, many people in the territories are placing savings in small-scale industrial projects. Whereas in the past they viewed these endeavours as being too bureaucratic and cumbersome, today those enterprises are considered an intricate part of the effort to erect a self-sufficient economy.

Outsiders are also stating to invest in the West Bank. Recently, a group of merchants who sell building materials sold shares in a house and wall-paint company, the first company on the West Bank to hold to equity offering since 1967.

After placing advertisements in two East Jerusalem newspapers, shares in the firm were sold for \$15 each through the Cairo-Amman Bank, and in two days more than \$600,000 was raised for 50 percent of the shares in the new company. A factory has now been established in Nabulus and the head of the new company says that because of the low cost of Palestinian labour, the paint products will be competitive both in the Israeli and European markets.

On the other side of the fence, the intifadah has had little influence on investment in the Israeli economy. In 1988 and 1989, Israeli companies in the electronics, media and communications, real estate, textiles, oil exploration, tourism and food sectors reported having never seen so much foreign investment, both from Jews and non-Jews.

Oded Bone of the Israel Investment Authority says that when foreign investors look at the possibility of investing in Israel, economic factors such as the annual inflation rate is of more interest to them than political events. Unrest in the territories is seen in much the same light as the overall conflict in the Middle East, that is, the ongoing state of war with most of the Arab world.

The intifadah is causing large changes in the economies of the administered territories. One of the clearest examples is in the building industry, whose traditional work force has been dominated by Palestinian companies. The estimated \$200 million worth of sub-contracting work (some official, some not) by Palestinian companies to Israeli firms was one of the first industrial casualties of the intifadah. Exports to Israel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip were down 50 percent from the 1987 level of 1988 and to 40 percent in 1989, to \$180 million.

Probably the most significant economic development for the Palestinians has been the desire for self-sufficiency and the substitution of Israeli products by those made by Palestinian companies. For instance, from January 1988 until March 1989 West Bankers purchased about 750 milk cows from Israeli dairy farmers each month, in an effort to form an independent dairy industry. They are now providing 80 percent of their dairy needs. In a survey carried out by Samir Hilhaylad, a Palestinian developmentalist, a 20 percent increase in the size of the animal husbandry sector was registered in each of the past two years, with the level of self-sufficiency reaching almost 100 percent.

The injection of self-confidence has enabled Palestinian factories to take significant market-share away from Israeli producers in the West Bank and Gaza. For example, Elite Ltd., Israel's largest chocolate producer, says that its annual sales have shrunk to less than a tenth of a preintifadah figure of \$700,000.

Yet, not all Palestinian manufacturers are celebrating. With a decrease of 50 percent in the amount of money entering household budgets, retailers of products like furniture, electrical goods, cosmetics and carpets report a 70-80 percent decrease in turnover. Another major problem is that since the uprising began it has become impossible for Palestinian industrialists to receive credit from Israeli banks. And Israeli suppliers of raw materials no longer accept cheques from them, or offer credit.

Of course, Israelis have had to adapt to the changing conditions as well and the fact that companies seem to be meeting the challenges make them that more attractive to foreign investors.

Communications Minister Gad Ya'agobi estimated that in 1988 alone Israel lost \$0.7 billion from construction slowdowns, a downturn in tourism, additional military expenditures, and fewer exports to the West Bank and Gaza consumer markets. Bank of Israel Governor Mikha'el Bruno said in December 1989 that the two-year cost of the uprising was 1.4 percent of GNP [gross national product], or \$1.1-1.2 billion.

In a few years, the intifadah might very well be seen as a economic blessing in disguise for both the Israeli and Palestinian economies.

### Columnist Seeks Israeli Arab Equality, Not Autonomy

90OL0279A Nazareth AL-SINNARAH  
in Arabic 23 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Munqidh al-Zu'bi: "Autonomy Is Not the Appropriate Legal Status for the Arabs of Israel"]

[Text] The Arabs of Israel are going through a period of creativity, coming up with many ideas and participating in many debates about their future in the state of Israel. That in itself is a positive phenomenon that must continue, provided that proper decorum is maintained in the debates that are held and the articles that are written. This positive phenomenon must continue, provided we deal objectively with the ideas that are being presented and provided we do not subject the writers to attacks and censure or intense scrutiny and disparagement. The sheer number of articles and ideas coming out and unfolding every week indicates how torn the Arabs of Israel are about this matter and the extent to which they are trying to find their way to the road they must follow. It shows that the Arabs of Israel have given up on existing political organizations, and it also shows that they are looking for new organizations and new proposals.

There is no doubt in our minds that those who proposed the idea of autonomy for the Arabs of Israel are sincere people who tried to set forth their own opinions in an attempt on their part to find the way for their people.

I do not wish to discuss the details of what has been proposed, since it is possible for the proposed autonomy

to assume an unlimited number of forms. I do, however, want to discuss the idea of autonomy as a whole. I want to discuss its inapplicability to the Arabs of Israel and the danger involved in proposing this idea. I want to ask what are the alternatives to autonomy that can give the Arabs of Israel equality. After all, equality is the goal we are striving to achieve. Useful methods guaranteeing success in our efforts to achieve that goal would then be selected through independent efforts.

But before I start talking about the idea of autonomy for the Arabs of Israel, I must mention the dangers that are involved in proposing such an idea at this difficult time, in particular.

The idea of autonomy may be deliberately misconstrued by government circles and officials in Israel, who may use it in their psychological warfare to impede the achievements of the intifadah [uprising]. Because Israeli Government officials have categorically rejected the idea of a Palestinian state, they may also use the idea of autonomy for the Arabs of Israel to drum up a marginal battle to strengthen their propaganda position in the world, thereby adding a new dimension to the "phobia" about the elimination of Israel: a threat that comes not only from Palestinians abroad, but also from Palestinians in Israel. This would cause Shamir to harden his position further and it would give him "legitimate" rational excuses for his rejection positions.

The theory of transfer, which was articulated by Ze'evi and others, has been fading because it is out of touch with reality, but the idea of autonomy for the Arabs of Israel could breathe new life into it. It could give it a new momentum that could attract the support of those who had not supported that theory in the past.

But the most dangerous consequence of the idea of autonomy for the Arabs of Israel lies in the backlash it will cause. We will lose the support of leftist and progressive Jewish forces because a strong consensus, from the far right to the far left, will emerge against these forces for supporting us, and that will divest the common struggle of its substance.

We join the authors of the idea of autonomy in asking these questions: Does the absence of peace, for example, justify the lack of equality in national insurance allocations, in housing loans, in grants to local Arab authorities, and so on and so forth? What does peace have to do with sewage projects in one village or another? What does it have to do with any of these things? We all agree that peace has nothing to do with such matters, and we make every effort to disprove any claims to the contrary. Unfortunately, however, reality is stronger than we are. Without peace, opposition to the Arabs of Israel and attitudes and views about them will not change. It is this opposition that is also delaying solutions to small problems.

With peace, solutions could be found for most of the problems plaguing us, such as sewage, schools, grants, housing loans, and others. With peace, the idea of

autonomy for the Arabs of Israel could also become reasonable, acceptable, and free from preconceived notions, like the "phobia" of eliminating Israel. And yet I am confident that with peace, autonomy for the Arabs of Israel will not be necessary.

I am not calling upon people to sit quietly with their hands turned up to the sky in silent prayer. I am not asking people to wait silently and hopefully for the advent of peace. God forbid!

The road of strife is the rough road we must take. Not for one moment are we to be anything less than determined in our rightful demand for equality. According to the law, the Arabs of Israel are citizens who have equal rights, but there is a big difference between what the law says and what happens in real life. We must struggle to make the written law a reality. Leftist and progressive Jewish circles will provide broad support for our demand for equality.

We demand, for example, repeal of the laws that are unjust to Arabs (allocations for children, housing loans, development towns, taxes on private land, etc.). These laws, which were enacted against the Arabs, are aimed at them even though they do not explicitly mention them.

We demand that new laws be enacted to ensure the Arabs their rightful share in the state budget, at least in accordance with their proportion of the population in the state. The Arabs' share in the state's budget should not be less than 18 percent.

We demand that laws be enacted guaranteeing the Arabs their right to be represented in the state's institutions (the Knesset, the government, the Supreme Court, and the courts of all levels) in proportion to their numbers in the state.

We demand that a law be enacted to set up an independent authority for the preservation of the Arabs' heritage, the Arabic language, Arab art, the theater, and the development of the theater.

We demand that a broadcast authority be set up for the Arabs of Israel, who would run it in accordance with their tastes, to respond to their artistic, cultural, and national desires.

Why shouldn't the law stipulate that the vice president of the state or the deputy prime minister be an Arab?

Our desire to become assimilated in the state is sincere. At the same time we want to preserve our national identity. No one—not Kahane, Ghandi, Ge'ula Kohen, or the most recalcitrant extremists—can deny us that. If we become assimilated in the state, they lose their distinction as extremists. The idea of autonomy for the Arabs of Israel, however, "legitimizes" their efforts to attack us and turn people against us. It will cause us to lose the sympathy and support we've had from a broad group of leftist Jews.



Becoming assimilated does not mean that we lose our distinctive identity. Those who proposed the idea of autonomy are graduates of universities in Israel who lecture in Bi'r Zayt University. Did the fact that we spent 41 years of our lives in the state of Israel undermine our sense of our national identity and national heritage in any way? Did the fact that the education we received was an Israeli education undermine that sense? Our national honor, thank God, remains intact; our national heritage is alive and well; and our Arabic language, too, is alive and well. Our persistent struggle for true, national and, legal equality in the state of Israel, as defined by its borders on 4 June 1967, will provide the best support for our brothers who are involved in the intifadah. We will expedite their victory, not delay it.

## KUWAIT

### Plans To Develop Seaports Reported

90OL0272A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT  
in Arabic 24 Feb 90 p 11

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim Kazim: "Kuwait Ports Fight Stagnation, Ambitious Projects To Deepen and Develop Them"]

[Text] In a plan aimed at developing the capacity of its ports, Kuwait is preparing to carry out large-scale deepening and development operations in the port of al-Shu'aybah, which is no longer able to receive some kinds of container ships with drafts exceeding 40 feet.

The deputy director general of the port of al-Shu'aybah, Captain 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Naybari, said to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, "We are having big problems in the ports. In particular, fourth- and fifth-generation transports cannot now enter the port, because the present depth is insufficient for the new drafts."

He added: "Our primary objective, which we will achieve in the next few years, is to extend the anchorages to sufficient depths in the sea, so as to suit the drafts of container ships. These transport vessels are continually being modernized. Their tonnage is increasing every day."

Al-Naybari added: "The new American and Japanese ships can no longer visit the port, because their drafts exceed 40 to 50 feet."

### Ambitious Plans

Kuwait intends to implement similar plans in the ports of al-Shuwaykh and al-Dawhah. These plans will concentrate on extending the anchorages, constructing new wharves, and deepening the marinas.

Four months ago, the government increased appropriations to the General Organization for Ports by about 17.5 million dinars. At that time, Isa al-Mazidi, the minister of state for services affairs, explained this measure as

aimed at modernizing administration departments and buildings in the port of al-Shu'aybah.

Al-Naybari added that the General Organization for Ports is now working under a plan to build four anchorages in the port of al-Shuwaykh to handle containers. These anchorages will be connected by a new canal to be a backup for the present container ports.

Pending further notice, the organization has postponed the expenditure of 3 million dinars to build an anchorage serving the free zone that is scheduled to be established. Concerning this, the deputy director general said, "A project to build [free] zones has been referred to the General Organization for Customs as the relevant agency."

### Al-Shuwaykh's Losses

He stated that losses at the port of al-Shuwaykh can be attributed to the decline in the level of trade activity in the last few years, as well as to the computation of appropriations for amortization, since it is being done on purely commercial principles that take into consideration accounts of revenues, disbursements, and operating forces and that employ fixed accounting principles.

However, he stated that utilization rates for the anchorages rose to 50 percent with the beginning of the year.

Al-Naybari added that service steps are now being implemented to improve the level of performance by linking the locally and regionally accredited shipping agencies at al-Shu'aybah container station by computer for the purpose of obtaining information.

The port of al-Shu'aybah suffers from a shortage of container storage areas, despite the fact that it operates on a system of immediate handling. Al-Naybari said, "What we lack are the proper services that would, for example, prevent the leakage of dangerous substances from their containers."

The port of al-Shu'aybah consists of 24 anchorages to receive container ships, commercial transports, ships to transport bulk commodities, Ro-Ro ships, and petroleum product transports.

Al-Naybari said that the transfer of the petroleum products wharf to the Kuwaiti Petroleum Agency has had an obvious effect on the revenues of the port of al-Shu'aybah.

### Improved Cargo Movement

In 1989, exports and imports through the port of al-Shu'aybah totaled 4.9 million tons—2.3 million tons of exports, and 2.6 million tons of imports.

By comparison, there were 3.4 million tons in 1988, which was the year that cast a gloomy shadow on trade between Kuwait and the outside world. The increase in

cargo movement during 1989 represents the most prominent indicator of improved trade movement because of the end of the Iraq-Iran war.

Kuwait plans to increase the depth of the marina to accommodate ships with drafts of up to 13 meters at the port of al-Shuwaykh and is planning to build marinas for coastal ships.

The port of al-Shu'aybah includes four anchorages and receives ships with drafts up to 13.7 meters. Al-Naybari said that the port charges moderate fees. He attributed the activity of the neighboring ports, especially the port of Dubayy, to the fact that they operate on purely commercial principles, unlike what takes place in Kuwait.

The port of al-Shu'aybah consists of the following installations and facilities:

1. Docks for dry goods,
2. Container station,
3. Wharf for petroleum products, and
4. Side docks and small boat docks.

From 1987 to 1988, according to statistics prepared by the port of al-Shu'aybah, 3,332 transports anchored at the petroleum products wharf.

The port's services include: receiving ships, handling various commodities, unloading and loading by means of ordinary hoists and container hoists, fuel and fresh water services, services to combat marine pollution and fire, and diving and underwater inspection services.

### Reasons Given for Domestic Labor Shortage

90OL0284A Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA'  
in Arabic 9 Jan 90 pp 12-14

[Article: "Danger of Foreign Labor, What Is Behind Shrinkage of Domestic Labor?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In this issue, we give the figures for foreign labor, especially Asian, in some of the Gulf countries. We clarify the reasons why the figure for native labor has shrunk and why citizens generally avoid it. We concentrate on Kuwait as a basis for comparison with the other countries, since conditions are in most instances similar.

### Proportion of Native Work Force in the Gulf

The native work force in Kuwait is close to 22 percent and growing. There are strong efforts, persistent attempts, and pressures to increase it and raise its proportion, but they require more training and education.

We have seen that Asians monopolize most of the remaining figure. Looking at the Arab nationalities, we find that Egyptians constitute about 60 percent of their total.

A quick overview shows us that the figure for foreign labor in Qatar, for example, is 83 percent, with Asians constituting 65 percent of it. In Bahrain, the figure for foreign labor is 73 percent, with Asians constituting 60 percent of it. In the Emirates, 75 percent of the work force is Asian. In Oman, 80 percent of the total work force consists of foreigners, with Asians also constituting a large percentage.

### Reasons for Small Percentage of Native Labor

If we want to learn the reasons why native elements in the Gulf and Kuwait participate narrowly in the work force figures, we find that these reasons are numerous. In most of the data of our research, we primarily consider the Kuwaiti situation. However, we draw rough conclusions about all the countries, since conditions are similar.

These reasons include:

1) Students fail repeatedly in secondary school and university and graduate late. This deprives the labor market of a potentially large number of people with the right age and qualifications for particular job slots. As a result of the spread of this factor, about 33.1 percent of people of working age in Kuwait, for example, are not working.

2) The composition of the population is skewed: 44.5 percent of all Kuwaitis, for example, are below the age of 15, i.e., below the working age. If we add the preceding group to them, as well as those on retirement, we retain a figure of 21.6 percent of Kuwaitis who are the actual work force.

Also, the support ratio in Kuwait is high, averaging 363.5 per 100 working individuals. This is three times the support ratio for the others, if we limit our examination to persons within the country.

3) The retirement system provides for early retirement. The retiree is paid a full salary, and most bonuses and raises, particularly the bonus for children, apply. This encourages retirement so that one can escape the restrictions of a job, working hours, responsibilities, routine, etc. People sometimes retire to become free for other jobs. Good talents are thus allowed to leak out of the job market. The job market loses these categories. When they leave the work place, the native component in it naturally decreases.

4) Training is inadequate and there is an aversion to it. In Kuwait, for example, we find that 75 percent of the population is of low educational level (less than secondary). This does not fit the requirements of development programs and the job market. We find that 7.2 percent of Kuwaitis have university or higher-institution credentials; 6.1 percent have a diploma, but below university level; 12.2 percent have only a high school diploma; 50 percent have an intermediate or primary certificate; 10 percent can read and write, but have no credentials; and 14 percent are illiterate—according to statistics of the

Civilian Information Agency as of 30 June 1989.<sup>1</sup> Until recently, Kuwaitis were relatively disinclined to enroll in institutes for applied education and training.

5) Planning and coordination in the field of education and employment are confused. The country is relatively inexperienced with the policies of planning or the planning of policies. We find that planning is usually confused because of differing opinions, analyses, research results, beliefs, and external imports, etc. Curriculums basically need clear planning of their goals and of the subject of their field, which is the formation of the human being. There is no careful, scientific planning of how to form a human being with particular specifications (e.g., a good Arab Muslim citizen), let alone planning about how to direct this citizen toward relevant future work areas according to the country's conditions and the demands of the job market and development programs.

Indeed, planning takes no account of Islam, its ideals, and its precepts and attaches no importance to any of these factors. It does not distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims, even idolaters. This creates tremendous social cleavages. It exposes society to many pitfalls and breeds many different contradictions within the society.

6) There is chaos in the employment of women. Government, company, and institution offices are filled with them—needed, or unneeded; women who have to work, or those who do not; in women's specializations (e.g., female education or providing medical treatment to women), or outside of them. This has led to narrowing the field for many young men and has directly affected them. Women have taken their places and their jobs. At the same time, women are by law and statute guaranteed [support], since the woman's guardian (husband, father, etc.) must support her. Adult men, on the other hand, are legally responsible for their own support. Thus, a man may be the provider of a family and yet be deprived of a job opportunity in a position occupied by a woman who may not need the job, regardless of the degree to which she is qualified or the safety of her situation in it.

The army of unnecessary women employees, workers, and secretaries has in turn created an army of unemployed men. It has turned many young men away from job fields to which they are more entitled and perhaps more qualified and more appropriate.

We thus believe that the basic job of women as a work force is the home and raising children. There is no harm in their working if forced to do so and if they do not disturb their domestic obligations toward their children and husbands. Their jobs must also be made safe, so that they are not forced to be alone with men or to mix frequently with them, since the resulting opportunities for immorality are obvious and need not be described.

Certainly, the best place for women to work, if they are forced to do so, or if society is forced to use them, is, as

we have indicated, is in the education or medical treatment of their own sex and in jobs that suit their nature, are not burdensome to them, and do not harm them. Attention must be paid to modesty, respect, and consideration for propriety, morals, and customs in every situation.

7) It is easy, especially for companies,<sup>2</sup> to send for guest workers, generally without setting a definite number as limit. This has opened the door to the importation of unskilled workers and to widespread dealing in residence permits. It seems that the relevant agencies have finally taken notice of this and are perhaps on the way to remedying it.

8) Citizens are averse to productive economic activities and tend toward high-return, low-effort financial schemes. In other words, they choose the easiest path and quick gain. Some such factor may have been one of the most important reasons for the climate crisis (or nightmare) that caused an economic disaster in Kuwait a number of years ago and from whose effects the Kuwaiti economy still suffers. The remains of this crisis and its problems remain a preoccupying concern of some government agencies and of the information media. How to eliminate its remaining noxious effects is still being discussed. These effects almost stopped the economy—indeed, they did so—and the economy is still groaning as a result of them and because of other factors, such as the Gulf war and the oil massacre (the decline in prices and production). This has led to the twilight of the golden age of an enormous, flourishing economy and to movement toward a realistic, limited economy. The assumption is that there will be greater self-reliance and greater reliance on domestic production.

9) The economic abundance that many people possess has led them to prefer leisure. They disdain many jobs and leave them for others. These include service jobs and simple technical and professional jobs.

10) Under the law, the government is obliged to provide citizens with job opportunities in government departments.<sup>3</sup> This has led young people to accumulate in ministries. It has caused job inflation that has led to saturation, until a problem of graduates without a job or far from their specialty has begun to appear. Some agencies have finally decided to stop hiring until further notice.

However, people who were dreaming of a sinecure did not prepare themselves for another job. Instead, they remain waiting for a chance to be hired in the job in question.

11) The tempting appraisal policy, whereby property is expropriated for exorbitant prices, has driven many to try to present their real estate holdings for appraisal.<sup>4</sup> They try to use connections to get this to happen or wait in expectation of it. Most of those whose property is so appraised become disinclined to take a position or work and turn their backs on it.

12) The system of providing assistance to many groups has often made them dependent on this assistance.<sup>5</sup> They are not forced to accept any job, nor do they show interest in it.

13) The system of guarantees has made some people rely on the guarantees that accrue to them but from which other persons, noncitizens, usually benefit. The person remains idle or sitting around without participating in direct production.

14) There are insufficient incentives and encouragements for some classes. This has led them to abstain from working in government departments or not to be interested in it. Although the government may have lost a great deal on their education, many expert talents work in private jobs—generally in commerce—far from their specialties. It is as if the time, effort, and expenditures made for them and by them during their education and training had gone to waste.

15) The socioeconomic situation generally: Many groups look down on many jobs and occupations considered menial by social custom, such as bakers, tailors, barbers, artisans, and mechanics. One can hardly find a single Kuwaiti in some of these occupations. In the other Gulf countries, one also finds only a few citizens in some of these professions.

This may be attributable to a past social attitude that considered practicing a trade for gain to be a disgrace, whether the job was in industry or in agriculture. This is in line with the fact that some milieus that have the custom of showing hospitality to guests disdain asking for anything in return for food, drink, shelter, etc.

When sudden economic abundance came to many people, it strengthened this attitude. Enormous social changes have occurred, but they have not wiped out the view that many occupations are degrading.

#### Footnotes

1. Cf. article by Dr Muhammad 'Ali al-Ramadan, *AL-WATAN*, 3 Dec 89.

2. See book by Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Jardawi, "Zahirat al-Khadam wa al-Murabbiyat" [The Phenomenon of Servants and Governesses], pp 10 ff.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

## LIBYA

### Correspondent Views al-Qadhdhafi's Call for People's Power

90OA0319A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI'  
in Arabic 12 Feb 90 p 21

[Article by Qasim 'Izz-al-Din: "Adherence to Revolutionary Committees and Campaign Against Brokers and Profiteers"]

[Text] The basic popular conferences convened their ordinary session for the new year. Under Libyan law, this session is a necessary prelude to the ratification of domestic and foreign policies because it is used to "promote ministers" and to form a new government at the beginning of March. Shortly before this session got under way, everyone inside and outside the country expected that a step-by-step legislative policy aimed at revitalizing traditional government establishments, and at ratifying a policy in keeping with international changes and economic and political measures adopted in Libya in the last year would be followed, especially since Colonel Mu'amar al-Qadhdhafi had stated publicly on several occasions that Libya was not the ideal place to apply the "Green Book" concepts, creating the impression that such change is possible.

Al-Qadhdhafi, however, sent a message to the basic popular conferences in the opening session, asking them to apply the motto "the people's revolt against themselves." He announced that he did not want to be president, threatening to leave Libya if the people unanimously decided to turn over the presidency to him and asked the people to hold on to the "people power" concept and to preserve the role of the "revolutionary committees." He also asked the people to define his role and the leadership duties.

The last question was quickly answered when the Free Unionist Officers Movement announced its adherence to the people's power concept and vested the "brother leader" with the absolute authority to steer the revolution, to guide the experience, and to represent Libya in Arab and international conferences and forums, prompting military and popular sectors to release similar statements. Whereas this issue has been clearly settled, other issues are not as easy to resolve, given the fact that internal and external developments are becoming more complex and muddled.

### Domestic Policy

No Libyan official tries to make a secret of mismanagement and overlapping jurisdictions, attributing this situation to the experience's immaturity and the Libyans' disdain for responsibility. In the motto, "People revolt against themselves," al-Qadhdhafi pointed to this reality, but he asked the conferences to hold the officials responsible and to follow-up the implementation of resolutions. This means that the general people's (government) conference that culminates the conferences'

session will witness a great deal of changes in functions and jurisdictions as well as many changes among the ministers. This will, by necessity, have an effect on government officials inside as well as outside the country. Many officials abroad are getting their suitcases ready for departure.

This administrative matter has another side to it that touches what al-Qadhdhafi called "the brokers and profiteers," a large segment of the government cadre coexisting on foreign trade and purchases and investments abroad. Some people believe that the two-year period of administrative stability gave these brokers a chance to take advantage of the absence of accountability to amass personal wealth and to build farms and villas. These people expect the conferences to hold this segment accountable through the motto "people's revolt against themselves." If, due to the current circumstances, the adage "wherefrom" cannot be applied in their case, it is expected that they will be removed from their positions and the importance and power of their fealties that got them into these positions will be minimized.

The other dilemma preoccupying the domestic situation in Libya is the economic problem. Perhaps the term "perestroika" was applied to the economic measures that allowed the revitalization of the private sector and brought back the "individual dealer." The conferences were expected to pass import and export legislation to enable this sector to assume the burdens of trade and distribution. But practical experience in the last year proved that this sector has been able to reconcile its work with import restrictions because investors facing tighter investment opportunities have invested their money in the agricultural sector and, as a result of government encouragement, agricultural production is now yielding double profits. In view of the foreign export volume, the private sector has taken it upon itself to import and export goods without the need for hard currency exchange and the agricultural production shortfall is made up for by other exports such as glass and petroleum byproducts such as plastic and agricultural chemical materials.

### Religious Current

But solving the economic problem "Libyan style" has not stopped the growth of the religious current that is influenced by world and surrounding conditions and, according to Libyan officials, by the experience's immaturity. The basic popular conferences included a special item on its agenda for "combating atheism" and a special studies center is expected to be set up to propagate Islamic thought and to expose the atheist currents' intellectual and doctrinal origins. To help expose this current, the conferences aim to reactivate the role of youth and of women, in particular. Some committees are busy preparing rehabilitation centers and the international Woman's Day on 8 March is expected to witness an international woman's festival.

### Foreign Policy

It is evident now that Libya is seeking to normalize its political and diplomatic relations with the outside. Last year

it took several perestroika-like initiatives alongside the domestic economic measures. Libya, however, cannot offer direct concessions to the superpowers because such a step would undermine its ideology and would have a rapid impact on its system of rule. Therefore, it is trying to exploit the contradictions among the countries of the West by using the "Arab Maghreb Federation" to cover its back. It had hoped that this federation would form an Arab force able to win over Western Europe to its side in countering the U.S. attempts to attack it from the Khalij Surt [Gulf of Sirte] or from Chad. Encouraged by the attitude of France and Great Britain toward the American Embassy [as published], Libya took advantage of the contradictions by consolidating its political and trade relations with Italy and sought to normalize its relations with France on several planes:

- It coordinated with the Arab Maghreb leaders to reopen discussions on French-Libya relations side by side with Arab Maghreb relations with France and Europe. Libya acceded to the terms of the dialogue and, according to Libyan officials, promised France to abide by anything that can promote or develop this dialogue.
- France participated in the preliminary talks to ratify the Algiers agreement on solving the Chadian question and it oversaw the secret talks held between a Libyan and Chadian delegation in a Parisian suburb to implement the agreements.
- France and Libya arrived at a new formula calling for the gradual consolidation of economic and political relations, beginning with the expression of good intentions. Topping this list was the granting of the second phase of the manmade river project to the French "BUIG" Company at a cost of approximately \$5 billion, provided that French companies operating in Libya would persuade the French Government to take up the matter of lifting the EC embargo. This contract was about to be signed last September, but the companies asked for more time to work on the matter. Libya waited for the EC to discuss the embargo shortly before the end of last year while French companies were negotiating business in Libya. France, however, did not put the matter up for debate but rather took advantage of al-Qadhdhafi's message concerning Muslim schoolgirls to suspend the agreement to deliver the three Mirage planes it had released. Libyan officials believe that this incident demonstrated the European countries' inability to break away from the American sphere of influence regarding international decisions and, accordingly, decided to reexamine their European policy. Some reports believe that Italy stands to benefit from the tense relations between Libya and the United States and cannot afford to make efforts to improve these relations. As for France, it cannot, if it wants to obtain economic facilities, reconcile its economic interests with its foreign policy.

It was in this context that Libyan-Egyptian relations were normalized. This normalization satisfies a bilateral need and is directed toward the realization by Libya of



objectives aimed at playing a special role in Africa and the African Horn and enjoying a weight able to influence American policy which, since the Malta meeting, has been showing a growing tendency to interfere in domestic affairs and replace rulers by force. Notwithstanding the fact that the normalization of Libyan-Egyptian relations was realized only recently, openness has reached a point not reached with any other Arab Maghreb Federation country, especially since Egypt is capable of taking over all of the sensitive medical, educational, and agricultural positions currently filled by foreign nationals, not to mention agricultural and maritime projects of interest to both countries.

Is this special relationship enough to ward off foreign dangers? And, will it grow into a drawing Arab force? The Libyans hope so. Some say that the new developments are bound to win over Europe, and that the current strained relationship with France is one that is looking for ultimate stability rather than lasting tension. They add that the general people's conference will be at a crossroads where next year's policy will be determined.

## SUDAN

### Government's Failed Attempts To Co-opt Support Detailed

90A0318A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 4 Feb 90 p 7

[Article by Sa'idah Ramadan: "Military Council Seeks Party Leaders' Support; Endeavors To Soften Popular Discontent With 'Rule of Military'"]

[Text] The Military Council [MC] is facing great difficulties in the various aspects of life in the country that has reached an unprecedented state of decline exacerbated by the regime's failure to solve the major problems, by the war in the south, by a slumping economy, and by isolation from the outside. This month Khartoum witnessed extensive MC activity aimed at urging some political forces to work and cooperate with the regime to help it deal with the severe and sweeping mass discontent that augurs the outbreak of a violent revolution at any moment to bring it down. Our sources in Khartoum have confirmed that, due to the hostile attitude the council has adopted toward both the old and new forces ever since the June coup that did away with democracy and dissolved the parties and unions, these attempts have failed.

Politicians characterize the June coup as the worst one Sudan has experienced in its coup history. The 'Abbud coup relied on the support of half the political forces in society represented by the old forces after gaining the support of 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar faction, and of al-Mirghani, leader of the Khatmiyah faction, and was only opposed by the Communist Party, which was small at the time. Al-Numayri's reliance on the new forces brought about, one week after the May coup, the largest popular demonstration in the

history of Sudan called for by the unions, the heaviest political weight in Sudanese cities.

As for the June coup, it was totally aligned with one small party. The greatest proof of that is that the MC is still denying this affiliation, notwithstanding that it is a fact that has been confirmed internally and externally. The MC is seeking to gain the support of some political forces, the Ummah and Unionist Parties in particular, but sources in Khartoum confirm that these attempts have failed for several reasons.

In its first June coup communique, the MC laid down its hostile position toward the parties that it dissolved and announced its intention to set up a single political system fully detached from those parties that it described as factional. The council's hostility toward the parties did not stop at that. It tried several times to discredit the party leaders and to portray them to the public as weak, as happened to al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, former prime minister and Ummah Party leader who received the highest percentage of the vote in the April 1986 elections.

Even though al-Mahdi had presented to the revolutionaries a specific statement on the fate of the rule in Sudan, on the grounds that the authorities declare a national provisional government and comply with all human rights charters, and had outlined in the statement the manner in which he would turn himself in to the authorities to avoid a clash, his arrest was followed by a deliberate media campaign aimed at discrediting him. While al-Sadiq al-Mahdi was in detention, the MC authorities staged a mock assassination attempt on his life to humiliate and intimidate him and to threaten him and all the members of his family with immediate execution. Al-Mahdi wrote a memorandum in prison to General al-Bashir about the threats and human rights violations he encountered. This memorandum was sent to all Arab human rights organizations and these practices were denounced by all the Sudanese parties and organizations.

And in an attempt to win world public opinion that persisted in its demands to release political prisoners, the MC released al-Mahdi and placed him under house arrest at a relative's home. But during the meetings held at the People's Palace, al-Mahdi refused to cooperate with the MC, emphasizing that the Ummah Party had abided by the national charter it had signed with the parties and the unions in which it described how to topple the regime and outlined the future of democratic rule in Sudan.

Just as the council's attempts with al-Mahdi were unsuccessful, so were its futile attempts with al-Mirghani, the leader of the Unionist Party. Following al-Mirghani's release and placement under house arrest for a month, he was visited by Brigadier General Faysal Abu-Salih, minister of the interior, who informed him that the Sudanese Government had unconditionally approved his travel abroad for medical treatment, provided that he sign a statement pledging not to engage in any activities against

the regime. Al-Mirghani refused to sign, asserting that his signature was worthless because it did not represent the Unionist Party. Unionist Party communiques are still being issued and circulated in Sudan, urging the Sudanese people to resist the regime and to wrest freedom and democracy through strikes and demonstrations. The MC's endeavors to gain the support of Sudanese party leaders was but an attempt to divert public attention from the national struggle against it and to strip the national charter of its power and credibility with the people and the world.

Just as the MC lost the support of the old forces represented in the parties, it has also lost the support of the new forces represented in the unions that it dissolved, creating provisional committees without setting a definite time for them and without defining the law under which elections will be held. It appointed construction committees that included National Front Party members and excluded all members of the elected union committees that were dissolved and whose leaders were detained. The council also issued an order to the general prosecutor's office to enact a new union law without asking the workers or others to contribute to it. The order was met with rejection and denunciation by labor base organizations that formed a union bloc of over 100 labor unions and issued a communique denouncing the deterrence and torture of union members. This prompted the MC to wage a large-scale arrest campaign against union members based on political labeling aimed at active union members, excluding the National Front. All indications are that the political forces in Sudan refuse to cooperate with a regime that condemned itself the minute it earned people's animosity.

### **DUP Urges Public To Remove New Regime**

900A0318B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 4 Feb 90 p 7

[Article: "Unionist Party Calls Sudanese To Struggle To Save Country in Worst Period of Its History"]

[Text] The Democratic Unionist Party issued a communique calling the Sudanese people to a continuous struggle to wrest freedom and democracy and to save the country from the worst periods of its history following the Front Party's autocratic rule that transformed the country into a vast prison where the entire population lived in fear of being tortured. The communique emphasized that the Military Council has been in a panic ever since the Medical Association, the vanguard of the national struggle against the dictatorship, went on strike. As the mass movement escalated, the military council began insinuating that the opposition would be liquidated under the guise of unifying the domestic front, and in an attempt to confine popular discontent to a battle with the Communist Party. This would occur with a view to neutralizing other parties in the wake of the military's unsuccessful Nairobi talks with the Garang Movement, their growing isolation internally and externally, and their heightened fear manifested in the repressive measures they use every morning against the noble strugglers,

politicians, and union leaders alike. This is represented in the sweeping arrest campaigns by the council's security agency comprised of front cadres headed by Major Ibrahim Shams-al-Din. This agency is equal to other security agencies and receives its orders from Front leaders. The communique condemned the Military Council for entering the Khartoum University campus and opening fire on students, killing two and seriously injuring others. Moreover, the wrongful trial of the Medical Association members, which is unprecedented in modern history, is but another indication of the military's fear of the escalating mass and union movement to overthrow them. The communique emphasized that the Sudanese people are not frightened by prisons and not intimidated by trials and hangings because their experience with Maoist rule is still fresh in their minds and the present regime will meet its demise for sure. It called on the Sudanese people to wrest their rights through strikes and demonstrations, adding that all the political and union forces will stand as an impenetrable barrier to topple this dictatorial regime.

### **UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

#### **Deputy Finance Minister Discusses Economy in 1990's**

90OL0265A London AL-MAJALLAH  
in Arabic 13 Feb 90 pp 43-44

[Interview with UAE Deputy Finance and Industry Minister Nasir al-Nuwayis in Abu Dhabi; first two paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction; date not given]

[Text] Are we heading toward a new upswing and will we in the nineties regain what we enjoyed in the seventies? What are the challenges of the coming decade and have we put the difficulties of the past decade behind us?

We have put these and many other questions to Nasir al-Nuwayis, United Arab Emirates [UAE] deputy finance and industry minister, director general of Abu Dhabi Arab Economic Development Fund, and chairman of the managing board of Abu Dhabi National Hotels Company.

Regarding the new upswing and its possibilities, al-Nuwayis said: No, no I don't think that we are heading toward a new upswing similar to that that we went through beginning in 1973 and up to the middle of the past decade. The nineties are not the eighties and the seventies. In the past two decades we were in a race with time and were trying to cross distances in the shortest time possible. Also, we were in need for a complete infrastructure, including airports, hospitals, service utilities, roads and so on. At that time we paid no attention to the cost; rather, we were concentrating on speed and trying to raise the people's social, economic, and cultural standards and to provide qualified and trained cadres. Moreover, there was a desire to distribute wealth by creating opportunities for the citizens to own real estate

projects that would bring them material returns. Now, most of what we have worked for in those two decades has been accomplished and all the basic necessities and needs have been provided. I believe that the drop in oil prices in the second half of the past decade was a "blessing in disguise" because the drop in oil prices came after the infrastructure was completed, cadres were provided and trained, and good service institutions and utilities were established. Therefore, the drop in oil prices, and consequently in financial revenues, was a warning for us to review the course of action, rearrange the priorities, put our fingers on the negative aspects, and try to strengthen the positive ones. During the review period we tended toward cutting costs and revising the administrative structure and the budget provisions. Also, since the second half of 1987 we began proceeding toward a normal and continuing growth. I believe that we will continue proceeding in this direction during the nineties.

[AL-MAJALLAH] But are there no priorities for the coming stage?

[Al-Nuwayis] I believe that in the nineties we should concentrate on increasing per capita productivity as well as on industrial goods, especially those derived from oil or depending on it, whether as a raw material or as an energy source, as well as the industries that could replace imports. I also believe that we should make the entire UAE a free market including an international trade center as in Dubai and a primary financial market in Abu Dhabi. Also, we should give tourism a bigger role after the tourism experience in the past years proved its worthiness. This calls for the establishment of industries and production services for the tourism sector.

[AL-MAJALLAH] What is the present growth rate and what is the expected rate during the nineties?

[Al-Nuwayis] I believe that our growth rate is no more than the normal growth rate in countries with economic conditions similar to ours, which is between five and 10 percent. It is a good rate that we hope to maintain and not exceed it or go below it.

[AL-MAJALLAH] The Abu Dhabi National Hotels Company represents a pioneering experiment in the field of creating giant stockholding companies. This would reduce duplication and multiplicity of similar small companies. Do you believe that the establishment of more companies in other economic fields is going to be among future options?

[Al-Nuwayis] In fact, the idea of establishing giant companies specializing in various sectors is not something new. Indeed, UAE President Shaykh Zayid Ibn-Sultan and his crown prince have constantly been working to create such establishments. I believe that the Abu Dhabi National Hotels Company is a living example of such policy. The company, thanks to the support and encouragement it received, has been able to build up experience and to administer tourist utilities of different types and in various fields in Abu Dhabi Emirate. It now also owns

domestic and foreign tourist investments. The company has now become one of the profitmaking institutions. Through it the goal that Shaykh Zayid has set has been achieved, namely to distribute wealth among the citizens in an indirect manner. The company has been able to return the citizens' cash investments four years after its establishment. Also, since it was established 15 years ago, it has been distributing dividends reaching 25 percent of the capital, causing the price of its shares to quadruple. I am giving these details about the Abu Dhabi National Hotels Company by virtue of my position as chairman of its management board. The results and profits the company has achieved are evidence of the importance of the establishment of giant companies specializing in fields other than hotels, such as real estate, construction, contracting, financial investments, and foodstuffs. I believe that we now have some good major institutions and we hope to see more of them in the coming decade.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is there any intention to turn the ownership of some public institutions [over] to the private sector? If that is the case, what are the priorities in this process?

[Al-Nuwayis] In principle, the UAE depends on free economy and free market. At one time, the state used to intervene in order to carry out certain projects, not with the aim of making profits or competing with the citizens. Rather, the government previously shouldered most of the burden of financing and was concerned with providing maximum services without expecting a financial return from doing so. I believe that this method needs to be revised and the realization of a greater participation by the private sector in some of the fields in which the government is currently involved should begin. I hope that this will be done gradually so that the present administration method in the public sector will change and the private sector method will be adopted. This is because improving the public sector administration is the first step toward transferring ownership. We must begin with projects of productive nature and then move to service projects and their various utilities. I believe that among the fields that may be considered for transfer to the private sector are the electricity, water, and various municipal services, as well as government-owned industrial projects and petroleum service utilities, such as distribution stations and factories dependent on oil.

[AL-MAJALLAH] In your capacity as director-general of the Abu Dhabi Arab Economic Development Fund, is there any intention to change the current lending policy? What is the most significant thing you are planning for in the coming years?

[Al-Nuwayis] With regard to the fund's lending policy, there is no change in it and there is nothing that calls for changing it. As for investments, the fund will concentrate, as does now, on grants and easy loans, particularly to the Arab countries, and especially the Maghreb, Egypt, and other Arab countries that have carried out adequate feasibility studies on specific projects.

There is also an inclination toward making some tourist investments in Turkey and certain other Islamic countries.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Is there coordination between the Abu Dhabi Economic Development Fund and similar Gulf funds?

[Al-Nuwayis] There is a great coordination between the Gulf funds. Continuous meetings are held on the project directors level every six months and on fund directors level every year. There is also coordination in the field of studies and of studying projects, joint financing, implementation of loans, and following up projects, as well in many other fields.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you believe that there is a need to create specialized financial institutions in order to raise the level and effectiveness of the private sector?

[Al-Nuwayis] This matter is important and necessary because the establishment of financial institutions specializing in the fields of industry and real estate is one of the factors that encourage citizens to invest, that increase savings, and stimulate the various economic activities. I believe that this matter is a subject of interest for officials at the highest level. We have an industrial bank that specializes in offering loans to citizens for industrial projects. A study is under way to establish a real estate bank or a housing bank.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Do you believe that the committee on expenditure rationalizing headed by the finance minister and of which you are a member has resolved deficit problems in the UAE? Is the committee planning to extend fee increasing and seek to impose taxes?

[Al-Nuwayis] The committee on expenditure rationalizing has contributed to resolving some of problems facing the budget, but it is not planning nor is it intending to devise ways to levy fees from the citizens with the aim of meeting the deficit from which the budget is suffering. The objective of the fees that have been imposed so far is to improve the standard of service offered to the citizens and to streamline that service. Medical fees, for example, have contributed to easing pressure on treatment centers by restricting their services to those who really need treatment, rather than having people frequenting hospitals for a reason or no reason. I believe that the rate of fees imposed so far is reasonable. These fees represent only a very small percentage of the total budget, while the main burden of the budget falls on Abu Dhabi and Dubai emirates that shoulder most of the financial needs of the federal budget. With regard to the question of taxes, I believe that the fees are adequate at present. We have no need to impose taxes because, thank God, the oil revenues are good. There is no need for taxes that might have a negative effect on our present economic revival and our desire, concern, and work to make the UAE an international commercial, economic, and financial center.

## INDIA

### Papers Report on 77th Session of Indian Science Congress

#### V. P. Singh Opens Meeting

46001308 New Delhi PATRIOT in English 5 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by Lalit Raizada: "Prime Minister Exhorts Scientists To Find Renewable Energy for Survival"]

[Text] Cochin, Feb 4: Prime Minister V. P. Singh today, exhorted scientists to use the advancement of science for the benefit of mankind. Science should help in the development of the "total man" he said, and not in "consuming the man."

Inaugurating the 77 session of the Indian Science Congress here, the Prime Minister emphasised that while taking science to newer heights, we should not forget man. Science could be used for both development and destruction. But as development was possible only on human survival, scientists should take the question of survival as a challenge.

Mr V.P. Singh, who spoke in a highly emotive and poetic manner before a gathering of scientists from India and abroad, drove his point home by saying that while many might be aware, of who invented the Atom bomb, perhaps hardly anybody knew who created the tiny match box which kindled warmth in homes.

"Which part of science do we take—the match box or the bomb? That is the crucial choice before us," he remarked.

Referring to the stockpiles of weapons he said science was being used more for annihilation than for life. In some of the developing countries, for example, there was one soldier for every 250 people whereas there was only one doctor for every 4,000 population.

The Prime Minister called upon scientists to identify more "friendly renewable sources of energy." This had become imperative because we were digging too much into the natural resources available on the planet. This, if unchecked, would threaten the survival of not only life but the planet itself.

Mr V.P. Singh pointed out that education did not seem to have changed the thinking of the modern man. The instinct of the cave man who threw the stones on his enemy was no different from that of modern man who sends missiles to kill lakhs of people.

The Prime Minister said the need to find new sources of energy was particularly relevant in India where usage of the existing forms of energy have had a tremendous negative impact on society.

Modern technology had centralised energy and production, generated an exodus of rural populations to urban

centres, torn asunder families in rural India and resulted in tremendous social impact, he added.

"New sources of energy will have to be identified to rehabilitate living societies in Indian villages. This, the Prime Minister said, was a major challenge in the context of democracy.

He said decentralisation of energy usage would usher in decentralisation of production centres, economic and political power.

Mr Singh said the profound effect of technology on society and the political system should not be underrated.

Technology has done wonders for development of man but it has also standardised his life. Today we not only standardise nuts and bolts, but also human beings, the Prime Minister said.

"A big challenge before us is to retrieve ourselves from this standardisation which has truncated human feelings and reduced us into labels. Society does not want man as a whole but in parts and labels," Mr Singh said, to the applause of nearly 3,000 assembled delegates.

Mr V.P. Singh, who was on his first visit to Kerala after becoming Prime Minister, drove into this sprawling beautiful harbour city to a tumultuous welcome from thousands of people who had lined up on both sides of the main material road from the airport to see their new Prime Minister.

Even though Janata Dal is little known in this region, scores of Janata Dal's green flags mingled with those of the Left Democratic Front's flags.

At the airport, a contingent of girls wearing colourful traditional dress performed "aarti" of the Prime Minister as crowds chanted full-throated slogans in Hindi "V.P. Singh zindabad, V.P. Singh desh ka neta."

#### Presidential Address

46001308 Madras THE HINDU  
in English 5 Feb 90 p 4

[Text] Cochin, Feb. 4. Non-alignment would be a concept without meaning unless the country was innovative in science and technology, said Prof. Yash Pal, UGC [University Grants Commission] Chairman and President of the Indian Science Congress Association today.

Delivering the presidential address at the inaugural session of the five-day Science Congress meeting which began at the Cochin University of Science and Technology here today, he said, being innovative meant creating new products, goods and services better than or at least as good as anyone else. "It also means that your technology should specifically address to your problems, irrespective of whether it is very simple or highly sophisticated. You cannot have a scientific and technological society which is dependent for everything it uses on innovations from abroad."



A society depending on foreign innovation might appear very glittering for a while, but it could not be nonaligned or self-reliant, he said.

While in many areas Indian scientists were equal to the best anywhere, there were not too many Indian products which were better or as good as those elsewhere. Nevertheless, considerable potential was visible, he said. There should be no fear of reinventing the wheel if necessary. The French developed their own telephone instruments, even though these were available from the British and the Americans.

"In science, you cannot imbibe the true spirit of it unless you do some things on your own, do your own inventing. It is necessary to make science and technology your own."

Stifling innovation: But as soon as headway was made towards self-reliance, he said 'somebody will suddenly come with a loan offer coupled with a collaboration agreement, perhaps allowing you to use an Indian foreign hyphenated brand name. It is bad easy money for some industry. A few middlemen and everybody jump at it.' But all the innovation which might have happened and could have been fortified is killed, he observed.

There were vested interests in developing countries who found foreign collaborations much more lucrative. "Unless we have a supportive attitude towards invention and innovations in the country, it is unlikely that we will be able to stand in this tremendously competitive world where everybody is out to push his own things," he said.

A society should not be measured by its shop window. People equipped and trained and given the right kind of attitude to think on their own determined whether a society was self-reliant, non-aligned and totally free.

Patent system flayed: Prof. Yash Pal criticised the shift away from the process patent system the country now used. The West was forcing the developing countries into changing to product patents valid for 17 to 20 years.

Even if for instance a certain drug had been patented by an outsider, it was possible for the country to manufacture that or a similar drug with an entirely different process. Indian patents were valid for only three to five years, he said.

The laws also allowed takeover of patents in public interest. The product patent would mean that the country would be barred from making that product, even with a different process. The product could be made only by purchasing the patent. The patent owner was not obliged to give permission to use it. More, he could also dictate the price at which the product patent would be allowed to be used, he said.

India and other developing countries had only a small fraction of the world patents now, he said. Accepting product patenting would 'essentially mean that from now on any new products which you want to produce in your country must necessarily be exactly those which

have been invented outside and which belong to outsiders'. This would make nonsense of encouraging science and technology and innovation within the country.

Prof. Yash Pal drew attention to the inadequacy of national and international laws in coping with the increased capabilities of exploiting resources. Appropriate ethics and laws must be evolved.

### U.S. Genome Project Discussed

46001308 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*  
in English 7 Feb 90 p 9

[Text] Cochin, February 6. Dr P.M. Bhargava, director of the centre for cellular and molecular biology, Hyderabad, today attacked the proposal of the department of biotechnology (DBT) to hold discussions with an American scientist, Dr Charles Canter, on the human genome project.

The human genome project is a U.S. project aimed at knowing the sequencing of the human genome and has been compared to the human equivalent of the geographical map of an area. It will provide all the genetic information about man, his inherited diseases and even the different qualities of human beings and the genes responsible for them.

PTI adds: Dr Bhargava told reporters at the science congress here that we have the full capability, and should discuss by ourselves the project and policy because the human genome information has far reaching implications."

"The United States did not ask us before they initiated their programme. Why should we?" Dr Bhargava asked, adding, "We are competent and capable of taking our own decisions." He said he had written to the Union minister of state for science, Prof M.G.K. Menon, and the secretary, DBT, expressing his reservations.

Dr Bhargava said he had submitted a proposal explaining how genome sequencing could be done within India more than a year ago. I am still awaiting even an acknowledgement," he said.

Dr Bhargava was of the view that India was capable of completing the project at an investment of Rs 300 crores in 15 years. "India can afford this investment and we should do it," he stressed.

He claimed that India was among the half-a-dozen countries, including the USA and Japan, which had expertise to sequence the human genome.

Talking to reporters later, he said it would be worthwhile to 're-tune' the Science congress and bring it abreast with the exploding areas of modern science.

'Where are the young scientists?' he wanted to know. "I don't find any around except winners," he said, adding that the reason for this was that most of them were involved in research in modern, frontier areas of science.

Dr Bhargava said while 70 percent of modern science was happening in the fields of biology, space sciences, chemistry and nuclear sciences, the science congress sessions were giving hardly any importance to these areas.

**Double Investment:** A central task force has recommended doubling of investment and manpower in research and development (R and D) by the end of the eighth plan.

The recommendation aims at improving and expanding R and D through an increase in manpower from the present 100,000 to 200,000 and in allocation from one percent of the gross national product to two percent, according to the task-force report, presented by Dr Vasanth Gowariker, chairman and secretary department of science and technology.

**CSIR Fellowships:** The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) proposes to double the number of its fellowships from the present 4,000 by end of the eighth plan, according to a Central government task force report.

The CSIR also plans to strengthen its links with various universities and establish several joint CSIR-university centres in selected areas of mutual interest, the report presented at the 77th session of the science congress, in progress here, said.

**Lankan Students (UNI):** India has agreed to absorb 500 Sri Lankan students who could not continue their studies during the last three years as all the nine universities in the island remained closed following ethnic violence.

These 400 undergraduate students and 100 postgraduate student will be admitted to various Indian universities and colleges for a period of four years, the University Grants Commission chairman, Mr Yash Pal, told reporters.

### Hyperplane Project Discussed

46001308 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*  
in English 8 Feb 90 p 8

[Article by Bharat Bhushan: "Hyperplane Will Put India Ahead"]

[Text] The Times of India News Service, Cochin, February 7. India may start a project to make a hyperplane which would revolutionise space technology as it exists today. This was stated by Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the director of the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad, during a lecture to the Indian Science Congress.

Dr Kalam said that the hyperplane would completely revolutionise the launch vehicle technology, if the project comes through. In that case, India would be the only country to have a launch vehicle that would have a payload fraction of 15 percent. The payload fraction is the ratio of the payload being carried into space to the weight of the launch vehicle itself.

At present, most space launch vehicles have a payload fraction less than five percent. This means, for example, that the space shuttle, which has a payload fraction of about two-and-a-half percent and weighs nearly 2,000 tonnes, is able to carry a payload (such as a satellite) weighing about 50 tonnes. In less than five percent payload fraction category come the following launch vehicles at present: The European Ariane rockets, the Proton rocket of the USSR, the space shuttle of the Americans, the Chinese launch vehicles, Energia of the USSR and the geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle and the polar satellite launch vehicle being planned by India.

The reason for the inability of these rockets to carry high payloads is related to the kind of engines they use. These engines are such that in addition to the solid or liquid fuel they carry, they also have to carry on board an oxidising agent to help the fuel to burn in space. However, according to Dr Kalam, the hyperplane concept would change all this. The concept of the air-breathing and in-flight air liquifaction, which would be used in the hyperplane, by itself is not something new, according to Dr Kalam. There are two international projects already going on which use this concept fully or partially.

What is involved in this new type of engine is that during the portion of time when the vehicle is traversing through the atmosphere, (say, the first 1,200 seconds of its flight), atmospheric oxygen is sucked by the plane and converted into liquid oxygen which is then used along with the fuel being carried on board to burn it. Dr Kalam said that the NASA space plane of the U.S. uses this concept partially as it has an air breathing engine.

The hyperplane being proposed by Dr Kalam would draw about 100 tonnes of atmospheric oxygen and convert it into liquid oxygen. The functioning of the engine itself would go through different states during its flight, ultimately functioning as a rocket engine when the hyperplane leaves the earth's atmosphere. Its payload fraction, according to Dr Kalam, would not be matched by any of the existing or planned launch vehicles anywhere in the world.

In justification of the project, Dr Kalam said that the idea was to get out of the fifth country syndrome. He said: when we launched the SLV- 3, we were called the fifth country to have acquired that technology. When we launched the Agni missile, we were termed the fifth country to have done that. And when we launched the Prithvi missile, once again we were described as the fifth country. All this is very demoralising. He hoped that the hyperplane project would get India out of being the fifth country again to have such a technology internationally.

### Proceedings Evaluated

46001308 New Delhi *PATRIOT*  
in English 12 Feb 90 p 8

[Text] Cochin, Feb 11 (PTI)—Fears of negative impacts that burgeoning scientific research might have on human future surfaced at the mammoth 77th science congress that ended here on Friday.

While top-ranking scientists presented their visions of science and technology goals in India, lawyers and sociologists attending the congress for the first time cautioned the scientific community against adverse spinoffs that could threaten man and the planet earth.

Existing trends in Indian science and its exciting and at times unusual facets also emerged at the six-day congress attended by a record 3,000 delegates and covering 16 branches of science and technology.

The issue of ethics, the need for indigenous technology and projects that are now propelling Indian scientists into frontier areas of research were among other things discussed at the congress with the total theme "science and society."

Emminent jurist Mr Upendra Baxi attending the congress voiced concern that public apprehensions of hazardous research were discounted by the Indian Scientific community as "infantile and ignorant."

Mr Baxi asked scientists to help formulate reasonable regulations to guide potentially hazardous research in the country and called upon them to be more "open, bold and encourage public dialogue."

Another dominant feature of the science congress was the strong appeal made by scientists to support innovations and indigenous technology development through which self-reliance would be possible.

General president of the Congress Professor Yashpal said "unless we have a supportive attitude towards invention and innovations in the country, it is unlikely that we will be able to stand in this tremendously competitive world where everybody tries to push his own thing."

Well-known economist professor Sukhnoy Chakravarty argued for a build-up of sound scientific infrastructure and a greater interaction between natural and social scientists.

Telecom chairman Sam Pitroda, who spent two days at the Congress, told a plenary session that technology could provide an answer to many of the country's problems and asked scientists to develop and defend indigenous technology.

The exciting, the controversial and the unusual facets of current activities in Indian science also surfaced during the plenary and scientific sessions of the congress.

Indian meteorologists sprung a surprise by boldly predicting a normal monsoon for 1990, nearly four months in advance of the onset while geologists startled delegates by resurrecting a controversial theory that the earth is expanding.

The congress also attracted self-proclaimed inventors who had a hard time to get an audience. Among these were two young men from Bihar with a hand operated

pump and a schoolteacher from Calcutta with a new "urine based" therapy for family planning.

The congress, hailed by many delegates as one of the best-attended and well-organised in recent times, was the first congress to be held in Kerala.

Its inauguration by the Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh, on February 4 also coincided with the declaration of Ernakulam here as the first district with 100 percent literacy.

Behind the scenes, several hundred student volunteers and other university staff worked around the clock, Cochin university of science and technology Vice Chancellor Harsh Gupta said.

The next congress is scheduled to be held at Indore in the first week of January 1991 with "disaster management" as the key theme.

### Congress Value Questioned

46001308 Calcutta THE STATESMAN  
in English 8 Feb 90 p 14

[Text] Cochin, Feb. 7—The question whether the Indian Science Congress [ISC] should continue to be held is the subject of heated debate at the ISC's 77th session here in view of the poor attendance and "lack of serious scientific discussions" at many of the sessions, reports PTI.

Eminent scientists like Mr P.M. Bhargava criticizes the Indian Science Congress Association [ISCA] and even urged that it be scrapped "if it could not reorient itself to modern science." He said it was unfortunate that modern branches of research like microbiology and space sciences did not find a place in the ISC, alienating young scientists.

However, Mr P. Poornachandra Rao, who had organized the ISC's Tirupati session a few years ago, said it was unbecoming of scientists like Dr Bhargava to belittle the ISCA as it was the only forum in which scientists from various disciplines could interact.

Lalit Sethi adds: Dr. Vasant Gowariker, Science and Technology Secretary to the Union Government announced at a Press Conference that India may be heading for a good monsoon for the third successive year. He said this was a tentative forecast based on the first signals in February. In February these signals will be monitored every week to update the monsoon prospects.

The scenario of the monsoon will become clearer as new information arrives in the coming months. Compared to the previous years, extra research has given an added insight into the trend analysis for the coming monsoon. The climatological pattern seems positive.

The present findings appear to promise a normal south-west monsoon. Normal is 10 percent more or less than the average rainfall over a long period of time.

Earlier, Dr Harsh Gupta, Vice-Chancellor of the Cochin University of Science and Technology, said hundreds of millions of people would be living in earthquake-prone cities by the turn of the century. The most populous city would be Mexico City with 30 million people. The other mega cities being Calcutta and Tokyo.

Scientists were trying to develop reliable prediction models to forecast earthquakes a decade or two in advance to enable evacuation of people and save lives.

Dr Gupta also warned that the Tehri Dam may be vulnerable to earthquakes. He insisted that hazards to the Tehri Dam should be properly estimated.

He said an earthquake measuring 8.4 on the Richter scale had occurred in Kangra in 1905. Tehri, therefore was situated in a seismically active zone. The non-occurrence of major earthquakes in the Himalayan region over the past 30 to 40 years had generated a false sense of security. "While it is possible to erect earthquake-proof structures, you cannot generate a quake-proof environment. There may be landslides which are equally dangerous and may trigger quakes as had happened in the 1963 Italy earthquake which left 2,000 people dead.

**Swami Interviewed, Bitterly Critical of V.P. Singh**  
*90OI0145A New Delhi DINMAN TIMES*  
*in Hindi 10-16 Dec 89 p 8*

[Interview with Subrahmanian Swamy, the Janata Party leader, the 'James Bond' of Indian politics, by Ramsevak Srivastava; date and place not specified]

[Text] The former economist of the erstwhile Jan Sangh and unique debater and deputy chairman of the modern Janata Party, Dr. Subrahmanian Swamy, is the "James Bond" of Indian politics. In order to avoid arrest, he went underground during the emergency. Once he suddenly appeared in the parliament and before the police and spies could arrest him, he had again disappeared.

During a foreign stay, years ago, he had prepared an indigenous model of Indian economy. He was noticed by those who claim to discover in the Vedas every technology and every science, and immediately they accepted him as their own. He was given a respectable seat. Later he discovered that there was a lump in the seat.

It is not clear whether the problem lies in his sensitivity, or in the occupant's point of view, or in his interactions. Dr. Swamy has nowhere and never been at peace. The honors bestowed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee did not suit him. These days he is trying out Indubhai Patel.

Ramsevak Srivastava's interview with Dr. Swamy, the volcano of Indian politics:

[Srivastava] You had described the Janata Dal as a duplicate Congress. How will you explain the Janata's victory and the Congress's defeat?

[Swamy] I admit that the public was crushed by inflation. Corruption continued unabated. The Congress was demoralized. It was defeated in North India. As a matter of fact, there are many reasons for the defeat. For instance, instead of stopping idol worship in Ayodhya, the Rajiv government let it continue. There was propaganda. Nor could they stop it, for the land was disputed. Muslims were influenced by the reactions of Pakistan and other Islamic countries and they voted against the Congress.

The present Chief Minister of Bihar, Bhagwat Jha Azad, and the Congress were held responsible for the terrible riots of Bhagalpur. It is because of this that the duplicate Congress won. But these factors were not uniform in the South. There, the government was in the hands of the opposition. It was the target of popular displeasure, even though the Muslim vote did not have that much effect there. I believe that in the elections there was no positive vote at all for Vishawpratap Singh. I say this also because wherever we fielded influential candidates, they got the available votes there.

[Srivastava] Have you also reconciled with the democratic leadership, Devi Lal's role in making Vishawpratap Singh a leader?

[Swamy] In fact, I am not surprised at whatever transpired. VP Singh has been crafty right from the beginning. There have been many such occasions in his life, when he deceived. But the methods he used to reach the prime minister's office do not bring him credit. You cannot run this country without pride, dignity, and leadership. I will call it violation of tradition.

[Srivastava] Much praise has been bestowed on the good sense that Vishawpratap Singh has shown in selecting candidates for the cabinet. Don't you find significant the declaration of property?

[Swamy] Look! The declaration of property is a legal requirement for a minister. After becoming a cabinet member, you have to furnish details. These should be published. In that case, I will grant that it is something remarkable. So far as the question of selection of ministers goes, they are fine people. But this government will have to clarify what its policy is. Devi Lal and VP Singh announced their visit to Amritsar, but prior to that they did not announce their government's policy regarding Punjab. Therefore, this gives the appearance of a "stunt". So much so that even the governor of that state was not consulted. Similarly, even though the government has been formed with the support of the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party], it has not been clarified what the policy is on the issue of Ram's birth place. The Home minister, Mufti Mohammad Syed, has indeed said that the consent of all parties will be obtained. But what happens if no consensus can be reached. Similarly, what is the government going to do about the foreign exchange crisis? If it is about to request a loan from the IMF, how will the Leftists acquiesce in it. The reason is that in 1981, when Venkatraman was the finance minister and

there was talk of obtaining a loan, the leftist parties fought tooth and nail. The Sri Lanka issue is no less grave. In the center there is a minister from the Dravid Munnetar Kashgham. If the government accepts the principle of giving the Sinhalese majority a free hand, a new genocide against Tamils can begin. That is why I ask what the government's policy is regarding it. Selection of good ministers is welcome, but there is so much confusion in the policy, that it won't do any good.

[Srivastava] How is the economic health of the administration that the Janata Dal has inherited? Would you like to say something regarding the National Front's manifesto?

[Swamy] It will be very difficult to work according to the statements in the manifesto. For instance, it is stated that the right to work will be included among the Constitution's basic rights. This means that if someone does not have a job, he will have to be issued an allowance. On the one hand, it is claimed that the exchequer is empty. On the other hand, it is being said that the right to work will be made part of the fundamental rights. How is this possible? This government has talked of ending inflation but if there is no money in the treasury, how will the budget deficit be made up? Will taxes be levied for this purpose? If so, will it be direct taxation? That will only aggravate inflation. If indirect taxes are levied, the black money will grow even more. I do not find any good or systematic plan in the National Front's manifesto. VP Singh himself has no knowledge. His finance minister, Madhu Dandavate, has been a teacher of physics. Therefore all the planning will have to be done by the officials and no changes can be expected.

[Srivastava] Before the elections, you had remarked that if the Congress returns to power, the Rajiv administration will result in calamities for the country. And if VP Singh comes to power, the country will go to the dogs. What do you think of your past comments?

[Swamy] The future is dark. This is so because, in order to maintain his reputation, VP Singh can stoop to any kind of fraud. To maintain his image, he can even resign at the nick of time and escape. This is his history. Today, the people are not prepared to listen to me. They get upset also. Especially when I say that within six months, my predictions will come to life. I believe that, under foreign pressure, VP Singh will reduce the defense budget, and agree to put less emphasis on Agni and Prithvi (missile) programs. He will give in on questions of our national interests relating to Sri Lanka and Pakistan. That is why I say that there will be disaster.

[Srivastava] How do you view the problem of communalism?

[Swamy] This is very terrible. I am a firm Hindu. I also want Hindu revival. But the thinking of several communal parties like the Bhartiye Janata Party is quite different. They are not interested in Hindu revival. Instead, they want to suppress Muslims. If you ask them, what program is there for the Hindus, they reply that

section 370 should be abolished. Muslims should not be permitted to have more than one wife. Don't make Urdu the official language. Ram mandir should not be built by demolishing Babari masjid. I maintain that this will not do the Hindus any good. The Muslims will be demoralized. Look here. Kailash Mansrovar has been in the hands of China. But the BJP has never broached the subject. Atalbinhari Vajpayee did not take any initiative in the matter. I had talks with China and opened the way. Similarly, the BJP does not speak up about the evils of the caste system. They played no role in the Satti case either. They have not done anything to popularize South Indian languages in Northern India. In fact their Hinduism is negative.

[Srivastava] Under what conditions can a minority government succeed in India?

[Swamy] A minority government can never succeed in this country. A weak leader like Vishawpratap Singh has never succeeded. The biggest crisis will be the one concerning Sri Lanka. In that, India will not be able to withstand pressure from Russia and America.

[Srivastava] But both the BJP and Marxist Communist Party have promised to support him unconditionally. Won't VP Singh maintain a balanced relationship with both of them?

[Swamy] Not at all. I believe that this government will fall either from inter-cine fights, or VP Singh, himself, will have to ask for reelections. He can say whatever he wants, but he will have to do a few good deeds. On that basis he will approach the public and plead that to enable him to continue to do the work, the public should give him full majority.

[Srivastava] Certain things have been said in the National Front manifesto which are very encouraging. Do you find nothing but flaws?

[Swamy] In my opinion, a good manifesto should have four ingredients. (1) The aims and objectives should be clear. (2) Priorities should be laid down. (3) What would be the strategy and policy to achieve the goals and (4) Where will the resources come from? Everything is jumbled up in the manifesto. Anyone can see that. I will be surprised if it is implemented properly. For proof, there is talk of 30 percent representation for women. That has not been fulfilled even in the selection of candidates. There is not a single woman in the cabinet. The budget talks of 60 percent investment in the agricultural sector. I would like to see how they can manage this.

[Srivastava] How did you say that Bofors kickbacks can be brought to light?

[Swamy] If the government wants, it can find the names within five days. I will show the way. For example. (1) The government should inform Bofors that it has committed fraud. And that if it does not disclose the names, the contract will be canceled. (2) A letter should be



written to the prime minister of Switzerland asking in whose name the funds, which were deposited in the name of Svenska, were withdrawn. We need this information, since these funds are the result of bribery. If a letter is written on these lines, the information should be forthcoming. This is just like the Philippine's case in which Switzerland government provided all details of accounts relating to Marcos. Similarly, in this case also, the information will be provided and it will become clear who got one share. (3) A letter should also be written to the prime minister of Sweden alleging that Bofors has violated the agreement reached between Rajiv Gandhi and Olof Palme. Thus he should disclose which parties were given funds. At least one of these steps will bear fruit and the name will be known. This government can find this out, provided it wants to do so sincerely.

### **Commentary Urges Tough Diplomatic Stand on Kashmir**

90OI0185A Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES  
in Hindi 4 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by Madhusudan Anand: "India Is Not Weak, Nor Is Its Diplomacy"]

[Text] Following formation of V.P. Singh's government, our Foreign Affairs Ministry, demonstrating an extreme degree of goodwill toward neighboring countries, indicated that India was far more serious than before for better relations with them. Perhaps Pakistan construed this cordiality as an indication of India's weakness and, through its puppets in Jammu and Kashmir, it is firstly trying to infuse new life into the Kashmir issue and secondly, it is resorting to this charade in order to trap Islamic countries. Look! The issue, which by signing the 1972 Simla Agreement, Pakistan had conceded to be dead, has come back to life.

Islamabad persuaded Tehran to cancel Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral's Iran visit. It launched a diplomatic offensive on the subject of Kashmir and began inciting Islamic countries. It indicated that it will raise, in the United Nations, the issue of the right of Jammu and Kashmir to the so-called plebiscite.

All this is vital to Pakistan's existence because if it does not do so, its creation on the basis of religion, can prove to be illogical. Pakistan has been aiding the Afghan mujahidin for the last several years in order to Islamize Afghanistan. Despite the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, it has perhaps become convinced that it is difficult to convert Afghanistan into a fanatical Islamic country. Now it has set its sights on Kashmir. Having suffered three defeats at the hands of India, Pakistan is fully aware that it is not possible for it to defeat India on the battlefield. Therefore, it has adopted the clever strategy of, on the one hand, weakening New Delhi in Jammu and Kashmir, and secondly, justifying its own existence on the basis of religion, by embarrassing India in the world by resorting to an aggressive diplomacy.

Why did Pakistan do this? Did it believe the new Delhi government to be weak? Or did it consider India's well wishers to be helpless? In controversies with Pakistan, we have been receiving the greatest support from the Soviet Union, and following the collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, Pakistan probably assumed that the Soviet Union now is a weak country, intent only on saving its own skin. Why would a Soviet Union that did not want to come to the defense of its supporters in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania as before, care to voice support for India? India is not even a communist country.

Admittedly, the Soviet Union is in the grip of dire economic, political difficulties and now, when the fires of fundamentalism are smouldering right there, it is neither practical, nor possible for it to help any Third World country or liberation struggle. Indeed, India is not in need of any such aid. The Washington-Peking axis against the Soviet Union may not be active now, but the Soviet Union needs India as much as India needs the Soviet Union.

As it is, the Shia insurgency is in full swing in Azerbaijan Republic of the Soviet Union and in order to feed its religious revolution, Iran is inciting Shia muslims of Azerbaijan. No doubt, there is a provision in the Soviet Constitution that its four republics can secede whenever they so desire, and during his visit to Lithuania, Mikhail Gorbachev has admitted this much in principle. But it is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union will permit its own disintegration. If the Soviet Union remains silent on any Pakistani resolution regarding the so-called right of self-determination in Kashmir, that will mean that it should remain prepared for self-determination in its own republics, especially Azerbaijan.

It should not be forgotten that, when in December 1979, the Soviet Union sent its troops into Afghanistan, one reason given for this was that Moscow was trying to protect its own Muslim population from the fires of fundamentalism originating in Tehran and Islamabad.

In the background of the Iran-Iraq war and the struggle between Tehran and Jedda for leadership of Islamic power, it may appear that the Islamic countries are themselves hopelessly divided and therefore they can never unite on any issue. But there always was the danger that by raising the slogan "Islam is in danger," they could all unite together. Today it is not merely Iran that has cancelled our foreign minister's Tehran visit. Iraq, which fought a terrible war with it, has, by telling our Muchkund Dube that first he should visit other countries and then come to Baghdad, indicated that despite their mutual war, their Islamic unity remains intact.

So why should Moscow suppose that Iran and Pakistan are not trying to weaken it indirectly and India directly? Moscow has always sought that its relations with Islamabad should be as cordial as those with New Delhi. But the Soviet Union's experience in this regard has not been happy. This is because an anti-Soviet Union stand has

been a condition for Pakistan to obtain the cooperation of Western countries. Because of the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1967 and the Sino-Russian war of 1968, there has developed so much distrust between Moscow and Islamabad that Moscow can never put faith in Islamabad at the expense of India.

Can the attitude of China and America, on the Kashmir issue, remain sharply hostile to India as before? China and America have both stated that India and Pakistan should resolve their problems through mutual negotiations. There was so much blood letting of the freedom fighters in Peking's Tiananmen Square, but India did not issue any statements which could cause annoyance to the Chinese communist leaders. Therefore, the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng, during his visit to India's neighboring countries last year, did not harp on any anti-Indian refrains. On the subject of Tibet, China has India going on record as saying that Tibet is a dependency of China. Therefore, why would China adopt an anti-Indian stand on the issue of Kashmir? It is also doubtful if it will support Pakistan covertly. China needed Pakistan so that it could relieve Soviet pressure on China. Presently, relations between the Soviet Union and China are normal and the old necessities have disappeared. Chinese Foreign Minister Chin Chin's resolve to visit India proves that China wants India and Pakistan to settle their problems through mutual talks.

On the subject of the American invasion of Panama, India criticized the Bush administration in a very balanced manner. It was so balanced that the leftist parties supporting V.P. Singh's government were upset with the government. India has admittedly been supporting the call for making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and return of Diego Garcia to Mauritius. But this does not mean that, in South Asia, India is as hostile toward America as Pakistan was hostile toward Russia until only a year ago. The American State Department has acknowledged that Pakistan may have played an inflammatory role in Kashmir. It has been reported that the political parties in Pakistan are raising the Kashmir issue for the sake of their own interests.

Overall, on the Kashmir issue, the world powers do not appear arrayed against India. As far as the Islamic countries go, they have always been swearing by unity with Pakistan and Pakistan, being in a position to provide them with an Islamic bomb, has been laying a claim on their support on this score as well. But, support of the Islamic countries, in the past, could not weaken Indian diplomacy and could not tarnish India's image as a nonaligned nation, and this especially when Pakistan enjoyed the support of America and China, how can Indian diplomacy be worsened now?

Against the background of Pakistan's poison spewing against India and the Islamic countries' pro-Pakistani attitude, our Foreign Ministry should ponder whether India should continue to follow the traditional policy of supporting the Arabs or whether, by forging strong diplomatic ties with China as well as with Russia, India

should create such a democratic, socialist trinity which, in any emergency, could act as a guard for the relatively backward societies of the three countries. No doubt, these days, military alliances are breaking down, but the necessity of friendly alliances cannot be denied. Since the societies of the three countries face a host of problems, therefore in these days of changed international relations, possibilities of friendship among them are endless. The Soviet Union, on account of Azerbaijan, India, on account of Kashmir, and China, on account of Sikiyang, can each face similar problems over and over again. Thus making a trio of them will be useful for all three countries.

### Communist Leader Namboodiripad Interviewed on Kashmir

90010188A Bombay NAVBHARAT TIMES  
in Hindi 12 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with E.M.S. Namboodiripad, Communist Leader, by Suryakant Bali and Madhusudan Anand: "Kashmir Problem Cannot Be Solved by Force"; date and place not specified]

[Text] There may have been no change in the basic philosophy of the MCP [Marxist Communist Party], however, the situation is forcing it to become more realistic. After clashing with the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] for the last three years, the MCP is working with the BJP to provide some stability to the minority government at the center. The MCP has its own ideas about Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Punjab, and the changes in Eastern Europe. Our interview with Mr. Namboodiripad on all these subjects is being presented here verbatim.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] The new government at the center has your approval. What kind of experience did you have with the National Front government?

[Namboodiripad] I am very positive about the National Front government. The difference between the Rajiv government and this one is that the new government is proactively trying to solve the national problems with the support of the people.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Do you think this government will be able to achieve its goals?

[Namboodiripad] There is no reason for it not to.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] You have been a very strong opponent of the BJP. Now, you are supporting it and have approved the National Front government. How did you adjust to this change?

[Namboodiripad] Our party is supporting the National Front government because we consider the program followed by the National Front to favor the people. However, we will continue to oppose BJP's actions because the BJP supports Hindu nationalism, and this party has opposite views about social and economics issues.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Your goal during the Lok Sabha elections was to defeat both the Congress (I) and the BJP. The Congress (I) has been defeated, but the BJP has emerged as a powerful political force. What strategies will you use to counter this new development?

[Namboodiripad] Let me make a correction here. Our goal was not "to defeat BJP and the Congress party" as you stated in your question. Our goal was "to defeat the Congress party, break up the factionalist groups, and to strengthen the left." The Congress has been defeated and there are no factionalists in the government. As for the leftist group, its representation has increased from 32 to 51 members.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] The BJP is sure that it will be able to form state governments in Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh on its own strength, in Rajasthan and Gujrat with the help of the Janata Dal, and in Maharashtra with Shiv Sena's cooperation. It is not very difficult for anyone to understand this emerging situation and political ambitions embedded therein. What do the leftist groups, especially the MCP, think about it?

[Namboodiripad] There is no doubt that our political unity is threatened by the Vishawa Hindu Parishad. There are, however, some strong parties that can fight it. These include some lower branches of the Hindu religion and the low caste people. The Vishawa Hindu Parishad only supports the high caste Hindus. There are people who are united behind the leftist parties, the Janata Dal, and other secular groups in the United Front. All these are capable of fighting the religious factionalism supported but the Vishawa Hindu Parishad and continuing the secular policies started by the Congress (I).

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] The Vishawa Hindu Parishad has announced that it will start constructing the temple at Ayodhya on 14 February. The Babri Masjid Action Committee has announced its intentions to oppose this construction. What are MCP's plans about this situation that might lead to a national catastrophe?

[Namboodiripad] Not only the MCP, but also other secular parties such as the Congress (I) and the Janata Dal are ready to face this situation. They can unite people from all groups to campaign against this.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Do you agree that the Vishawa Hindu Parishad is causing problems for the MCP and the leftist government in West Bengal?

[Namboodiripad] West Bengal is not an island. It cannot remain immune to the germs being spread by the Vishawa Hindu Parishad. However, the leftist campaign there is strong enough to protect it from this poisonous influence.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] It is generally believed that while the BJP could not win even one seat from Kerala to the Lok Sabha, it managed to use its supportive voters very smartly to defeat all leftist candidates. Do you agree with this?

[Namboodiripad] The major reason for the leftists defeat in Kerala was that it got only 45 percent of the votes. The other 55 percent of the votes were cast for the other parties including the BJP. The BJP had only a six percent share of votes there. Obviously some of these were moved to other parties. Some of it went to the United Front. However, it is wrong to say that the election results were effected by this one factor alone.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Let us talk about Kashmir. What is your opinion about the valley?

[Namboodiripad] The situation there is really serious. We have united all patriotic groups including the National Front government at the center, pro-government parties, the Kashmir National Conference, and the Congress (I).

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Even though the government is using its constitutional right of 370, Kashmir still appear to be ready to rebel. Was there any benefit in using this constitutional right? Is it still appropriate?

[Namboodiripad] Ending this law would give such a powerful weapon to the separatists that they will be able to move all Kashmiri people against India.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Why did you oppose the appointment of Jagmohan as the governor of Jammu and Kashmir? We have seen some positive results of his skillful administration within a few days.

[Namboodiripad] We will not be able to unite the people there to fight the terrorists because Jagmohan has the top position there.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Will the unity of all parties help Kashmir? It did not help in Punjab.

[Namboodiripad] We should not expect results so soon. It is more important to be patient and keep trying.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] What is the difference between the situation in Kashmir and Punjab?

[Namboodiripad] The situation and the political background is different in both regions. However, both threaten the national unity equally.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] What should we do in Kashmir now?

[Namboodiripad] We must have a political plan. As I mentioned earlier, the National Front government, parties working with it, the National Conference, and the Congress party have to take some action. Your earlier question indicated that Mr. Jagmohan's administrative skills can solve this problem. I do not agree with it. The solution to this problem lies in the people's unity and their action. And for it, as V.P. Singh has said, we need to practice popular politics.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] But, no leader is ready to face the situation there. It is rumored that Mir Waiz Maulvi Farooq has also left Sri Nagar for some safe area.

[Namboodiripad] I cannot say anything about this, since I have not heard or read such news.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] What is your opinion about Simaranjit Singh Man?

[Namboodiripad] He is a very complicated person. He definitely supports violence. Now, he is trying to go abroad. This makes him even a more complex person.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Would you mind telling us what caused the situation in Punjab to worsen after the central government took over the administration of this state?

[Namboodiripad] I do not believe that the situation there has deteriorated. However, this situation will not improve until all parties, including the Congress (I), work actively together. The Congress (I) has not yet contributed any creative idea.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] There is a new political atmosphere in Eastern Europe. Does it show the failure of Marxism or Stalinism, or the dictatorships in those countries? Does Jayoti Vasu have some ideas about this change?

[Namboodiripad] Why are you trying to show Jayoti Vasu as a separate person? We discussed this whole development and had issued a statement. We had said that it was not the failure of communism. The announcement has been published in newspapers. (Laughing) Jayoti Vasu is one of us. He participated in this discussion for two days. The announcement was made after these discussions.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Would you blame Gorbachev for what happened in Eastern Europe? And on what basis?

[Namboodiripad] There are other reasons for the situation in Eastern Europe. We cannot blame just one person.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] Not even Ceasescu?

[Namboodiripad] As I mentioned just now, there are many other reasons and all of them are very complicated. It would be wrong if you try to blame one person.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] What are the other causes?

[Namboodiripad] You should read our statement I mentioned earlier.

[NAVBHARAT TIMES] In this context, what is the future of the Communist movement in India, especially, when it has already become weak?

[Namboodiripad] I do not agree that our movement has stopped. We can be proud of our progress thanks to our understanding of Marxist-Leninism.

## IRAN

### Kurdish Religious Leader Comments on Current Government

90OA0370A London AL-MAJALLAH  
in Arabic 20 Feb 90 p 30

[Interview with Shaykh Izeddin Hoseyni, Kurdish Religious and Political Leader: Religious Leader of Iranian Kurdistan, Shaykh Izeddin Hoseyni, Tells AL-MAJALLAH, 'Religious Sites in Saudi Arabia Are in Safe Hands'; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Shaykh Izeddin Hoseyni, the spiritual and political leader of Iranian Kurds who was forced to leave Iran in 1985, gained prominence during the past 10 years as the actual leader of Iranian Kurds calling for equal rights and the right of self-determination. AL-MAJALLAH met Shaykh Hoseyni in an Arab country and interviewed him. The text of that interview follows.

[AL-MAJALLAH] When you had to leave your country in Iran, were you at that time the leader of groups using weapons to resist the regime, or did you have to leave because you were a symbolic religious figure who had differences with the leaders of Iran?

[Hoseyni] It is known that the Kurdish people in Iran have been fighting for their freedom, their independence, and their right to determine their own destiny for scores of years. Because they had these goals, the Kurdish people joined the people of Iran in bringing about the downfall of the previous regime. After Khomeyni came to power, we tried using political methods to reach some kind of an understanding with him, but Iran's leaders would not budge. In fact, Khomeyni declared a holy war against the Kurdish people, who are Muslims, and he called them a nation of nonbelievers who could be killed with impunity.

After that, we turned to the use of weapons for the sake of our people's rights, and after three months of an armed struggle, Khomeyni had to deal with us. So he sent his envoys to work out the problems that we had with him. It turned out, however, that he was not serious about finding solutions and that he wanted to gain time so that he can strengthen and consolidate his positions. After settling his domestic scores, he mounted a campaign against us in the spring of 1980. The fighting against us was such that we were forced to flee the cities and go to the mountains. The resistance continued for many years. Eventually, that is, in 1985, I left the country and went to live in Iraq.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Did the Iranians know that you were leading the resistance against them, especially in 1979 and 1980?

[Hoseyni] Iranian Kurdistan has a large number of armed political forces who had taken it upon themselves to carry out resistance operations. As far as I was concerned, I was a spiritual leader. My relations with all

these forces were positive and we had an understanding about the general course of action.

[AL-MAJALLAH] It is well-known that Iranian Kurds follow many religious schools of thought. Was any particular school of thought singled out for what you call persecution by the Iranians?

[Hoseyni] This persecution was basically political and ethnic, but it was compounded by the fact that most Kurdish people are Sunnis. It was on that basis that Khomeyni did not recognize any religious authority in Iranian Kurdistan. He did not recognize any of them because they were Sunnis. The Iranians have been and are still relying on a few Shi'ite clergymen who were brought into the area from outside.

[AL-MAJALLAH] You indicated there was religious persecution as well as political and ethnic persecution. This religious persecution that you are talking about, what form did it take?

[Hoseyni] It is well-known that the Iranian regime rests on a certain principle and that it denies Sunnis the rights that are stipulated in that principle. Everyone also knows that the orthodox caliphs, may God be pleased with them, are disparaged every day, and that Sunnis' feelings are always being provoked. Furthermore, all the Sunni religious schools in Mahabad have been shut down by the Iranians.

[AL-MAJALLAH] It is being said that the Iranian regime became more moderate after Rafsanjani was elected president. Is that true?

[Hoseyni] There are two wings in the Iranian regime: one of them is radical and the other is moderate. Moderate here does not mean moderate in the absolute sense, but it means moderate in a relative sense. Rafsanjani is, of course, trying to strengthen his relations with the United States so he can use that against the other wing. He is unable to do that, however, because Khomeyni's influence is still strong on the Iranian scene.

[AL-MAJALLAH] With regard to 'Ali Khamene'i, the new spiritual leader, is he a moderate man or a hard-liner?

[Hoseyni] Khamene'i has sided with Rafsanjani's group.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Which wing is the stronger one at the present time?

[Hoseyni] Rafsanjani's wing is the stronger one now.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Under Khomeyni hard-liners were promoting the notion of exporting the revolution. After Rafsanjani came to power, some sabotage activities were carried out, including the explosions in the holy city of Mecca. Do you think these actions were carried out without the new president's knowledge and behind his back?

[Hoseyni] The fact of the matter is that the death of Khomeyni brought about no radical change. Terrorism outside Iran and in Iran did not stop. Many leaders of the Iranian Kurdish opposition were assassinated after Khomeyni's death, and it is well-known that the explosions in the holy city of Mecca took place after Khomeyni's death also. I believe that what has happened amounts to nothing more than a change of methods. Instead of practicing terrorism overtly, the Iranians are practicing it in roundabout ways. The real substance of the Iranian regime underwent no change with Khomeyni's death.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Given your familiarity with Iranian conditions, what, in your judgment, are the political and religious objectives that the Iranian regime was hoping to accomplish by having these explosions take place in the holy city of Mecca during the blessed days of the pilgrimage?

[Hoseyni] Their main objective was to wipe out the Sunni Islamic center of the world, which is represented by the holy city of Mecca, and the city of Medina in the blessed land of Saudi Arabia. It is unfortunate that Iranians think Shi'ism is the true Islam. To them, all other Muslims are deviants from Islam. While graveyards are the only religious centers that Iranians have, we consider the holy city of Mecca, the city of Medina, and al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem to be the centers of our religion.

[AL-MAJALLAH] Many Muslim clergymen have spoken their minds about the application of God's law and His judgment on those who committed the criminal acts in the holy city of Mecca during the sacred holy months. As a senior man of the cloth in Iran, what do you think about that?

[Hoseyni] Those who committed that act are actually evildoers who willfully set out to hurt Islam and Muslims. The verdict against them was a legitimate one from an Islamic viewpoint. But the verdict is not just a condemnation of those individuals; it is also a condemnation of the Iranian regime that planned this operation. That is why when Iran raised an outcry against the executions, it was not defending those individuals, but it was rather defending itself.

#### **Reporter Names Iranian Diplomats as Intelligence Agents**

90OA0364A London AL-DUSTUR  
in Arabic 12 Feb 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Dr. 'Ali Nurizadeh: "Who Is Responsible for Assassination of Saudi Diplomats; Iranian Terrorism Crews Abroad"]

[Text] The assassination of the three Saudi diplomats in Bangkok is not isolated from the terrorist "diplomatic" presence that is sheltered by the Iranian embassies abroad. In this review of the crews of these embassies and of their relationship with Javad Mansuri, who



currently holds the post of Iranian ambassador to Pakistan, Dr. 'Ali Nurizadeh dots the ii's and crosses the tt's concerning the terrorist activities against the Arab diplomatic missions, generally, and against the Saudi missions, in particular.

His supporters and disciples call him the professor, whereas the media at times couples his name with the title of "brother doctor" and at other times with "Mr." His face looks much the same as that of most officials in the imam's republic—"unkempt beard, artificial anger, and a rare smile that appears when he receives news that one of his disciples has succeeded in carrying out a terrorist operation somewhere in the world."

He was one of the revolution's first theoreticians. The world and the Iranian people came to know him when a group of his supporters and disciples stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979.

He entered the U.S. Embassy triumphantly and he left it distressed on 4 November 1980. But he promptly found himself on the way back to the theater when he was summoned by Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the foreign minister in Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i's cabinet, to manage revolution exportation affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While holding the post of deputy foreign minister for cultural and consular affairs, the professor was able to transform every Iranian embassy abroad into an intelligence center and into a base for exporting the revolution. By virtue of his invaluable experiences in the Revolutionary Guard and (Savama) intelligence, the brother doctor scored major victories in disseminating terrorism and chaos into the Arab countries by recruiting agents in these countries and supplying them with weapons and explosives through the embassies, which were under his control.

Currently, brother doctor and professor Javad Mansuri, the Islamic revolution's theoretician, holds the post of Iranian ambassador to Pakistan that, Mansuri believes, has an imminent appointment with a revolution similar to the "Islamic revolution." Even though his former post as assistant foreign minister for Asian affairs was outwardly more important than the post of Iranian ambassador to Pakistan, Mansuri welcomed his transfer after he was assured by 'Ali Khamene'i, the revolution's spiritual guide, that the apparatus he has set up to export the revolution will remain under his control and that Iranian embassies abroad will continue their work according to the programs that Mansuri has especially designed for each embassy.

There is no doubt that Javad Mansuri's role in purging the Iranian Foreign Ministry of whoever was considered a veteran diplomat and in appointing members of the guard intelligence to the Iranian diplomatic corps abroad and to the departments and agencies controlled by the Iranian Foreign Ministry is a major role that nobody can deny. A look at some of the embassies is perhaps enough

to demonstrate the importance of Javad Mansuri's role in the terrorist activities witnessed by the region in the past 10 years.

#### 1. Iranian diplomatic mission in Pakistan:

A. The mission chief is Javad Mansuri. He is a founder of the guard, the revolution's theoretician, a leader of the movement of the imam's line, ex-chief of the guard intelligence, an ex-assistant chief of the Saqama, deputy foreign minister, chairman of the agency to export the revolution at the ministry of foreign affairs, and, finally, Iran's ambassador to Pakistan.

B. Seyyed Mohiyeddin Najafi: The consular officer in Peshawar, a disciple of Mansuri's, and an ex-member of the guard intelligence. He is entrusted with provoking disputes between the Afghan Mujahidin and with organizing pro-regime meetings and demonstrations.

C. Seyyed 'Ali Saqa'ayan: The consular officer in Karachi, an ex-official of the ministry of intelligence, and private guard to Mansuri when the latter was assistant foreign minister. Saqa'ayan's task includes absorbing Pakistani youths and sending them to Tehran to attend scientific and practical training courses during which trainees receive the necessary instruction on producing and using explosives and weapons, in addition to ideological studies derived from Javad Mansuri's writings.

There are four other Mansuri disciples in Pakistan, namely: Kaabasi, Yahyavi, Karimi, and Qasemi. They work in the Iranian commercial and cultural institutions in Iran. It must be noted that their underground activities include preparing terrorist operations against the interests and citizens of the Arab states that oppose the Iranian regime's policy, spying for the Iranian regime by recruiting Pakistani officials, and instigating the Pakistani people against Pakistani Prime Minister Mrs. Benazir Bhutto who has been characterized by Mansuri in one of his latest writings as a real danger to the future of the (Khomeynist) revolutionary movement in the region. Therefore, she must be expelled from the Pakistani political arena either by the masses or through liquidation because the Bhutto family boasts, as Mansuri says, of its secularism and because Benazir does not conceal her admiration for democracy and for political pluralism. We in revolutionary Iran cannot withstand Bhutto's continued presence in the premiership. (Collection of Lectures by Professor Javad Mansuri at Foreign Ministry's Political Studies Institute—July 1989)

2. Iranian Embassy in Turkey: Manuchehr Mottaki, Iran's ex-ambassador to Turkey who was appointed assistant foreign minister two months ago, has been one of Mansuri's outstanding students. During his service in Turkey, he carried out Mansuri's instructions and schemes so well that Mansuri once described him as "one of our best diplomats abroad." According to AL-DUSTUR sources, Mottaki was selected to the post of assistant foreign minister on Mansuri's suggestion. A study of Mottaki's activities in Turkey exposes the

varied roles with which he was entrusted by Mansuri. Most significant among those roles were the following tasks:

A. Liaison officer between Iran and Israel.

B. Officer in charge of contacts with the Palestinians inside Palestine and in charge of recruiting them against the PLO.

C. The officer mainly responsible for 24 terrorist operations carried out between 1984 and 1989 against Iranian opposition elements, Arab diplomats, and the interests of Arab and Western countries.

D. The officer mainly responsible for kidnapping opposition cadres and transporting them to Iran.

E. The officer mainly responsible for instigating religious riots in Turkey.

Upon Mottaki's return to Iran, his duties were assumed by Mohammad Reza Baqeri, who has also been one of Mansuri's disciples. To characterize Baqeri, perhaps it is enough to reiterate what one of his ex-colleagues in Kuwait said about him three years ago:

"When you hear reports of explosions in the Gulf, do not look for anybody to be responsible for the incidents. Just go to the Iranian Embassy in Kuwait where brother Mohammad Reza Baqeri runs his terrorist network in the Gulf region." It is worth noting that Baqeri's involvement in a series of terrorist acts witnessed by Kuwait in recent years is no longer secret to the Gulf officials. This is why when Tehran decided to dispatch him to head one of its diplomatic missions in a Gulf state, it received a brief cable from this state's foreign ministry, saying: "We thank you for your cable that proposes the dispatch of Mohammad Reza Baqeri to succeed your returning ambassador. Because our people hate explosives, we beg you to send somebody else to run your diplomatic mission."

In addition to Baqeri, Mansuri's disciples are in control in Turkey. They run the Iranian consulates and commercial and cultural institutions. These disciples include: Mehdi Semsari, Hasan Aqamiri, Ja'far Za'faranchi, 'Abbas Latifi, Mahmud Meysami, and Sa'id Shahrgerdi.

Through these institutions, new agents are incorporated into the apparatus of Javad Mansuri and of his partners in the "revolution export" company.

3. The Iranian Embassy in Lebanon, run by Hoseyn Niknam, is one of the most important bases for absorbing new agents and for spreading anarchy and terrorism in the region. Some of Mansuri's disciples hold the sensitive positions in the embassy and in the institutions that belong to the regime and to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. All these disciples are involved in activities managed by the foreign ministry's apparatus for exporting the revolution. Most important among these elements are:

A. Mohsen Armin, the intelligence officer.

B. Zamaniyan, the political adviser.

C. Asakar [name as published], the guard intelligence chief.

D. Khakasar, the guard chief of staff.

4. The embassy in Damascus: Even though this embassy is under the management of Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad (Hoseyn) Akhtari who represents the ministry of intelligence, Mansuri's disciples hold important positions in the Iranian diplomatic mission and in the institutions controlled by the embassy. These disciples include:

A. Mohammad Salar, the cultural attache.

B. Salimi, the finance officer.

C. Hoseyni, the liaison officer between the guard and the embassy.

5. The Iranian Embassy in Somalia: It is run by 'Abdol 'Ali Tavakkoli, a dangerous element who follows Mansuri.

6. The Iranian Embassy in Sudan: It is run by Hojjat ol-Eslam Ne'matollah Qaderi and it enjoys the extraordinary attention of Mansuri who has dispatched Azer-shab, one of his prominent disciples, to implement his ideas and schemes.

In addition to these embassies, which are the main bases for launching the process of "exporting the revolution," Mansuri's disciples are also spread throughout the following Islamic, Arab, and African countries:

1. Sultanate of Oman: Mohammad 'Arab, (Iran's ambassador).

2. Republic of Yemen: Vahid Farmand, (charge d'affaires).

3. UAE [United Arab Emirates]: Most officials of the Iranian Exports Company, and the Iranian consul in Dubayy.

4. Bahrain: One of Mansuri's disciples was head of the Iranian diplomatic mission until recently. Tehran is scheduled to dispatch another disciple to replace Hasan Naraqiyani who is slotted to go to a European country.

5. Congo Brazaville: Mohammad Shahidi, one of Mansuri's disciples, heads the Iranian diplomatic mission.

6. Ethiopia: Iranian Ambassador Bahman Hoseyn Purdashtgholi is one of Mansuri's former disciples in the guard intelligence.

7. Hoseyn Maranaki represents Mansuri and his intellectual line at the Iranian Embassy in Conakry, Guinea.

8. Karshenas, the Iranian consul and intelligence officer in Cyprus, was one of Mansuri's assistants before assuming his current post.

9. The Iranian Embassy in Algeria is controlled by Mansuri through Siavush Zargar-Ya'qubi, Mansuri's special friend and disciple.

In Southeast Asia, there are Iranian diplomatic missions that are run by Professor Mansuri's disciples or in which his disciples operate as advisers or cultural attaches. Of these missions, the following are worth noting:

1. The Iranian Embassy in Thailand, which is run by Mohammad Sazeshkaran, one of Mansuri's followers. It is the main base for exporting the revolution and implementing terrorist schemes against the interests of the Arab countries, especially of Saudi Arabia. AL-DUSTUR noted three weeks ago that the dispatch of Sazeshkaran to Thailand is, in one sense, tantamount to escalating the terrorist activities against the countries that are opposed to domination by Iran's policy. A week after this report was published, a terrorist gang of the Iranian Embassy perpetrated the crime of assassinating three Saudi diplomats in Bangkok.

2. In Manila, the Iranian diplomatic mission is headed by Kamal Sajjadi, the officer formerly in charge of Mansuri's office.

3. The Iranian Embassy in Bangladesh is controlled by Mansuri's disciples, led by Mohammad Ganjidust.

As for Mansuri's supporters and disciples in the Iranian embassies in Europe and America, a number of these people, such as Mohammad Sadri in Cuba, Baqer Asadi in Geneva, Seyyed 'Ali Musavi in Canada, Reza Dokhanatchi in Finland, Mohammad Taqi Mo'ayyed in the Netherlands, and 'Abdollah Zifan in Spain, are in charge of the task of spreading the idea of exporting the revolution through terrorism. Professor Mansuri believes, as he says in his book "Revolution and Diplomacy," that "our glorious revolution can only be exported with grenades and explosives."

## PAKISTAN

### Article Weights Options in Kashmir

46000089C Karachi DAWN in English 27 Feb 90 p 5

[Article by M. B. Naqvi: "Choosing the Option Carefully"]

[Text] Grave crisis in and over Kashmir continues to worry. Kashmiris' campaign against Indian occupation, after having demonstrated their alienation from India-imposed dispensation through an amazingly-complete boycott of November, 1989, elections to the Lok Sabha, shows every sign of going on; as this is being written no newspapers have been published in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK).

India, for its part, faces a moment of truth because the Kashmiri people have, for the first time, convincingly refused to go on acquiescing in Indian domination through truly popular actions. What is going on is a sort of uprising in which, contrary to the subcontinent's ethos, the gun and bomb have made an appearance.

An Indo-Pakistan crisis has also been occasioned. New Delhi has gone on accusing Pakistan of aiding and abetting 'terrorist activity' in IHK. A war of words goes on between these South Asian governments and fears of a possible war have been envisioned. Pakistanis deny any involvement, of course. But that does not impress New Delhi or it has reasons not to be impressed.

Pakistanis doubtless face a difficult situation—made more difficult by domestic political confrontations that are reducing their political life to near anarchy. A section of opinion led by IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] chief, Mr Nawaz Sharif, and ably assisted by Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) President, Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, have all but succeeded in cornering the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government at the Centre with taunts of a 'sell-out' to India and 'doing nothing while Kashmir is burning'. PPP, for its part, has also taken to street demonstrations to affirm its traditional solidarity with the Kashmiris. Demands on the Pakistan Government for stern and resolute action are rising. Most of them are made for reasons of petty politicking, while some romantics press for 'seizing the change of a lifetime.'

The new Indo-Pakistan crisis is possibly the most needless. Pakistan recently sent two emissaries to New Delhi for probing the basis on which the interrupted bilateral business could be resumed. Both returned apparently bearing a message that the Indian Establishment is in no mood for business as usual and wants Pakistan not to do what it perceives as stoking the fires of unrest that are graduating into a rebellion. Pakistan's own mood is definitely peaceable. But the unfortunate facts has to be faced that just as the opposition and ruling party are not really able to talk with one voice, the Government at Islamabad is equally weakened by the PM and President being two parallel power centres with somewhat differing nuances over foreign policy.

For Islamabad it is necessary to put its act together, or course. And in the particular case of Kashmir, it does look as if the change of policy formulation, coordination and execution has been taken over by the President, mostly by default. Meanwhile, high-level confabulations continue: an all-parties conference on Kashmir, was supposed to have been called; a legislators' briefing by intelligence, military and foreign office officials has taken place; and a joint session of Parliament was held on Feb 10 to formulate a national response to the new situation in Kashmir. Even so, some straight thinking is called for.

The Kashmir problem is no longer what it used to be in the 1950s or even in the 1960s. After the signing of the Simla Agreement, Pakistan has contracted with India to

pursue a final solution of the problem through bilateral negotiations or international arbitration provided the two sides agree on the course. It certainly represented an obligation by both sides that only peaceful means would be used in finding a solution to the problem. Both sides remain committed to it. What of the war hysteria, then? Curiously, the Indian reaction to what Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan said over the radio and TV on Jan 30 was sharply critical, although its operative part should have been reassuring: Pakistan remains committed to Simla Agreement. Why Indian reaction was adverse is a different story and shall be looked into presently.

Some super-patriots seem to dislike the Simla Agreement but not many outside the extremist fringe have advocated its annulment. A treaty or agreement between nations lasts only so long as it is in their mutual interest to keep. The Simla Agreement cannot be an exception. But those who advocate its scrapping should be ready to accept the responsibility of thus sending a signal to India that we are no longer bound to seek only a peaceful solution of Kashmir and or other bilateral issues. By the same token, India will also become free to seek a solution by whatever means judged more cost effective.

The lessons of the two wars have, however, to be kept in view: while the purpose of all Pakistani action may have concerned Kashmir, no sooner the general war broke out, the perspective changed and Kashmir slipped into the background: what the upshot of the war will be was always conceived in terms of loss and gain to combatants and Kashmiris were forgotten. Another war on Kashmir between Pakistan and India would not be different. Indeed, that would be the greatest disservice that can be done to the Kashmiris.

The fact of the matter is that the parameters of the Kashmir dispute have now changed. In contrast with the past, the issue now is between the people of Kashmir and the Indian Government. It is indeed mainly an Indian problem. While the Pakistanis are intensely interested in the denouement for obvious reasons, insofar as the main problem is concerned, the Pakistanis are now fundamentally irrelevant. In real life, Pakistanis are politically irrelevant but are emotionally committed—to support the Kashmiris.

Thousand and one affinities between the Pakistanis and Kashmiris in IHK constitute the reason why they cannot remain indifferent. the inevitable conclusion to be drawn is this: Pakistan, through its Government and armed forces, has no role to play while Pakistanis both as freedom-loving people and as those closely concerned with the fate of Kashmiris have every reason to extend moral and political support to the embattled Kashmiris.

The Indian reaction to recent events in Kashmir required to be studied. No one can really mistake the fact that most of the IHK troubles are occasioned by the Kashmiris' disillusionment with things as they have been. Pakistan's contribution could only be minimal. Even those who give credence to the Indian claims that

Pakistanis are aiding and abetting those Kashmiris whom Indians prefer to call terrorists and Pakistan media terms them freedom fighters, would be hard put to it to claim that the Kashmiris' boycott of the elections last Nov too was a Pakistani act?

The truth is that, for the first time, the new dimensions of the Kashmir dispute have become crystal clear and the Indian Government cannot easily cite any justification for its stern military measures: keeping almost the whole Valley under curfew for more than two weeks and throwing out of all foreign journalists etc. Time was when Pakistan provided a justification of sorts; Pakistan's words and actions provided the Indian Government with a cover for its own actions to strengthen Indian hold over the disputed territory—when the dispute was conceived as a territorial one mainly between Pakistan and India. That convenient cover is no longer available to New Delhi. Now that a fundamental change has occurred and the Kashmiris have asserted their own status as the main antagonists, the Indians are unable to cope with the consequence of this new fact: it has become a dispute between the Kashmiris and the Indians in which India can maintain its hold over the territory only through military suppression.

This is the reason why the Indians are desperate to involve the Pakistanis, indeed should even be ready to invite them to fish in the troubled waters. The Pakistani involvement would be Godsend for them. That would be an excellent excuse to internationalise the problem and justify the use of military force. The Indian Establishment would be only too happy to use their big war-machine against Pakistan in order chiefly to obfuscate the newly-emerging clarity of the Kashmir problem. Nothing will suit India better than to keep on pretending that it is a dispute between the two old rivals over a piece of territory. This is why reaction to Sahabzada Yaqub Khan's speech was so vehement.

The Pakistanis need to devise a course of action that would deny India the opportunity for obscuring the new truth about Kashmir. Not only no occasion should be provided for another war between the two countries but even the chance of bringing in Pakistan into the trouble as the main opponent is to be avoided. A clear-cut programme of action, unambiguously adumbrated, should support the Kashmiris in their struggle for freedom. As its dimensions must be clearly and unambiguously non-military—in order to prevent India from finding any excuse to convert the Indo-Kashmiri troubles into India-Pakistan ones. Pakistanis cannot but support the Kashmiris in their hour of need. But the support that is needed is chiefly political and moral—and not in guns and bombs.

#### Symposium Views S&T, Honors Botanist

46000089A Karachi DAWN in English 25 Feb 90 p 3

[Text] Karachi, Feb 24—An International Symposium on 'Plant life of South Asia' was inaugurated on Saturday by Sindh Governor, Justice (retd) Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim.



The symposium is being held under the auspices of Karachi University Botany Department, in connection with the centennial of Dr R R Stewart, a botanist who worked in Pakistan for about 50 years.

Dr Stewart also attended the function.

Mr Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim, in his inaugural address, said that the present Government was pursuing a liberal policy towards science and technology and was trying to achieve the highest targets despite limited resources. He said that the National Science Commission was set up in 1984 but the previous Government kept it in the cold storage.

He said the present Government wanted to revitalise the science policy and assured the audience that the recommendations and suggestions of the symposium would be given serious consideration.

He paid tributes to Dr Stewart on his services as scientist and plant explorer. He said that the Faculty of Science in Karachi University was inspired by Dr Stewart's work and was actively participating in research in various fields.

The meeting was also addressed by Dr Manzooruddin Ahmed, Vice-Chancellor, Karachi University, Dr G M Khattak, former VC of NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] Agricultural University, Peshawar, Dr I C Hedge, Dr R R Stewart and Ms Ellen Stewart, daughter of Prof Stewart and Dr S I Ali, Dean of Faculty of Science, KU.

Dr Manzooruddin Ahmed in his welcome speech, paid tributes to Dr Stewart, saying that his services were unparalleled as a scientist and a social worker. He collected over 60,000 species of plants in Pakistan and Kashmir, during his long stay in Pakistan from 1911 to 1961. He said that the symposium was being held in the honour of Dr Stewart.

He expressed satisfaction on the pace of research work of Karachi University and said that the university was producing the highest number of PhDs and M Phils scholars which could not be produced collectively by all other universities.

When Dr Stewart was invited to speak, the audience gave him a standing ovation. Overwhelmed with sentiments, he said the Pakistani scientists were doing better in the research fields and particularly Dr S I Ali and his companions had displayed great talent in research.

Earlier, Ms Ellen in her speech, recalled the days she had spent in Pakistan with her father and said she still cherished those memories.

The four-day symposium held at Avari Hotel, will continue up to Feb 27. The session on Sunday will start at 9:30 a.m.

President: President Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan extended hearty felicitations to Dr R R Stewart on his 100th

birthday and a warm welcome to the eminent plant scientists, participating at the symposium.

In his message, the President hoped that the celebrations at the symposium will focus on effective measures, required to nurture our plant wealth and to ensure its optimum utilisation.

PM: Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in her message, said the Botany Department of the Karachi University deserves to be felicitated for carrying out useful research in various disciplines of botany and particularly, for compiling a comprehensive account of the flora of Pakistan. Its research work has broadened the base of our knowledge in this field, which we value most.

She conveyed heartiest felicitations to Dr Stewart, who, she said would always remain an inspiring example to the plant scientists.

### Editorial Discusses Change in Sindh Administration

46000089B Karachi DAWN in English 27 Feb 90 p 5

[Editorial: "Change in Sindh"]

[Text] The change in the stewardship of the Sindh administration raises fresh questions about the destiny of Sindh and the way things are managed or mismanaged in what is now Pakistan's most deeply troubled province. That conditions in Sindh have been going from bad to worse and the normal pace and the pattern of life has been shattered beyond belief is a fact that must induce a spot of soul-searching all around, especially on the part of the prime protagonists on the province's political stage. The worsening crime situation, chronic political and ethnic violence, the existence of well-armed militias, a general atmosphere of insecurity and scare and a stagnant economy are all matters that need to be addressed in all seriousness if the citizens have to have some respite from the tension and insecurity of a troubled existence and some light is to be seen at the end of what has so far been a very long, dark and unending tunnel. A question inextricably linked with the resignation of Syed Qaim Ali Shah and the coming in of Mr Aftab Shahban Mirani is: why has fifteen months of democratic rule failed to drive some sanity into the bedlam that has been Sindh for a long time? The central issue is the substance of policies mandated to the provincial administration and, equally important, the execution of those policies. Where exactly the outgoing Sindh administration failed is for the ruling party to determine. If the policies as handed down to the provincial administration were unrealistic, poorly defined or were lacking in coherence, then Syed Qaim Ali Shah's departure will have no meaning; he will be seen as having been sacrificed for no fault of his. On the other hand, if the policies were bold, imaginative and well-formulated and it was the Sindh Chief Minister who failed to implement them effectively enough, one would want to look for concrete results when the new chief of the provincial executive is firmly in the saddle. According to



Mr Mirani, Syed Qaim Ali Shah "did an excellent job: but the desired results could not be obtained because of "what he inherited from the previous dictatorial rule." There may be some substance in this assertion, but the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] was voted into office exactly because the people expected it to get results and steer the province out of what Mr Mirani called "the mess of confusion, insecurity and instability".

The foremost task before the new Chief Minister is clear, if not easy: he has to tackle, intelligently and boldly, the menace of backward-looking nationalism, with its emphasis on exclusiveness, that is eating into the vitals of Sindh. there is no doubt that violence and crime should top the new Chief Minister's list of priorities. Ensuring safety of life, honour and property of every citizen is the first responsibility of any government worth the name. A strong political commitment to law enforcement without fear or favour is bound to produce results sooner or later. However, if durable results are to be produced in this sphere, it is absolutely necessary to develop a strong political trust towards the normalisation of inter-ethnic relations. Without putting an end to Sindh's ethnic conflict even the basic minimum condition for a war on crime and for the restoration of economic activity would not exist. The ruling party's position on the ground is not as solid as its strength in the provincial legislature makes it appear, but it is not hopeless either. Its responsibility toward both the rural and the urban population is enormous and equal, and it can make a headway in that direction only if it succeeds in checking the trend toward ethnic chauvinism that has characterised Sindh for the last so many years. While, on the one hand, it has to contain the extremists within its ranks, it has to develop a working relationship with the Sindh Assembly's other major party, the Mohajir Qaumi Movement. Given the history of relationship between the two and the fact that the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] and a COP [Combined Opposition Parties] component, a political rapprochement is highly unlikely to be effected soon. But most certainly, in the interest of peace and stability in the province, the new Chief Minister will have to be on speaking terms with the MQM leadership. This is needed not for some distant

political goal but for achieving the very minimum conditions for a return to social normality. The people of Sindh want nothing more than that they be allowed to pursue the rhythm of daily life peacefully and that schools, colleges, offices, factories, shops, harbour, airport, railway stations all should function normally. This is not asking for the moon—if only the ruling party addresses itself single-mindedly to this task. Of course, an equal responsibility falls on the MQM, too, for whatever its differences with the PPP, it has no choice but to show common sense and cooperate with the Government in checking the rapid slide into anarchy. Its voters and followers have a permanent stake in Sindh's peace and stability and in the welfare and contentment of all the people of the province. Surely the Mohajirs cannot enjoy peace and stability and contentment if their compatriots do not. The same holds good for other parties and groups, for such is Sindh's demographic reality that wicked elements in any party or group can manage to trigger violence and perpetuate lawlessness.

In his crusade to set things right, the new Chief Minister will need the cooperation and understanding of all sections of society. The office he holds is not very enviable. Many events occur because they occur—there is hardly any other explanation. The syndrome of violence and counter-violence must be broken. The new chief executive has to seek and enlist the cooperation of all the break this trend. Where mischief is caused by terrorists or agents provocateurs people will have to be convinced that such was the case. the law enforcement agencies, too, need to be geared up. Above all, the new Chief Minister would need a free hand to run his province. The fact that Sindh and the Centre have the same ruling party should be a source of strength for the province's chief executive rather than a liability. It a fair chance is to be given to the new stewardship, the federal impulse to interfere in matters of administrative detail must be firmly checked. Once the provincial leadership is allowed a free hand within the parameters of the Constitution, the principle of accountability becomes fully applicable. With autonomy goes responsibility, and only those functioning autonomously can account for all their acts and omissions.

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